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Chapter 1
Introduction, research 
questions and key concepts
1.1. Introduction
The importance of environmental problems has long been acknowledged. 
Governments have responded to this, particularly since the late 1960s by 
 introducing an increasing amount of environmental regulation. The expansion 
of environmental regulation has meant that new activities have come under 
regulation and the range of matters pertaining to already regulated activities has 
become wider. Not only environmental regulation but also regulation in general 
has grown. The increased amount of regulation relates to the development of 
the modern state and started well before 1960s.1 However, the expansion of 
environmental regulation has been particularly strong during the last 30–40 
years and it has become one of the broadest areas of regulation.2 New regulation 
continues to emerge each year.
While environmental regulation has expanded, it has also changed in 
qualitative terms. Internationalisation and the emergence of new regulatory 
instruments are among the most important trends. Internationalization has 
not, however, meant that the relevance of national regulation has disappeared; 
most of the regulation affecting individual firms or citizens is still national. 
Instead, it has meant that the stimulus for a regulatory change emanates more 
and more often from sources outside the national state. Globalisation, which 
refers to the globalisation of firms, markets and regulation3 as well as that of 
environmental problems, affects the development of environmental regula-
tion in many different ways. The globalisation of firms may influence the ef-
. Tala 1999, 2–7
. Ministry of Justice 2003, 55.
. Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 8–9.
0
fectiveness of previous regulation. Liberalization of trade requires new kinds 
of environmental control. Global environmental problems, climate change 
being a major example, require global responses and the increased importance 
of human rights is related to procedural aspects of environmental regulation. 
The notion that globalization affects the governance structures directly and 
indirectly has been captured by the concept of multilevel governance, which 
leaves a role for a variety of market, governmental and other actors at different 
levels.4 Until now international influences have been particularly strong with 
regard to substantial environmental matters, whereas procedures and administrat-
ive structures have been to larger extent in the hands national government. 
However, globalisation has also advanced decentralization trends. In sum, 
globalisation has many important and fundamental implications for national 
environmental regulation.
Global environmental regulation continues to be poorly developed in 
comparison to regional or national regulation. Though global international law 
has significantly expanded,5 there is no institution at the global level comparable 
to the European Union. No global institution has such extensive regulatory 
responsibilities with regard to the environment as well as other issues and no 
global institution produces new legislation at the same rate as the European 
Union does. For the member states of the European Union, the regulatory 
process at the European level has become increasingly important both in 
terms of ambition and basic structures of regulation. In substantial terms, new 
regulatory instruments, which aim to avoid the problems seen as inherent in 
old ones, are changing regulation. Some new regulatory instruments are based 
on better employment of market forces, whereas others rely on information and 
self-regulation. As a result, the variety of instruments in use has become greater 
than before.
At the same time as the rapid expansion of regulation, concerns about 
its quality have increased.6 The issues of quality of regulation have attracted 
increasing attention among various actors. The OECD has a long tradition of 
working in the field.7 In the European Union problems of regulation are treated 
as a part of good governance8 and have resulted in different kinds of activities.9 
At the level of national government the improvement of regulation has long 
been a key topic. The increasing amount of regulation, which is common to 
many fields of regulation, is one reason behind quality problems. In addition, 
. See e.g. Winter 2006, 11–13.
. Birnie and Boyle 2002.
. Council of State Experts Group for the Planning and Management for Law-making (Valtio-
neuvoston lainvalmistelun suunnittelun ja johtamisen kehittämistyöryhmä) 2005, 23–25.
. See e.g. OECD 2003a.
. European Commission COM (2001) 428.
. See European Commission SEC (2004) 1153 for an overview of recent development.

environmental regulation can be assumed to be particularly vulnerable to 
quality problems due to the complicated nature of environmental problems, 
uncertainty of causal links between problems and responses, the highly 
technical nature of regulation, partly unforeseeable linkages between different 
pieces of regulation and long time-lags before eventual impacts take place. From 
this it follows that it is not easy to design perfect regulation and unintended 
side-effects emerge from time to time. Due to these problems quality issues 
have been and will continuously be on the regulatory agenda. The changing 
environmental problems—or changing perceptions of them—are one factor 
behind regulatory reforms, but new understanding of the quality of regulation 
also spurs regulatory reforms.
The worries about the quality of regulation relate to all stages of the 
regulatory process, the quality of the preparatory process,10 the regulatory texts 
and impacts regulation causes. It has, however, been noted that it is easier to 
achieve consensus on how regulation should be prepared and when the quality 
of regulatory texts are good than agree what the impacts are and whether they 
should be considered positive and desirable or negative and undesirable.11 This 
stresses the importance of investigating the impacts of regulation. Thus it is 
not surprising that in policy papers at all levels the need for evaluation of the 
impacts of regulation has frequently been stressed, in particular since the 1990s. 
This is true with regard to regulation in general12 as well as environmental 
regulation in particular.13
Though the evaluation of impacts is stressed in policy papers, the impacts 
of regulation are rather seldom adequately anticipated during the preparation 
processes of new legislation.14 The insufficient amount of retrospective 
evaluations has long been acknowledged in Finland,15 and in 2003 the small 
number of evaluations, in particular retrospective evaluations, was still 
considered a problem.16 Only few evaluations of environmental policies were 
0. On the criticism of the quality of preparation of legislation and proposals for development in 
Finland, see Council of State Experts Group for the Planning and Management for Law-making 
2005, 23–33 and 50–83.
. Ministry of Justice 2003, 55–56.
. Council of State Programme for the Development of Law-making 1996 and Council of State 
Programme for the Development of Law-making II, 2000.
. For example Article 10. The Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European 
Community 2002–2012, Decision No 1600/2002/EC, Article 10. A working group on evaluation 
has developed a systematic evaluation approach for the Ministry of the Environment 2001. A 
Ministry led evaluation on the Environmental Protection Act, Ministry of the Environment 
2003.
. Ervasti ja Tala 1996, 11, Ervasti, Tala and Castrén 2000, 113–115, Tala 2001, 48–50, Council of 
State Experts Group for the Planning and Management for Law-Drafting (Valtioneuvoston 
lainvalmistelun suunnittelun ja johtamisen kehittämistyöryhmä) 2005, 16.
. Harrinvirta, Uusikylä ja Virtanen 1998, 79
. OECD 2003a, 59.

made before 2000 although thereafter the number has increased.17 The research 
undertaken so far represents a variety of different approaches, though they 
all can be considered to belong to social environmental research. Despite the 
rather small number of evaluations of environmental policy, the literature 
on regulation in general is rich, and not least so in the field of environmental 
regulation. Both lawyers18 and other social scientists have contributed to 
this literature. Although the legal research tradition in Finland, as well as 
internationally in general, is mainly focused on issues related to systematization 
and interpretation of law, there are an increasing number of legal studies, where 
regulatory and empirical issues have been pinpointed.19 Furthermore, the 
distinction between the normative legal research and the regulatory approach 
towards law is not strict, because the perspectives are interlinked.20
This study focuses particularly on the Finnish environmental regulation. 
Finland was rated number one according to the environmental sustainability 
index in 2005.21 Good air and water quality were mentioned as particular 
reasons for the excellent rating. The rating is based on indicators, which means 
that it does not give reasons why Finland has been so successful. Hence the 
rating leaves open whether the good quality of air and water, for instance, is 
due to governmental interventions or due to other factors, like low population 
density.22 This study aims to provide new insights on how the Finnish regulatory 
machinery has worked.
1.2. Research questions
The general theme of this study is the relationship between environmental 
regulation and its impacts. In particular, the research aims to identify and 
analyse how key features of regulation are relevant for the impacts. The issue 
of impacts is approached retrospectively which means that the focus is on the 
impacts already occurred. From this it follows that the research also covers 
regulation which has changed since the regulatory decisions relevant to the 
impacts have been made. Furthermore, it looks at the regulatory change to 
increase the understanding of what kind of regulatory instruments have been 
. For example Määttä, K. 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, Sairinen 2000, Hildén   et  al. 2001, 
Ympäristöjuriidiikka 1/2003 (a special issue on the reform of environmental law), Hildén et al. 
2002, Similä 2002, Mickwitz 2006.
. For example Ogus 1994a, Gunningham and Grabosky 1998, Hilson 2000, Ogus and Abbot 
2002, Gunningham 2002, Driesen 2003.
. Määttä, K. 1997, Tala 1999, Tala 2001 and Ervasti 2004.
0. Parker et al. 2004.
. Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy et al. 2005.
. In the executive summary of the report it is pointed out that all 5 top countries have substantial 
natural resource endowments and low population density. Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy et al. 2005.

actually used. It aims to improve our understanding of how the legal regulation 
in Finland works and has developed and so provide a better basis for future 
development. One may call this approach legally-oriented.23
Impacts of regulation is a broad term referring to numerous issues. In this 
study, the focus is on three criteria of merit, namely effectiveness, efficiency 
and impacts on innovations. Effectiveness of regulation refers to achievement 
of policy goals. Effective regulation makes it possible to fully achieve the goals, 
whereas ineffectiveness of regulation means that the goals are not at all or only 
partially achieved. Efficiency has many meanings but throughout this research 
it refers to cost-effectiveness unless otherwise stated. Cost-effective regulation 
is regulation that “produces” desirable outcomes at least costs in relation to 
 alternative types of regulation. Another way of using the term efficiency would 
be to use it to refer to allocative efficiency (or Pareto efficiency) which concerns 
the satisfaction of individual preferences.24 Regulation would be allocatively 
 efficient if it created a situation where no change of regulation could be made 
to satisfy one person’s preferences at the expense of some other party. Impacts 
on innovations, instead, refers to technological change. Regulation may affect 
technological change in two different ways. It may induce new technological 
innovations or it may diffuse existing innovations.
The general research question is what implications follow from different 
forms of regulation in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and impacts on 
innovations. No doubt the three criteria are not the only criteria relevant for 
the discussion on the impacts of regulation,25 and some other criteria are even 
referred to in various places in the study. It is not possible to make an exhaustive 
list of possible criteria, and what criteria should be used depends on the context 
and purpose of evaluation.
After stating this, it can be noted that particularly effectiveness and 
efficiency are among the most commonly used criteria for evaluations of 
regulation. Effectiveness, the ability of regulation to foster environmental 
protection, and efficiency, the costs of regulation related to policy goals, have 
traditionally been considered crucial factors when the need for regulatory 
. To point out the differences of approaches to study regulation Kalle Määttä has made a distinction 
between economics orientated and legally orientated approaches. Määttä, K. 1997, 3.
. Cooter and Ulen 2004, 15–17. An alternative for Pareto efficiency would be Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. This is based on an idea that situation B is preferable to situation A, if those benefiting 
from the change from A to B can give a compensation to others so that all will be better off in 
situation B. Kanninen, Määttä and Timonen 1996, 13.
. Määttä, K. (1997, 15–19) uses environmental effectiveness, flexibility, efficiency and equity as 
criteria (though his language slightly differs. What I call evaluation criteria, he calls regulatory 
standards) and Baldwin and Cave (1999) use efficiency, legislative mandate, accountability, due 
process and use of expertise criteria whereas Hildén et al. (2002, 18) employ 10 criteria, which 
are relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, acceptability, transparency and participation 
rights, equity, flexibility, predictability and sustainability.

reform has been discussed. The role of these criteria for decision-making has 
not always been and will not remain the same. Recently the role of innovations 
has increasingly attracted the attention of researchers26 as well as policy makers. 
This is based on a simple observation that in the long run both effectiveness 
and efficiency largely depend on the emergence of innovations making possible 
something that is not achievable today.
In terms of environmental problems, the core of this research lies in water 
and air pollution from industrial activities. Though the relative role of pollution 
from point sources has decreased in the last two decades in comparison to other 
sources of environmental harms, point sources still emit significant amounts of 
certain pollutants in certain areas.27 Furthermore, pollution control regulation 
is particularly interesting, because the diversity of regulatory techniques used 
to solve pollution issues is wide. It would be hard to find another field of 
environmental regulation which could give a better basis for the understanding 
of regulatory change.
To put traditional regulation in a wider perspective a literature review of 
environmental regulation research is carried out. The literature is explored from 
the perspectives of the above mentioned three criteria, namely effectiveness, 
efficiency and impacts on innovations. The focus of the review is on the critical 
analysis of traditional regulation. However, in order to have a point of reference, 
this type of regulation is compared to economic instruments. Furthermore, 
issues of transparency and accountability are briefly discussed. The literature 
review gives useful theoretical insights on how regulatory instruments work and 
is useful as such. Still, it remains an insufficient attempt in that only the basic 
models are analysed. The exact formulation of regulatory instruments in the real 
world may differ in various ways from the basic models, which are often relevant 
for the impacts of regulation. This is why the analysis of the detailed formulation 
of policy instruments in one country, now Finland, deserved to be explored.
The expansion of regulation and the change towards new instruments 
was observed in the introduction as a key element of general development. 
This change is relevant with regard to all three evaluation criteria used. The 
expansion of regulation is explored on the basis of material concerning annually 
adopted legislation. Furthermore, the extent to which new instruments have 
been adopted is relevant for this study, likewise the extent to which regulation 
has become Europeanized. The regulatory change alone does not tell to which 
extent it has cause a change. This is why the impacts of new instruments are 
explored using the results of empirical research.
. E.g. Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 2000.
. On the development of air emissions, see Air Pollution Control Programme 2010, on the 
development of water effluents, see Finnish Environment Institute 2006, generally on pollution 
load, see Hakala and Välimäki 2003, 340–357.

The impacts of regulation depend in particular on what kinds of standards 
it employs and hence special attention is paid for the standards and their 
implications. Standards are analysed in two phases. First it is asked what kind 
of implications in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and impacts on innovations 
can generally be associated with certain kinds of standards? Thereafter, the 
standards used in the Finnish air and water pollution regulation are studied. 
The investigation covers sectoral air and water pollution standards prior to 
2000 as well the integrated permit mechanism. The aim is to identify which are 
the key features of standard setting mechanism and discuss the implications of 
these features with regard to effectiveness and efficiency.
The impacts of regulation do not appear automatically and the actual 
impacts depend on how regulation is implemented and enforced and what the 
responses of those regulated and other actors are.28 Empirical material is used to 
complement theoretical analyses. This study employs empirical material related 
to standard-setting as well as the responses of industry. An empirical analysis 
of the influences of water pollution regulation on technological development 
is presented. The chosen field of industry is pulp and paper mills, which have 
traditionally been major sources of water pollution in Finland. Taking into 
account the different character of regulated industries, the findings related 
to this sector may not be directly applicable to other sectors. However, the 
sector is used as an example to show the implications of particular features of 
Finnish pollution control regulation. The integration of the permit mechanism 
in 2000 aimed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. The 
basic mechanisms by which integration should increase effectiveness and 
efficiency are identified. The way in which the different traditions of water and 
air pollution control have modified the new integrated system is explored. The 
mechanisms for increased effectiveness and efficiency are assessed based on 
empirical material.
1.3. Outline of the study
The study is divided into three main parts. The first part consists of two 
chapters. In this introductory chapter research questions and key concepts are 
presented. The second chapter draws on the literature for key characteristics 
of different types of regulatory instruments. It works at a general level without 
specific reference to the Finnish regulation and aims to provide a theoretical 
basis for the analysis of regulation in one country in the coming chapters. 
Theoretical analysis and comparison do not produce final answers to regulatory 
problems, though they provide intellectual tools for research and a context 
. Tala 2001, 286–336.
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for observations. A typology of regulatory instruments is presented, different 
kinds of standards of traditional regulation are analysed and finally traditional 
regulation is compared to other regulatory instruments using three criteria 
mentioned as the basis for structuring the discussion.
The second part consists of two chapters, both focusing mainly on 
national pollution control regulation concerning point sources. While Chapter 
3 starts from more general notions on the development of environmental 
regulation, it specifically aims to offer an understanding of the recent 
development of environmental regulation relevant to industrial pollution. 
Legislative development and variation in the amount of legislation in different 
environmental sectors, its Europeanization and regulatory shift towards new 
instruments are explored on the basis of statistical information since 1988. The 
issue whether the observed legislative change is relevant for the substantial 
goals of environmental policy is discussed. Thereafter on the basis of literature 
the extent to which the improved environmental performance of industrial 
activities in Finland can be associated with alternatives to traditional regulation 
is discussed. This helps to put traditional regulation—the instrument assumed 
to have the greatest impacts—in a broader context.
The focus of the fourth—and longest—chapter is on the environmental 
permit system, which is a traditional form of regulation concerning pollution 
control from point sources. This chapter, unlike Chapter 2, aims to reveal 
effectiveness, efficiency and innovations issues on the basis of the analysis of 
the legal regulation in one country, namely Finland. Before going to specific 
topics related to environmental permits, a general overview of the permit 
mechanisms is provided. The development of the legal framework for pollution 
control, with particular focus on air and water pollution, is presented. The 
examination covers previous sectoral regulation and ends up with integrated 
pollution control regulation. The first substantial topic is the implications of 
water and air pollution standards for effectiveness and efficiency prior to the 
adoption of integrated permit mechanism. The goal of this topic is to investigate 
how the legal framework modifies the general nature of standards and what 
implications follow from this in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. A second 
topic explored is the influences of permits on technological development. This 
investigation is limited to water pollution permits and is based on empirical 
material. The analysis is divided into two parts. First the key elements of the 
regulatory approach are explored and thereafter the impacts on the pulp and 
paper industry are evaluated on the basis of the material collected. The third 
topic is integrated pollution control and aims, in particular, to understand 
whether the goals of integrated permitting, namely increased effectiveness and 
efficiency, have been achieved. To accomplish this task the legislative material 
relevant for integrated pollution control is studied so that exact goals and 
mechanisms for how goals are intended to be achieved, can be identified. Also, 

as a continuation of the first topic, the legal framework for standard setting 
under an integrated pollution control mechanism is explored, taking into 
account the previous analysis of sectoral regulation. Thereafter, the mechanisms 
to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of pollution control are discussed 
first on a general level and then on the basis of the material gathered. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn and the findings discussed.
The third part, namely Chapter 5, has two different goals. The first goal 
is to present the main results as a summary of previous chapters. The second 
goal is to discuss, in the light of the results obtained, the future development of 
environmental regulation with specific attention to environmental permits.
1.4. Theoretical approaches and concepts
Regulation is a multidisciplinary research topic. It has attracted the attention 
of scientists representing disciplines such as law, economics, sociology and 
political science.29 Each discipline even covers several approaches. Economic 
theory has remarkably influenced the research of regulation,30 though not 
all researchers of regulation would like to commit themselves to all the 
assumptions and concepts of this research tradition. Some scholars prefer to 
speak about a theory of legislation31 instead of a theory of regulation, though in 
terms of research questions, multidisciplinary approaches and methods used, 
there seems to be much in common between the theory of regulation and that 
of legislation. The proximity of the concepts becomes clear, when one thinks 
of the general purpose of research and uses the results.32 A significant part of 
the ‘better regulation’ discussion relates to the question how (hard and soft) 
law could be improved, and, for example, in this context it may be difficult to 
make a meaningful distinction between these two theories. However, theory 
of regulation may be—as will be discussed later—restricted to a certain kind 
of legal regulation and theory of legislation, instead, excludes non-legislative 
means outside its interest. An attempt to apply legal theory to the study of 
legislation has also been made. This attempt calls itself legisprudence and aims, 
unlike jurisprudence, to look at law from the perspective of the legislator.33
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The issues of effectiveness and efficiency are at the core of regulatory 
research, though regulatory studies are by no means limited to these issues. 
Public interest theory of regulation and private interest theory of regulation34 
aim to understand the emergence and development of regulation. However, it 
is also possible to explore the impacts of regulation without trying to explain 
why the regulation has taken the form and content it has. Within another 
multidisciplinary research tradition, namely evaluation research, specific 
methods and approaches to assess impacts of policy has been developed.35 This 
research tradition should not be seen as an alternative to regulatory studies, but 
as a complement. Seen from the regulatory studies point of view, evaluation 
research has developed theoretical concepts and tools, which are useful for an 
analysis concerning the impacts of regulation. The evaluation literature does 
not aim to produce a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon studied, 
like the behaviour of regulated firms, although evaluators, as representatives 
of multidisciplinary research, may partly base their questions, methods an 
conclusions on traditional disciplines, such as economics. Instead, the concepts 
and tools of evaluation research have mainly a methodological role—they 
aim to help to design and implement a research project. The understanding 
of the phenomenon studied is, in this research tradition, based on empirical 
observations. The problem with the empirical approach may be that the 
empirical data accessible is not necessarily sufficient to establish causal links 
between causes and consequences. This may be due to various reasons, such 
as the impact problem, which will be discussed later. Availability of data may 
also impose restrictions on empirical research. It may be difficult to obtain all 
the necessary documents from private companies, not to mention information 
which never achieved written form. When the empirical data is insufficient, 
theoretical analysis may help to interpret weak signals arising from the material. 
In the case of a lack of any empirical results a theoretical analysis may be 
the only alternative. In other words, theoretical approaches, like those of law 
and economics, which aim to analyse the general features of regulation based 
on economic reasoning, may contribute to empirical evaluation. Regulatory 
studies aims to benefits from both types of research.
1.4.1 The concept of regulation
The concept of regulation is a flexible term with many definitions.36 Selzenick has 
often been considered to capture the essential meaning of regulation by defining 
regulation as a ‘sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over 
. Ogus 1994a, 3–4.
. On evaluation see e.g. Vedung 1997 and Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey 1999.
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activities that are valued by a community’.37 The expression ‘valued activities’ aims 
to exclude the issues of criminal law and justice from the concept of regulation. 
Manufacturing, for instance, is something society values, though it causes 
pollution and, thus, needs to be controlled. ‘Control’ indicates that regulation 
aims to direct the behaviour of those regulated towards desirable goals. Thus, this 
can be seen to in contrast with the facilitative functions of private law.38
Regulation is often divided into economic and social regulation,39 which 
is an appropriate distinction so long as Selzenick’s definition of regulation is 
followed. Economic regulation aims to guarantee the functioning of markets. 
For example competition law is part of economic regulation. Instead, the regula-
tion aiming to foster public interests, like health and safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection is called social regulation. Market 
failures are broadly considered an economic justification for both types of 
regulation, whereas regulatory failures may prevent the achievement of optimal 
environmental outcomes of regulatory activity.40 The insufficiency of private 
law to effectively define rights and responsibilities41 can be considered to be 
an institutional origin of environmental problems and environmental, often 
public law based, regulation is a response to this deficiency.42 However, through 
the materialisation of private law the borderline between public and private 
law has somewhat dissolved. Private law may recognize and reflect, albeit with 
reservations, public interests.43
Hilson has made an attempt to define environmental regulation based on 
Selzenick’s general definition. He identifies three main problems in Selzenick’s 
definition with regard to environmental issues. First he notes that environmental 
regulation covers some non-valued activities (fly tipping) and may employ non-
regulatory criminal law. Secondly, though “sustained and focused control” 
implies continuity common in environmental regulation, there are also “one-
off ” activities controlled by environmental law. Furthermore, Hilson would 
like to include self-regulation, which is another tool to deliver regulatory goals, 
under the concept of regulation. Hilson ends up with a definition of regulation 
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which also includes the European dimension, and is as follows: regulation 
means “control exercised by a non-police public body over the activities of 
individuals, firms or member states in order to achieve defined goals; or control 
by firms of their own activities to achieve such goals.”44
Often regulation is seen as something that government does. This view is 
challenged by a decentred understanding of regulation, which is connected to 
globalisation and pluralisation of regulation in terms of actors, techniques and 
goals. According to Julia Black, decentred understanding stems from regulatory 
failure related to five factors: complexity of causal interaction between actors, 
fragmentation of knowledge, but also power and control, interdependencies 
between social actors as well as between them and government, autonomy 
and ungovernability of actors, and rejection of a clear distinction between 
private and public. Decentred regulation ‘happens’ in the absence of formal 
legal sanction. According to Black, regulation does not aim solely to correct 
market failures but also aims to pursue other goals, like legitimacy, and/or the 
achievement of social justice.45 The notion that regulation does not need to be 
a governmental activity puts also activities carried out solely by private actors, 
namely self-regulation, under the concept of regulation. The Responsible Care 
programme is a well known example of self-regulation.46 It is a sustained and 
focused attempt to alter environmentally harmful behaviour, and entails the 
use of rules and other means.
Regulation and, in particular, regulatory law as concepts are bound to a 
socio-linguistic community, namely that of the English-speaking world. As 
Julia Black notes, ‘there is often no parallel word or even concept’ to ‘regulation’ 
outside English-speaking countries.47 While explaining the concept, Ogus 
points out that regulation relates to the aims of the state to correct market 
failures in order to meet collective or public interest goals. According to him, 
in some countries there is a special field of law which governs the instruments 
used for this purpose, namely Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht in Germany 
and droit  public  économique in France, though in English legal culture the 
expressions ‘regulation’ and ‘regulatory law’ are used instead.48 The German and 
French expressions suggest that the comparable Finnish branch of law could 
be talousoikeus’ which, indeed, has existed. Furthermore, this field of law has 
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a link to environmental regulation. Talousoikeus covers a broad area of issues, 
including maa- ja vesioikeus (land and water law), and modern environmental 
law has its roots in land and water law.49 However, there has been little research 
and discussion under the label of talousoikeus for a long period of time.50 Hence, 
it would be artificial and unnecessary to use this as a comparable concept. In 
fact, Finland seems to be among those countries not having a good parallel 
term or concept for ‘regulation’ or ‘regulatory law’ as it is used by Selzenick and 
others. However, the content of the concept seems also to vary among English 
speakers51 and ‘regulation’ could be broadly translated into ‘sääntely’52.
To me environmental regulation (ympäristösääntely) refers to an attempt by 
a public authority to alter or maintain the behaviour of others in order to protect 
the environment. Environmental regulation can be seen as a governmental 
response to market failures. Though its primary goal relates to the protection 
of the environment, it must also meet requirements related to democracy and 
Rechtstaat, which may or may not be in conformity with an effective and efficient 
response to market failures. In this sense, it can be said that it also serves other 
public goals. There is no need to link environmental regulation solely to business 
activities by definition; though in practice it is usually economic activities 
which are regulated. Environmental regulation may take the form of private 
law depending on the intention of the legislator. If a legislator53 intends to use 
liability as a means to promote the protection of the environment, then it can be 
considered as a regulatory instrument for environmental policy.
For the purposes of this study, non-governmental regulation is excluded 
from the scope of regulation. Regulation is here understood as an attempt made 
by a public authority. This means that self-regulation in its pure form is beyond 
the concept, unless government is involved by giving a legal framework or 
otherwise. A major justification for this is that principles such as transparency, 
accountability and justice do not apply in a similar way to non-governmental 
regulation as they do to governmental regulation.
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1.4.2 Goals of pollution control regulation
Pollution control regulation aims to prevent and reduce pollution as stated in 
EC Treaty and many other legal documents. The notion that pollution should be 
prevented whenever possible and reduced in any case to an absolute minimum 
to avoid harmful effects still leaves open what the desirable level of pollution in 
a specific situation should be. Although pollution may have effects which are 
not acceptable regardless the costs (like serious health effects), in many cases 
the question of what the absolute minimum is, is open to debate. Next I briefly 
overview matters relevant in the finding of desirable pollution levels.
Perhaps it would be wrong to argue that all environmental policy measures 
are based on natural science. However, all policy measures aiming to solve 
environmental problems need information on ecology as well as on technological 
possibilities to prevent or diminish those problems.54 Some sort of information 
and understanding between causes and effects is required before a problem is 
even identified as an environmental problem. The causal relationship between 
anthropogenic sources of pollution and ecological effects might, in a simple 
case, be linear, which means that one unit increase of pollution causes one unit 
increase of damage without other implications. In this case, there is no qualitative 
change and information about the causal relationship does not make any level of 
pollution more desirable than any other. Less pollution would always be better. 
However, natural science may provide information about focal points to which 
policy goals might be linked. Ecological thresholds, which have defined as “the 
points at which there is an abrupt change in an ecosystem quality, property or 
phenomenon, or where small changes in an environmental driver produce 
large responses in the ecosystem” are examples of such focal points.55 The 
concept of critical load, used in the context of the Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, is an example of an ecological threshold. However, 
though this kind of knowledge about qualitative changes is useful, while the level 
of environmental protection is decided, it does not show what the level should 
be. It is not possible to draw normative conclusions from scientific facts. In other 
words, nature does not tell humans what to do.56 Neither does technological 
information on the possible ways to reduce environmental pollution show what 
the level of environmental protection should be.
The precautionary principle, deeply rooted in the existing law and policy,57 
has changed the role of scientific facts in decision-making. The lack of full 
evidence of the existence of detrimental environmental effects should not 
prevent the taking of environmental protection measures. In practice this 
. Sterner 2003, 67.
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means a move towards probabilistic approaches, where it is accepted that policy 
can be based on best but still somewhat uncertain scientific facts. This further 
stresses the notion that natural science can not provide full basis what the 
desirable pollution level should be.
One could claim that efforts to reduce pollution should be increased so 
far as the benefits from the reduction of pollution to society at large outweigh 
the costs of such efforts. This is the approach adopted by economists.58 They 
consider that an optimal level of environmental protection would be one where 
marginal costs are equal with marginal benefits. This refers to a situation where 
perfect allocative efficiency is achieved. So far as marginal costs are less than 
marginal benefits an increase of effort to reduce pollution causes more benefit 
than it requires costs. As a point of departure, the idea of having a balance 
between costs and benefits is a step in the right direction and, in practice, it has 
had major implications in the making of environmental policy. However, there 
are a number of problems which make it difficult to know when marginal cost 
and benefits are equal.59
Economic analysis tends to use market information as a basis for 
valuation. With regard to the costs of environmental protection, market exists; 
environmental protection requires the adoption of new technologies and 
technologies have a market price. This gives a basis for the assessment of costs. 
However, it does not mean that the assessment of costs is always correct. It has 
often been noted that ex ante assessment of costs tends to be higher than ex post 
assessment, although the opposite may also turn out to be true in individual 
cases. One of the reasons for the tendency to overestimate costs is that the 
emergence of technological innovations is difficult to predict, not to mention 
the price of not-yet-emerged technologies.60 Other reasons, like omission or 
inaccuracy of data or accuracy of it, and the strategic behaviour of regulated 
industries, also contribute to this.61
In some cases, the uncertainty of environmental effects may make the 
assessment of costs next to impossible. If one does not know what the actual 
environmental effects of pollution are, knowing the costs of measures intended 
to reduce possible undesirable effects becomes an extremely complicated matter. 
Climate change is a case in point. There is sound evidence that the temperature 
will rise due to climate house gases, but estimates of what will follow from 
this in terms of human economy vary from negligible to significant changes, 
which could involve an increase of extreme weather conditions, significant 
impacts on the agricultural patterns, a rise in the sea level and large scale 
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migration. At this level of uncertainty cost estimates, which also cover the costs 
of adjustment, cannot be precise. Uncertainty of predictions does not mean that 
economic assessments are not valuable, as two recent examples clearly show. 
The former assessment indicates that the costs of the technologies required for 
the implementation of climate change policy are not high,62 and the latter that 
the benefits of decisive and timely action far outweigh the economic costs of not 
acting.63 No doubt these are valuable contributions to the political discussion, 
but they do not show what the exact level of pollution should be.
The estimation of cost may be challenging, but that of benefits is even 
more so. The main reason for this is the fact that there is no market for public 
goods and hence no market prices for them. This makes the evaluation of the 
benefits of environmental protection much more difficult than that of costs. 
Despite this, methods for evaluation have been developed, like contingent 
valuation, which is based on surveys to elicit the willingness of respondents to 
pay for environmental protection.64 This method, however, is only the second 
best alternative, and it does not abolish the fact that there are no prices for 
public goods. Respondents may respond in strategic ways to surveys and their 
response is not only dependent on the values of different people but also on the 
information available to them. Values that do not directly benefit anybody (like 
the protection of the habitats of no well-known species) could be particularly 
underrated.
Although costs and benefits could be assessed, a cost-benefit analysis does 
not necessarily tell what the desirable level of pollution is. Assessment of costs 
and benefits often happens at aggregate level. This means that the variation 
in how costs and benefits are distributed between different social groups or 
regions remains unclear.65 Although economic analysis may be able to show 
geographical variation of costs and benefits, it is not possible that a desirable 
level and fair distribution of pollution could be found in this way. For example, 
an assessment of the effects of pollution on the property rights in different parts 
the Baltic Sea could show that the impacts of pollution measured in economic 
terms in those areas which are already polluted (and inhabited by poor people) 
are not so significant as in those areas which are not polluted (and inhabited 
by rich people), because property values vary. If such were the result, it would 
not be clear whether the most allocatively efficient policy option should also be 
considered fair and just with regard to those people who are living in polluted 
areas and whose property values have already fallen due to previous pollution or 
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other reasons.66 Hence, the issues of social justice—or those of environmental 
justice as they often are called67—are involved in decision-making. The notion 
that other means of public policy (like progressive income tax) than pollution 
control regulation may be better tools to promote social justice does not solve 
the problem. The decision-makers still need to find the right balance between 
environmental policy measures and other measures.
Another economic approach would be that of cost-effectiveness 
evaluation. As noted above, efficiency is used in this study to refer to cost-
effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness analysis aims to produce information about 
the efficiency of alternative regulatory instruments. Hence, it does not produce 
information what the goals of regulation should be, but what means should be 
used to achieve the given goals.68
In sum, we are in a situation where neither natural science nor economics 
can provide definite answers as to what the desirable level of pollution should 
be. From the notion that there is no unique, uncontested method to produce 
information for the determination of pollution levels it does not follow that all 
information is useless. The notion presented by economists with regard to cost-
benefit analysis that it “has a potentially important role to play in helping to 
inform regulatory decision-making, although it should not be the sole basis for 
such decision-making”69 can be applied to other kinds of information producing 
methods as well. In fact, there are even more disciplines, including legal analyses, 
which are able to produce useful information for practical political solutions. 
Special reference needs to be made to evaluation research, which deliberately sets 
out to provide information to improve governmental intervention. Retrospective 
evaluation may produce information relevant for the determination of goals of 
future regulation, if its results show, say, that the goals already set have been 
achieved with fewer resources or, alternatively, with greater side-effects than 
expected. Despite the fact that numerous different disciples may turn out to 
be useful for the determination of goals of environmental regulation, the final 
decision is and will remain a political judgement which involves not only facts 
but also moral and political considerations.
One c an approach the role of different kinds of information using the 
idea that a public policy process is understood as a process consisting of several 
stages in never ending succession. The stages include initiation, preparation, 
policy decision, administration, output, outcome and then—after feedback—
again initiation, preparation, policy decision and so on. From this perspective 
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one could think that ecological knowledge often precipitates the initiation of 
intervention, whereas ex ante evaluation is used at the preparatory stage and 
retrospective ex post evaluation as a part of a feedback mechanism after the 
decision is made. This is, however, idealisation in the sense that in reality new 
information of whatever kind may influence the governance process at any 
stage. Governmental intervention and retrospective evaluation can be seen as 
two different subprocesses of the larger political-administrative governance 
system, where evaluation is a part of general administrative control.70 One could 
extend the idea of the subprocesses of the general governance system to other 
information producing systems than policy evaluation. Information produced 
prior to decision-making under different disciplines, such as natural science 
and economics, could also be seen as subprocesses of the overall governance 
system. What the exact role of different kinds of knowledge will be for the 
determination of pollution level is a context related matter and it is not possible 
to draw universal conclusions in this regard.
1.4.3 Quality of regulation and evaluation criteria
A general societal justification for regulatory research is that it can help to 
improve the quality of regulation. This clearly is not the only justification—
as noted in the introductory part of this chapter—though perhaps the most 
commonly used. The quality of regulation is, however, a complex notion. 
International organisations, like the OECD and the World Bank, national 
governments and academics have developed different sets of principles to 
define what quality means.71 There is no overall consensus on this matter and 
the sets of principles used to assess quality in different contexts may vary 
substantially. Partly this is because the purposes of the sets of principles vary. 
In particular, laying down principles for the quality of future regulation is 
a different endeavour from defining criteria of merit for the retrospective 
evaluation of regulation, which has existed for long time. In the case of long 
existing regulation, low level of effectiveness or major side-effects can easily 
be considered signs of its poor quality for contemporary society, though the 
same item might have been considered to be of excellent quality at the moment 
of its introduction due to lack of sound information of the effectiveness of 
regulation. Furthermore, the quality of the rule-making process is a part of an 
overall quality of regulation and principles and criteria suitable for the process 
evaluation may differ from those focusing on the outputs of the process.
Different sets of principles of regulatory quality can be seen as reflecting 
different values. The Mandelkern Report, which was prepared for the EU 
Laeken summit of the European Council, identified necessity, proportionality, 
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subsidiarity, transparency, accountability, accessibility and simplicity72 as the 
principles of quality for (new) regulation. This set of quality criteria can be 
understood to reflect certain value judgements intended to direct the making of 
future regulation. The Mandelkern Report is a policy paper, where a normative 
approach can be taken as a natural point of departure. One could expect that 
value judgements have a different role in research than in policy papers. 
However, it is important to stress that even in research-based retrospective 
evaluations it is impossible to avoid value judgements, though the research is 
not intended to be normative. Even the selection of evaluation criteria involves 
a value judgement,73 though the use of an explicit criterion may also be seen 
as a precondition for a rational discussion. The notion that suitable evaluation 
criteria vary from one situation to another,74 does not ease the problem, 
because the nature of the problem may not alone determine what criteria 
should be applied. The values and perceptions behind evaluation criteria may 
vary from one person to another, but they may also generally change over time. 
For example, at the moment the issue whether and how regulation fosters 
innovations is considered more important than previously.
In sum, there is no single concept, criterion or principle which covers 
or could cover all aspects of quality.75 Hence, decision-makers often face 
the situation where the quality of regulation can be assessed on the basis of 
numerous criteria. Were this the case, then decision-makers must also decide 
what weight each criterion will get. This again requires a value judgement. This 
value judgement can, however, be understood as a political endeavour, which is 
not a task of scientific research. Basically, I think—along the lines of Vedung76—
that the role of research is not to decide how a balance should be struck between 
different criteria. Research may produce analyses using different criteria and 
present future ideas how regulation could be developed to better meet given 
criteria, but the final conclusion is to be left to political decision-making.
1.4.4 Concepts of evaluation research
Evaluation aims to produce knowledge on the effects of regulation. The side-
effects  evaluations model developed by Vedung77 is a useful tool to make a 
distinction between impacts and direct the research question as well the 
gathering of material. In this model effects are divided into three levels of 
categories: on the first level there are two categories of effects, namely anticipated 
and unanticipated, on the second level both anticipated and unanticipated 
. Mandelkern Group 2001.
. Shadish et al. 1995 and House and Howe 1999.
. Hildén et al. 2001. 
. Centre for European Studies 2004, 10–24. 
. Vedung 1997, 260–264.
. Vedung 1997, 35–92.
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effects are divided into effects occurring in the target area and outside it. On 
the third level effects are still divided into beneficial and detrimental effects. 
The concept of target area is flexible. For example, in the case of environmental 
permits, the reductions of emissions of regulated pollutants are effects in target 
areas. Because emissions of different pollutants may be interlinked, a reduction 
of one pollutant may result in a reduction of another. But the opposite may 
also be the case; an abatement method of one pollutant may increase emissions 
of another. However, all these effects take place “in the target area”, though 
they may be anticipated or unanticipated and some are beneficial and others 
detrimental. Not all effects take place in the target area. Improved know-how 
and decreased employment are examples of possible effects outside the target 
area of environmental permitting. Because the judgement of whether an impact 
is beneficial or detrimental, in particular with regard to unanticipated effects, is 
not always easy to make, this model has been used in a slightly simplified way in 
environmental evaluations.78
The so-called impact problem79 refers to a challenge hard to avoid in 
any empirical retrospective evaluation of regulation. The causal relationship 
between environmental regulation and its impacts is not often easy to establish. 
The reduction of emissions from industrial plants may be a result of many 
different kinds of causes. Regulation, technological development and economic 
cycles, for instance, may all either decrease or increase emissions. Furthermore, 
the final outcome (changes in the state of the environment) may also depend on 
other factors than emissions from the regulated industry. Furthermore, different 
factors may affect each other. Regulation may or may not foster technological 
innovations. The regulated industry may develop technology in order to find 
solutions for anticipated requirements, but it may also be that the conditions of 
environmental permits only reflect the development that already occurred for 
other reasons. Impact problem refers to the fact that many factors other than 
regulation may also affect policy outcomes, like the state of the environment.
One of key notions of evaluation research relates to the idea behind the 
concept of ‘intervention theory’. Intervention theory has been defined as “all 
empirical and normative suppositions that public intervention rests upon.”80 
The idea behind the concept of intervention theory has become popular in 
recent years in the evaluation literature81 as well as the social science literature 
generally, though different authors term the idea slightly differently. Basically 
. Hildén et al. 2002, 15–16.
. Vedung 1997, 97–99.
0. Vedung 1997, 301.
. In particular a book written by Huey-Tsyh Chen has contributed to this development among 
evaluators. Chen 1990. 
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the same thing has been called policy theory,82 programme theory,83 programme 
logic,84 programme theory of action85 and theory of change.86 The aim of an 
intervention theory can be said to describe how the policy is intended to be 
implemented and function.87 It shows what measures are assumed to be taken 
in what order and what is assumed to follow from the measures taken. An 
intervention theory includes different kinds of assumptions: assumptions of 
impacts at different stages of the causal chain and their causal relationships, 
as well as assumptions on the relationship between impacts, goals, various 
actors and moderators, i.e. contextual factors.88 In evaluation an intervention 
theory is used as a point of reflection: the observed reality is compared to 
the intervention theory. However, it is also possible to assess the rationality 
(coherence of the logic) of an intervention theory on a theoretical basis without 
empirical evidence.89
Several intervention theories may apply to one state intervention. This is 
because different stake-holders (industry, environmentalists, administration) 
or individual members of a stake-holder group may see different assumptions 
behind the regulation, which means that the ways in which they understand 
an intervention to produce outcomes are not the same. Hence it is possible to 
construct several intervention theories based on (partly) different assumptions. 
One way of constructing an intervention theory is to base it as far as possible 
on the official material available produced for law-making, as is done in this 
study. Taking this into consideration, an alternative expression to ‘intervention 
theory’ could be ‘the logic of law’, though I will stick to the more common 
‘intervention theory’.
1.4.5 Law and evaluation
A major part of governmental regulation comes in the form of law. Though 
regulation is in a sense more than “pure” law, referring also to other than legal 
instruments and activities carried out within the legal framework,90 much of 
it is based on (hard or soft) law. Though the issue of evaluation of the impacts 
. Hoogerwerf 1990.
. E.g. Chen, 1990, Weiss 1997, Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey 1999, Rogers et al. 2000.
. Lenne and Cleland 1987
. Patton 1997.
. Pawson 2003, 473.
. Hildén et al. 2002, 16.
. Vedung 1997, Chen 1990, Dahler-Larsen 2001, 336–340.
. Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey 1999, 174–188.
0. As Black notes, law can also be seen to be more than regulation, because regulation does not 
perform all functions of law (like dispute resolution, stabilising and adapting expectations 
and allocating authority) neither do regulatory studies aim to answer similar question as 
jurisprudence. Black 2002, 22–26.
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of laws has drawn the attention of legal91 and other social scientists, specific 
issues related to law are not discussed too often in the evaluation literature and 
legally-orientated evaluation is rather rare.92 Hence, it might be useful to make 
a few points about the role of law in the context of evaluation.
The first point is the obvious notion that the role of law varies from one 
policy area to another. Much of evaluation research has traditionally been 
carried out in policy fields like criminology, teaching, health and social 
work. With regard to criminology and criminal law the legality principle is 
particularly crucial and the link between certain behaviour and its (legal) 
consequences is defined in detail in law. In branches of social policy the role of 
law is, instead, often limited. Law creates the administrative framework and sets 
a general goal and lays down certain principles and rules, but it tends to leave 
a wide discretion to the authorities. In this sense the means used to implement 
the general policy goals are decided at a lower level. Hence, with regard to 
impacts, much depends on other variables than legal ones.93 However, the case 
of environmental law is different from criminal law as well as from social policy 
law. Though environmental law employs more general and abstract expressions 
than criminal law—and hence leaves the final decision to be made at individual 
level—it determines the means to be used as well as how they should be used in 
a more detailed manner than law regulating teaching, health and social work.
The role of law does not only vary from one policy sector to another, but 
also from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With regard to Finland the role of law 
seems to be of particular relevance.94 This notion has a link to the doctrine of 
Finnish administrative law, where administrative decisions have traditionally 
been divided into two different categories: those based on free discretion and 
legally bound decisions. With regard to the first category law sets framework 
and rough limits to decision-making, but leaves a wide degree of discretion 
to the administration. In the latter category the hands of a decision-maker 
are much more bound. As Tuori puts it: “administrative authorities, when 
assessing what means to employ in order to achieve their aims, can rely only 
on legally relevant arguments”95 Hence, in the case of legally bound decisions 
the decision-making is closer to the adjudication of courts than in the other 
. In the Finnish legal research tradition Jyrki Tala in various books and articles has developed 
a methodological approach to evaluate law. See in particular Tala 2001. Other examples of 
lawyers interested in the evaluation of laws are Winter H. 2002 and Oksanen 2003 and Ervasti 
2004 (see 31–33). 
. Criminal law and criminology, however, are clear exceptions to this. In these fields there are 
an established traditions to use empirical research and interaction between doctrinal legal 
research and empirical studies has been intensive. See e.g. Tolvanen 2005. 
. It goes without saying that law still determines the basic social rights, which may in some cases 
also be very strict, see Tuori 2004, 149–.
. OECD 2003b, 5–6.
. Tuori 2002, 141–142. 
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case. The distinction has been criticized, though not denied. According to 
the criticism, the distinction is too crude. Actually there is a great variety 
of different kinds of decisions on a continuum starting from free discretion 
and ending up with legally bound decisions.96 In any case a large portion 
of environmental decisions can be described as legally-bound according to 
Finnish legal doctrine.97 This applies, for example, to environmental permits. 
Though permit authorities have a degree of discretion, which stems from the 
use of flexible concepts, principles and rules in law, they still are allowed to 
use in their reasoning only in such arguments which are legally relevant. In 
principle, the use of other arguments, however rational they may sound, is 
excluded from the decision making.98 The notion that the concept of ‘legally 
relevant argument’ is itself flexible (emergence of new sources of law may cause 
changes), does not change the overall picture.
As a point of departure, the central government in Finland has no direct 
means to intervene in the environmental decision-making of lower authorities, 
not before, during or after the actual decision of an administrative body. Typically, 
if the central government thinks that a lower environmental authority has made a 
bad decision, it cannot immediately influence this decision. With regard to future 
cases, it must either persuade the lower environmental authorities that there is 
a need for change through informative means or it must change laws. Another 
legal characteristic relevant in this context concerns the review of administrative 
decisions. The review is nowadays solely the task of special courts (administrative 
courts). In the past a general starting point was what a superior administrative 
body reviewed the decisions of lower authorities.99 The role of legally bound 
decisions together with the lack of direct means of superior authority to intervene 
in the decision-making of lower authorities means that the formulation of law 
has a particularly important role in environmental regulation in Finland.
An example underlying the relative significance of decisions made by 
environmental bodies and the courts reviewing the decisions, is that concerning 
the construction of a very large artificial lake (Vuotos) in Northern Finland 
with extraordinary wide environmental as well as economic consequences. 
Though the permit authority (then called the water court) did grant a permit 
for the construction of the artificial lake, the Supreme Administrative Court 
rejected the permit on the basis of its wide environmental consequences.100 The 
. Mäenpää 2000, 352–357. 
. See e.g. Kuusiniemi 2001b, 276–278.
. This does not necessary mean that the administrative practice completely follows the doctrine. 
See Chapter 4.3. 
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00. KHO 2002:86. The key legal issue was whether the decision should be made on the basis of 
weighing interests (Section 6 of Chapter 2 of the Water Act, 264/1961) or on its significant and 
extensive detrimental environmental consequences (Section 5 of the same chapter as amended 
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ministers of the government were not pleased, but they could do nothing. As a 
response, the government is now pondering whether the law (the Water Act) 
should be changed in such a way that the government has the final word in such 
cases. This would be an exception from the main principle described above, as 
are some other cases.101
The second point concerns internal and external perspectives on law. 
This distinction is often used to make a distinction between legal and social 
sciences. Though legal and social sciences may both be interested in law, their 
focus is not necessarily the same. Tuori stresses that legal and social scientists 
understand law differently and points out that “for legal scholars, the law 
appears as a symbolic normative phenomenon, as a legal order, whereas social 
scientists are interested in … legal practices … and … the beliefs the members 
of a society have of legal norms and which causally influence their behaviour.”102 
In other words, legal science has adopted an internal perspective, where law 
is approached using its own concepts, whereas most social scientists tend to 
see law from an external perspective. Kornhauser has described the internal 
perspective as follows: “An internal theory (of law—JS) uses the concepts 
available to participants in the practice that the theory explains; an external 
theory, by contrast, uses whatever concepts best explain the practice in question 
whether the participants have or do not have those concepts.”103
Both perspectives of law may be useful for an evaluation exercise, though 
the external perspective has a dominant role in the sense that law itself can 
never alone explain its impacts. However, understanding the limits resulting 
from ‘the use of legally relevant arguments’, or ‘the concepts available for 
participants’ helps to understand why decision-making procedures produce 
such results as they do and why different actors do what they do. Furthermore, 
the understanding of legal concepts, principles and rules and their relation to 
“outputs” helps to identify what could be changed, if anything, to overcome 
the problems identified in evaluation. In particular, legal concepts, principles 
and rules (an internal theory of law) can be crucial for the construction of an 
intervention theory and they can be seen as elements of an intervention theory. 
After all, a general assumption behind the regulation is that the participants 
are following legal principles and rules and, furthermore, the achievement of 
goals is associated with compliance with regulation. Though other factors than 
compliance with law certainly also affect goal achievement, most people accept 
the idea that non-compliance tends to reduce the rate of goal-achievement.
0. E.g. permission in principle to nuclear power plants is given by the Parliament and the Council 
of State decides, whether a project having detrimental effects on the Natura 2000 will be carried 
out. 
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An example may clarify my argument. Let us think of an intervention 
theory concerning regulation based on environmental permits. A key legal 
concept for law governing the process through which environmental permits 
are granted, is best available technology principle (BAT principle).104 Emission 
limit values are, as a point of departure, defined on the basis of this principle 
and emission limits, in turn, define what those regulated should do. However, 
the principle can be understood in different ways and these ways may have 
significant consequences in terms of impacts.105 Furthermore, the principle is 
not valid for all cases,106 its interpretation may have crucial consequences, and 
occasionally other rules are even more important for the design of emission 
limits. Hence, ideally to construct a complete intervention theory would require 
understanding when this principle is applied, what other rules are applied 
and what it the essential content of the principle. In other words, a proper 
understanding of key features of law is required.
By this, I do not claim that an intervention theory could be constructed 
on the basis of law and legislative material alone. As noted above, constructing 
an intervention theory requires that the assumptions (e.g. concerning causal 
relationships) behind the rules are made explicit. However, not all such 
assumptions can be found through legal analysis or from legislative material. 
A Government Bill for an Act or an explanatory memorandum for a Directive 
is not just an explanation, but also a justification for a proposal. Thus, it would 
be rational to assume that a legislator tends to make explicit arguments and 
assumptions favouring the acceptance of the proposal and avoiding using 
those which call it into question.107 It has been claimed that legal draftsmen and 
decision-makers rarely point out in their legislative material how they think 
the new legislation will produce desirable outcomes, even though an impact 
assessment is required as a part of the legislative process.108
104. The key legal definition of this principle is to be found in Article 2 of the IPPC Directive, 
though the Directive uses the expression ‘best available techniques’ instead of ‘best available 
technology’. The Directive requires that the emission limit values shall be based on the best 
available technique. The best available techniques means the most effective and advanced stage 
in the development of activities and their methods of operation which indicate the practical 
suitability of particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit values 
designed to prevent and, when that is not practicable, generally reduce emissions and the 
impact on the environment as a whole.
105. The relevance of different interpretations with regard to impacts of the BAT principle comes 
clear, for example, in Pearce and Brisson 1993. 
106. For example, in a case concerning a gas station, the use of BAT technology was not required, 
because “no relevant detrimental effects to health” could be proven. KHO 2004:38.
107. Similä and Hildén 2003, 10–13. 
108. Salovaraa and Tala 2003, 11.
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Chapter 2
Pollution control regulation
This chapter analyses and discusses pollution regulation on a general, theoretical 
level. The aim is to provide a basis for the analysis in the coming chapters of 
regulation in one country. Theoretical analysis does not produce final answers 
to regulatory problems, though it provides intellectual tools and a context for 
observations. First, a typology of instruments of governmental regulation based 
on intervention theories is presented. In the typology legal instruments are 
distinguished from non-legal and thereafter legal instruments are divided into 
three groups of traditional regulation, economic instruments and procedural 
instruments. Secondly, different types of standards used for traditional 
regulation are identified and their features analysed from the perspective of 
impacts. Distinctions between verbal and technical, general and installation 
specific as well as different kinds of quality and source standards are presented. 
Throughout this discussion examples from EU regulation are presented. Finally, 
the criticism against traditional regulation as well as its defence is discussed 
on the basis of selected evaluation criteria, namely effectiveness, efficiency 
and impacts on innovations. In the final section the issues of transparency and 
accountability, which are themes of democratic governance, are also discussed 
in order to provide a broader perspective for regulatory discussion.
2.1. Regulatory instruments
While the amount of pollution control regulation has increased remarkably 
during the last 30 years, also the diversity of regulatory strategies and techniques 
used has increased. The diversity of instruments available for environmental 
regulation has inspired many researchers from many different disciplines to 
classify them.109 The motivation for such a classification varies and it does not 
necessarily have any other purpose than to facilitate discussion and teaching. 
However, a research-based justification for classification often stems from an 
0. Ogus 1994a, 121–261, OECD 1997a, 15–39, Määttä, K.1997, 11–22, Faure 1998, 444 -, Gunningham 
and Grobosky 1998, 37–91, Connely and Smith 1999, 158–179, Määttä, K. 1999, 18–28, Rehbinder 
1999, Hilson 2000, 101–131, Sairinen 2000, 36–39, Kuusiniemi 2001a, 97–112. 
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assumption that there are common features within a class of strategies and 
techniques, which can be extrapolated into other similar kinds of cases.110
Despite many efforts of various scholars there is no consensus on what kind 
of typology of instruments should be used. Partly this is because researchers 
coming from different fields make classifications from different perspectives 
and for different purposes. However, there is a certain amount of agreement. 
First, practically all make a distinction between traditional regulation and 
economic instruments, although the expressions for the categories vary. There 
are also differences in details, meaning that though the titles of categories 
may resemble each other, different instruments are located in the categories. 
Furthermore, it is often, though not always,111 acknowledged that there are 
still other forms of regulation than traditional and economic ones. However, 
there is no agreement as to whether these instruments should be grouped into 
one or several categories and what name(s) the category(-ies) should have. 
Thus, the practical solution of the OECD to refer to these instruments as ‘other 
instruments’ certainly reflects the discussion,112 though at the same time it 
can be noted that calling the third category information-based instruments 
has become quite popular. This follows the idea of Vedung that government 
has only three basic approaches available for public policy, namely the stick 
(regulation), the carrot (economic means) and the sermon (information).113
The making of a clear-cut typology is not necessarily easy. Though it would 
be possible to make a typology which looks simple and logical, locating different 
instruments to these categories might be difficult and now and then scholars 
openly admit that their taxonomy is “somewhat artificial”.114 In order to avoid 
the difficulty of following any definition, it has been proposed that instruments 
be classified by an explicit enumeration.115 However, an explicit enumeration of 
different instruments without any criterion for typology does not serve analytic 
purposes. A criterion (rationale) is needed for a classification, because it helps to 
structure research and discussion on regulation. The rationale of the typology 
used in this study—following Vedung and Ogus116—aims to make a distinction 
between instruments on the basis of how intensively and directly they intervene 
in the private sphere. In order to see the differences of instruments in this 
0. Vedung 1997, 122. 
. Faure 1998, 444 and Määttä, K. 1999, 18–28.
. OECD 1997a, 9–11.
. Vedung 1997, 121–136. He defines public policy instruments as a ‘set of techniques by which 
public sector authorities wield their power in attempting to effect social change or eliciting 
support’. Vedung 1997, 122. 
. Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998, 38. Despite this, their classification is informative and often 
used.
. With regard to economic instruments, e.g. Opschoor and Vos 1989, 13.
. Vedung uses the criterion ‘degree of authoritative force or constraint’ as a basis for typology 
(Vedung 1977, 126) and Ogus speaks about ‘degree of intervention’, which—I assume—means 
roughly the same (Ogus 1994b, 26–27).

regard, their intervention theories (i.e. the assumed chains of influence by which 
instruments produce desirable outcomes) need to be outlined. The intervention 
theories of the instruments belonging to one category of instruments have 
common features and these common features justify grouping them together, 
though each instrument has its own intervention theories. Hence, though the 
intervention theories of one permit mechanism differ from those of another, they 
can be assigned to the same category, because they also have similar features.
Regulation, as noted in Chapter 1, can be governmental or non-govern-
mental. Governmental regulation, which is the focus of this study, is divided 
here into legal and non-legal regulation, though this distinction is not clear-cut. 
Legal regulation is based on specific legislation, whereas non-legal regulation is 
based on the general competences of authorities. One could point out that the 
rule of law,117 which is a basic principle of all democratic societies, means that 
all actions by public authorities are framed by law, if not specific then general. 
However, the fact that general competencies of public bodies does not allow 
intervention into the private sphere, justifies making a distinction between 
legal and non-legal regulation. Most environmental regulation is based on 
specific legislation. However, at least the following governmental measures 
relevant for environmental policy though not based on specific environmental 
legislation can be identified: (1) voluntary agreements between public and 
private actors; (2) use of public resources (infrastructure, scientific research 
etc.) (3) persuasion, information production, and guidance; and (4) threat of 
invoking legal instruments.118 Of these voluntary agreements in various forms 
and permanent efforts to provide information comes closest to “sustained 
and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others”, whereas other means of 
influence may fall beyond the concept of regulation, if they are not used in a 
sustained manner.
Regulatory instruments, which come in the form of law, can be divided 
into three categories, which are as follows: traditional regulation, economic 
instruments and procedural instruments. I call the first category ‘traditional 
regulation’, though it could also be called as ‘command-and-control regulation’. 
‘Command-and-control regulation’ has a slightly negative connotation,119 thus 
the expression ‘traditional regulation’ is preferred. In this study regulation refers 
generally to governmental measures, whereas some others use the expression 
for a category of policy instruments which is equal to the category of ‘traditional 
regulation’ in this study.120
. Section 2 of the Finnish Constitution.
. Tala’s similar though not environmental specific list is used as a source of inspiration, Tala 1999, 
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economists for critical purposes. Gunningham and Grabosky 1998, 39.
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Figure 1. Instruments of environmental regulation.
With regard to traditional regulation, the desired outcomes (goals) 
are achieved, if what is regulated behaves as determined by standards of 
environmental regulation. Traditional regulation may prohibit or restrict 
behaviour detrimental to the state of the environment or it may require active 
measures to be taken. These instruments govern the relationship between 
the public authority and firms or citizens and mainly belong to the sphere of 
administrative law. An environmental permit is a typical instrument of this 
category.
In the case of economic instruments,121 the desired outcomes are assumed 
to be achieved, because a certain course of action is made economically more 
attractive than others. However, those regulated have the freedom to choose 
the course of action they deem best. Hence they may even continue to take less 
desirable action if they are willing to pay the full cost of it. The public authority 
may make a certain course of action more attractive than another in several 
ways. One way is to take or give financial benefits for example in the forms of 
taxes, charges and subsidies. However, the public authority need not to take or 
give financial benefits to make a certain course of action more or less attractive. 
Instead, it may by means of law modify the relationships between private actors 
and the desired impacts are produced through dynamics, which follows from 
the modifications. No doubt taxes, charges and subsidies also indirectly modify 
relationships between private actors (as does traditional regulation), but they 
are not specifically intended to do so. An example of an economic instrument 
of this sort would be liability for environmental damage. In this case public 
administration, as a point of departure, has no role in the implementation of 
legislation. If negotiation between private parties related to damages results in 
nothing, the injured party must take the case to a court to obtain compensation. 
From the effectiveness point of view, monetary compensation (as opposed to 
compensation in kind) has, however, a secondary function. The effectiveness 
. Fairly often the expression ‘market-based instruments’ is used as a synonym for ‘economic 
instruments’. Tietenberg 1990, Baumol and Oates 1988 and Sprenger 2000, 3–6.
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of environmental regulation refers to environmental outcomes and if damage 
has occurred, then the outcome in the particular case is negative. Dynamics 
(preventive effect) are assumed to be created by the threat of compensation, 
which is crucial for effectiveness. Besides making a polluter liable for damages, 
the public authority may by many other means modify the relationships between 
private actors, for example through market creation (tradable permits).
Liability for environmental damages can, as proposed above, be located 
to economic instruments. The expression ‘liability’, however, has many 
meanings and it is used in several different contexts in environmental law 
and policy. The roles of markets and public authorities vary from case to case 
and some regulatory instruments, which could for some reasons be called 
‘liability instruments’, actually have many features which justify locating them 
to traditional regulation. The Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35) is a 
case in point. Markets do not have an immediate role in the implementation of 
the Directive. The Directive requires an operator as defined in Article 2 to avoid 
causing certain kinds of environmental damage and take, when necessary, 
preventive or remedial action. The Directive sets public law obligations and from 
the mere fact that an operator may be liable in financial terms for preventive or 
remedial actions does make this a market-based instrument. An operator of an 
installation under traditional environmental permit mechanisms, as regulated 
by the IPPC Directive122, also bears the compliance costs. Public authorities 
have a crucial role in the implementation of the Environmental Liability 
Directive, and the role of public authorities is in many ways equal to that of the 
IPPC Directive. The Directive can, however, be considered an innovative form 
of traditional regulation in the sense that it at least aims to limit the amount of 
bureaucratic work in comparison to instruments requiring prior authorization. 
Ideally the operators avoid causing any environmental damage (as defined in 
the Directive) or a threat of it. If this were the case, there would be no need to 
involve public authorities in the implementation.
Another variant of liability relates to contaminated soil. The first rules on 
contaminated soil were adopted into the legislation in 1987 in Finland, though 
this reform was largely a codification of existing administrative practice. The 
operator, or in some cases the occupier of the land, was made liable for the 
purification of contaminated soil. This variant of liability also belongs to the 
sphere of public law; it is public authorities who impose the obligation to purify 
contaminated soil and who decide what is to be considered contaminated. 
Hence, it belongs to traditional regulation.
Regulatory instruments belonging to the third category take the form 
of procedural rules. Instruments like access to information, environmental 
. Directive 96/61/EC concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control.
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impact assessment, environmental management and auditing systems, pollution 
registers, corporate environmental reporting and product certificates are all 
procedural in nature. They may be mandatory or voluntary in the sense that 
private actors (companies) may themselves decide whether they would like to 
benefit from the instruments. Access to information is an example of mandatory 
and eco-label of a voluntary instrument. There are also non-legal variants of some 
these instruments, though then there naturally is no mandatory element in them. 
Often procedural instruments are open-ended in the sense that no substantial 
environmental goals are set. Hence, a law concerning access to information 
or an environmental management and auditing system may be established 
without explicit references in the law itself or any preparatory document to 
desirable environmental outcomes. The procedural instruments influence 
through transfer of information, for which reason they are sometimes called 
information based instruments. In other words, the outcomes are assumed to 
emerge because participants produce, provide and/or receive new information. 
However, the main role of the public authority is to create a procedural system 
where information is created and disseminated, not to produce information. 
Often information is produced and disseminated by other actors, though the 
public authority may also have some role in this respect.
Many real world instruments are often hybrid instruments, meaning that 
they have features which relate them to two or even more categories. For example, 
tradable permits have the common feature with traditional regulation that a 
public authority sets a behavioural standard, a pollution limit. This is certainly 
something which could be called a ‘stick’. However, in the traditional permit 
system the permit limit (stick) is applied to an installation, in a tradable permit 
scheme to a (possibly very large) group of installations, whereas an operator of an 
individual installation has freedom of choice either to buy allowances or reduce 
pollution. The possibility to reduce costs by reducing pollution and selling extra 
allowances is clearly ‘a carrot’. Some tradable permit schemes use markets only 
after the initial allocation of allowances, whereas others even also use markets for 
the initial allocation through auctioning them. Initial allocation by authorities 
(grand-fathering) come very close to traditional permitting and it may even be 
based on existing traditional permits. In addition monitoring emissions and 
control of trades requires the involvement of authorities as with to traditional 
permits. Hence, tradable and traditional permits have many similarities and 
this also applies to the European tradable permit scheme123 on CO2 emissions, 
which is the world’s largest tradable permit scheme. Accordingly, some scholars 
call tradable permit schemes ‘a mixed instrument’.124 Furthermore, it could 
be possible to create a company-wide permit, which in practice would allow 
. Directive 2003/87. 
. Kuusiniemi 2001a, 107.
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trading (or similar arrangements) within the company, though the law would be 
silent on such an opportunity. It would also be possible to design a bubble-based 
permitting mechanism for a number of installations without regulated trading. 
In this case the bubble could be allocated to individual installations through 
negotiations, not through markets. However, this, too, could to some extent 
increase the efficiency of pollution reductions in comparison to installation 
specific permits, because negotiators (=different companies) have better 
information on marginal costs than the government. This regulatory technique 
would not, however, totally eliminate the problem of asymmetry of information. 
It is possible that even the polluters are unaware of the costs of other polluters 
unless there is a market which shows the price. Still, the opportunity given to 
industry to decide where pollution reduction is to be done could be understood 
as ‘a carrot’. In fact, a mechanism created by the LCP Directive125 is rather close to 
this. Hence, the variety of instruments can be understood as a continuum with 
no strict boundaries between categories and where different kinds of mixes are 
possible. Having stated this, I prefer to discuss tradable permit schemes under 
economic instruments, partly to stress the difference between tradable and 
traditional permits and partly to follow the mainstream in the literature.
Furthermore, the regulatory web created upon one regulatory instrument 
may have many elements and often it is a matter of judgement whether 
different elements of this web should be considered as own instruments or 
a part of a single instrument. The regulatory web linked to environmental 
permits is a case in point. As a point of departure it is a most classical example 
of traditional regulation. However, environmental permits in modern 
societies are closely linked to impact assessment and mechanisms aiming 
to ensure access to information, which sometimes are presented as separate 
instruments.126 However, they may be formally and substantially so closely 
incorporated to traditional permits that distinguishing the impacts they 
cause may be difficult. The results of environmental impacts assessment feed 
the permit procedure and access to information provisions often becomes 
meaningful while environmental permits are granted. Another situation where 
it may be possible either to speak about a single instrument or two interlinked 
instruments is the combination of compensation for environmental damages 
or of pollution charges and environmental permits. Formally speaking, they 
may be determined through the same process as emission limits127 and their 
. Directive 2001/80.
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effectiveness or lack of it may be due to this combination. Environmental 
agreements in the Netherlands have been considered ‘an innovative version 
of command and control’,128 because the use of environmental agreements is 
incorporated into environmental permitting in a way that makes it difficult to 
totally separate them. Similarly, environmental management systems could be 
incorporated with environmental permits, though they can be understood as 
separate instruments as well.129
2.2. Traditional regulation
2.2.1. Instruments of traditional regulation
Traditional regulation is based on the idea that a public authority influences 
people by means of rules and directives, which often are backed by administrative 
and/or criminal sanctions.130 There is a great variety of instruments of traditional 
regulation if all the nuances in decision-making procedures and the formulation 
of obligations are taken into account. Still, these are variants of rather a few basic 
options. Kloepfer and Winter identify four different basic options of traditional 
regulation to direct the behaviour of those regulated: supervision, prohibition 
and rules, the obligation to notify and the permission requirement.131 All of them 
have the common feature that they aim to enforce laws that prescribe standards. 
Kloepfer and Winter apparently consider supervision an independent instrument, 
because supervision not only aims to control the lawfulness of different activities 
but also has a more general function for continuous environmental monitoring, 
which serves the planning and preparation of further administrative measures. 
However, I consider supervision as a subordinate function, not an independent 
instrument, though the form and intensity of supervision may be of crucial 
importance for the impacts of regulation.
Prohibitions and rules have a direct legal effect without a mediating 
administrative decision. The prohibition to pollute soil in the Environmental 
Protection Act (86/2000) is an example of this. The prohibitions or rules work, 
in principle, according to either-or logic, though the exact content of them 
may be open to various interpretations. The prohibition to pollute soil can be 
used as an example of this as well, because it is not necessarily clear when a 
discharge of a substance results in the prohibited consequences referred to in 
. Gunningham and Grabosky 1998, 41.
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Section 7 of the Environmental Protection Act. As a response to this problem 
more elaborate standards in the form of sub-legislation and soft law can—and 
have—been produced.
The use of a notification procedure makes it possible for the operator to 
commence a regulated activity before any administrative decision has been 
taken. Kloepfer and Winter identify two functions for notification; either the 
procedure aims at replacing permitting procedure or it is established purely for 
purposes of supervision. In the former case a public authority intervenes in the 
form of an administrative decision, where specific conditions are laid. In the 
latter case the procedure only ends up with registration without any additional 
conditions. If the information provided in the notification shows that the 
activity concerned violates the law, then the public authorities may intervene. 
However, if the activity has already commenced, it may be rather difficult for a 
public authority to impose conditions which would require radical changes. On 
the other hand, through notification procedure unnecessary delays, which may 
be a side-effect of permitting, are avoided.
Environmental permits are granted before the commencement of the 
activity. The permitting procedure includes an inspection of the activity or 
installation and results in the setting of permit conditions. Thus, it enables 
tailored decision-making. Permitting is often reactive132 in the sense that permit 
authorities have only limited opportunities to influence the basic technological 
alternatives adopted by the applicant in the permitting process, though in 
terms of environmental impacts the basic technological alternatives may have 
a crucial role. The permit authorities are often in a better position to influence 
end-of-pipe technologies, i.e. reactive measures.
2.2.2. Standards
Substantial standards133 are a crucial part of any pollution control strategy. The 
concept of standard is flexible and should not be reserved only for strategies 
based on traditional regulation. Not all responses linked to a standard are 
administrative orders or criminal sanctions; they may also be charges or 
taxes. In tradable permit mechanisms (‘a cap and trade’ scheme) the ‘cap’ can 
be considered a standard though it is not directed at individual sources of 
pollution but at groups of sources. It is even feasible to say that liability law 
includes a ‘due care standard’. The exact content of what is ‘due care’ in a specific 
situation may be left to be decided by the general principles and rules of liability 
law, or it can be anchored to substantive technical sub-legislation or soft law. 
Though it is possible to construct open-ended instruments without any binding 
. On the distinction between reactive and proactive environmental policy, see Cederlöf, 41–43.
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substantial standard, like certain kinds of taxes or environmental management 
systems, some kind of (non-binding) standards are also needed in these cases 
to reflect the desirable level of environmental outcomes.134 Thus, the question 
is not whether there is a need for standards, but what kind of standards should 
be used and what role they should have. According to Faure and Skogh,135 
economists have traditionally argued that the law should limit itself to setting 
target (or quality) standards. Traditional regulation, instead, (also) employs 
standards directed towards individual activities or products and the type of 
sanctions used is mainly administrative and criminal.
The concept of standard has many meanings. Sometimes it is understood 
to refer to something to be found in legislation which guides the future decision-
making of administrative bodies. Then the output of the administrative process 
(e.g. the permit decision with its conditions) is excluded from the concept. This is 
the way the expression ‘standard’136 is often used in the Finnish legal literature.137 
Other authors, instead, use the expression to refer to substantial requirements 
faced by those regulated.138 The substantial requirements may be imposed by 
administrative bodies, but a standard may also be adopted through a legislative 
act. Different uses of the concept relate to the dissimilarity of the purposes of 
analysis. For understanding the impacts of regulation the standards imposed 
on the regulated industry are essential, whereas for understanding what kind of 
decision a permit authority should make, the standards—as well as other legal 
principles and rules—guiding administrative decision-making are what matters. 
The difference in the uses of the concept becomes clear when asking whether the 
best available technology principle is a standard or not. According to the Finnish 
legal research tradition it is a standard,139 whereas others consider it a principle 
guiding standard-setting.140 In sum, it is possible to speak about standards as 
guidance for decision-making, or alternatively as legal obligations.
I will use the concept in a broad way, referring to both uses. I try to be 
clear in which sense the concept is used. In order to accomplish this, I tend 
to speak about ‘guidance’ instead of standards, when it is not a question of 
something which directly binds polluters. However, because the expression 
of quality standards is commonly used, I will use it, though a quality standard 
rarely directly binds an individual polluter. In those cases when there is a need 
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to stress that it is question of something which binds individual polluters, it will 
be pointed out.
The goals of environmental regulation may be seen as a hierarchal system, 
where the lower level substantiates the upper level, as Westerlund has pointed 
out.141 This means that the most general goals, like sustainable development at 
the highest level of the hierarchy of goals, can be divided step by step into more 
concrete goals and standards. Westerlund shows that, starting from causes of 
pollution and ending to the final effects of pollution, there are a number of 
stages to which a standard could be linked. Seeing it from this perspective, 
standards binding individual polluters are a substantiation of quality standards 
or more general policy goals.142
Standard-setting is a complex process, which involves many factors with 
many phases. One could say that standard-setting does not start from an 
enactment of law, but from the technical and political discussion preceding 
the legislative phase. In addition, standard-setting often does not end with a 
legislative act, but requires an administrative decision. In this case, however, 
the law tends to give guidance, which may be very detailed. The legal guidance 
for standard-setting may be either verbal or technical.143 Verbal guidance, as the 
name suggests, expresses in verbal terms the logic of decision-making, whereas 
technical guidance gives a technical reference value to which the final decision 
is to be based. However, technical guidance often leaves a certain degree of 
discretion to the decision-maker, who imposes the final legal obligations. 
Typically technical guidance is medium-based: it may, for example, define the 
maximum concentration of a pollutant in water, air or soil. Verbal standards—
like the BAT principle—can be constructed so that they cover all media, though 
their implementation usually requires distinguishing between media.
Flexibility of legal guidance for standard-setting is often an advantage. 
The standards binding individual polluters, instead, should be precise and clear 
so that they can be easily followed and monitored. Hence, they should and are 
often technical in nature. The flexibility of the guidance allows tailored decisions 
for individual installations and may thus help to avoid efficiency problems 
related to the rigidity of general technical standards. Furthermore, flexibility 
also has the advantage that final standards do not so easily become out-dated 
due to technological development, as can happen with law-based technical 
standards. In addition, not all environmental problems can easily be turned 
into measurable quantities at a general level. This applies in particular to issues 
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like landscape and biodiversity protection and to a lesser degree to pollution 
control. However, flexibility may also be a problem. The costs of sufficient, not 
to talk about perfect, information needed for translating general guidance into 
concrete installation specific standards may be disproportionately large due to 
the complexity and uncertainty of environmental problems. This applies both 
to the cases when the costs are borne by public authorities and when they are 
borne by those causing environmental harm. The use of technically precise 
guidance can remarkably reduce the costs of decision-making, because the 
information is gathered collectively and thus provides information basis for 
a number of cases.144 Many environmental problems of modern societies are 
of such a complex nature that it would be rather demanding for officials with 
limited time resources available to assess the amounts of all pollutants from 
each individual source, the impacts of pollutants and technological possibilities 
to reduce pollution. In addition, technical guidance has another function: to 
create a more stable competitive environment for different companies through 
standardization of environmental requirements. Technical guidance increases 
the predictability of regulatory machinery, which may create economic 
advantages. Predictability is considered a factor conductive to innovations.145
The information basis for standard-setting is multi-faceted. It could be 
claimed that understanding of the effects of pollution and the technological 
options for preventing and restricting pollution always precede to setting 
of standards. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that only this kind 
of scientific information is relevant. According to a more realistic approach 
economic and political considerations are equally involved in all standard-
setting. Cost-benefit analysis is the main vehicle to include economic 
considerations and the political model is based on discursive deliberation.146 
These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It would be possible 
to use all these approaches simultaneously for a standard-stetting procedure, 
because they draw attention to different aspects of the issue.147
Quality standards define, directly or indirectly, the desirable state of the 
environment. This may be done in many ways, such as using concentration of 
pollutants in waters and air or ecological characteristics of the environment. 
Critical load148 is an example of using ecological characteristics as a basis 
for defining the desirable target level of pollution. Another example is the 
. Ogus 1994a, 208.
. Kivimaa and Mickwitz 2004, 369.
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National Emission Ceilings Directive (2001/81), which sets national targets, 
although letting the member states choose the means of implementation. The 
option to use the total emissions from certain sources as a standard opens an 
avenue towards tradable permit schemes or bubbles, though more traditional 
forms of regulation are also available for the implementation of this kind of 
quality standard. There is a number of pieces of environmental law defining the 
allowed/desirable maximum concentration of pollutants in waters belonging to 
a certain category149 and in air.150
In addition to legal and political factors, the geographical scope of quality 
standards depends on the environmental issue at stake. Health-based standards 
may be the same in different waters or regions. Ecology based standards often 
take the natural state of the environment as a point of reference and because it 
varies geographically, standards, too, should vary. With regard to water policy, 
most of the EU quality standards have been health based. However, ecological 
considerations have been acknowledged in some directives, like the Freshwater 
Fish (78/659) and Shellfish (79/923) Directives, which established water quality 
objectives. Furthermore, ecological considerations were particularly important 
for the Urban Waste Water Directive (91/271) and the Nitrates Directive (91/ 
676).151 The first one established standards for the collection, treatment and 
discharge of urban waste water and control over the disposal of sewage sludge. 
The latter, instead, was directed towards nitrate pollution from agricultural 
sources, including measures like the Action Programmes for Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones and Codes of Good Agricultural Practice. However, due to the piecemeal 
approach at EU level, the main responsibility for taking into account ecological 
considerations has been left to member states until the adoption of the Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60). Prior the adoption of this Directive, the 
EU water standards were mainly based on health considerations. The Water 
Framework Directive makes it possible the setting of differentiated ecological 
quality standards according the characteristics of different waters. Generally, 
the Directive aims at good water status of waters throughout the EU and makes 
a distinction between environmental objectives, water quality standards and 
emission limits values. The objectives defined in Article 4 of the Directive 
are rather general, whereas water quality standards are defined to mean the 
. In EU law the Framework Directive 76/464, Article 6, set a system of quality objectives to 
be defined in daughter Directives. Quality objectives have been defined for bathing waters 
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concentration of a particular pollutant or a group of pollutants in water, sediment 
or biota, which should not be exceeded in order to protect human health and the 
environment (Article 2). The Water Framework Directive will gradually replace 
a major part of existing European water pollution law, including water objectives 
set in other Directives. The formulation of ecological quality standards has been 
noted to be a particularly complicated issue due to various problems as those 
related to ecological valuation.152
The use of quality standards as guidance for the setting final standards has 
an advantage in comparison to technology-based guidance. Quality standards 
allow pollution from different sources, whatever they are and however the 
pollution is mediated, to be taken into account. Source related decision-making 
may allow the accumulation of pollutants without violation of the standard. 
They may also ignore certain types of sources.153 However, the implementation 
of quality standards also requires source-related measures and in this process 
significant information problems may emerge.154 The quality standards do 
not contain information on how to allocate the needed reduction of pollution 
among polluters if the standard is exceeded. It may be complicated to link 
directly any sort of legally binding obligation or right of an individual polluter 
to a specific quality standard—unless the standard is not linked directly to the 
property of a single polluter, as a standard of the noise level in a factory is.
Apart from economic instruments, like tradable permit schemes, there are 
two main ways of linking quality standards to source related decisions: either a 
quality standard is a factor which is taken into account while installation specific 
standards are set; or violation of a quality standard initiates an administrative 
(planning) process, which aims to allocate pollution reduction objectives to 
different sources. Of the European standards the former group includes, for 
instance, many air quality standards, which define the desirable quality of air, 
which are meant to be achieved through a number of administrative decisions 
like permits, land-use plans and traffic plans, which would be taken in any case. 
The latter group includes, for instance, alert thresholds for ozone in ambient 
air (2002/3). Under this regime the competent authority is obliged to inform 
the public if the limits are exceeded. Another example would be the Water 
Framework Directive. The programme of measures referred to in Article 11, 
structures the future policy measures to be taken. Though member states have a 
fairly large degree of discretion as to what kind of new measures will be carried 
out, Article 11 of the Directive sets minimum criteria for each programme, 
which makes it possible to assess the sufficiency of the measures.
Standards binding individual polluters can be divided into product, 
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process, and performance standards.155 Product standards are always the same 
for a category of products, but process and performance standards can either be 
uniform or differentiated. Product standards define characteristics which each 
product of a certain category must meet. They may regulate, for instance, the 
concentration of pollutants in fuels. Process standards define the characteristics 
of the process to be carried out. They require the operator to employ certain 
production methods, practices, protection measures or raw materials. A 
simple example of this kind of standard is the height of the chimneys of energy 
production plants or factories. Another example would be the requirement to 
adopt a certain type of purification plant.
Among performance standards emission limits156 are apparently the 
most typical. There are a number of types of emission limits, such as binding 
maximum limits, target limits or guideline limits. Emission limits may be 
 expressed in different ways, like amount of pollutants in releases, specific 
amount of pollutants in releases, or as a purification effectiveness requirement 
in percentage terms.157 At the moment the BAT principle is perhaps the most 
important guiding principle with regard to the emission limits regulating 
industrial activities. Emission limits based on technological possibilities do not 
determine the technology, only the amount of pollution. Thus, the polluter is 
free to choose whatever means he wishes as long as emissions limits are met. In 
addition to the emission limit values, there are other techniques, like reference 
technology, available for the description of the required level of performance.
Installation specific standards are easy to implement and monitor in 
comparison to quality standards, because they are clearly addressed. The 
precision in the formulation of standards facilitates their enforcement and 
monitoring. However, occasionally the formulations of standards remain 
rather abstract and consequently difficult to monitor. In addition, abatement 
technologies may be complicated and manipulative, which may obstruct the 
authorities from seeing what is happening. All kinds of standards of traditional 
regulation may be problematic with regard to innovations, but in particular 
the process standards do not provide an incentive for a polluter to develop its 
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technologies or practices. In fact, the process standards may constitute obstacles 
to the adoption of better technologies and practices, though the polluter would 
like to find more effective and efficient solutions. Performance standards, 
depending on their use and design, leave greater room of freedom for a polluter 
to find the right solution and hence are more innovator-friendly. Accordingly, 
the option to use process standards is restricted by the IPPC Directive158 and 
emission limits are the most typical standards for pollution control. However, 
there are still other fields of environmental protection (like waste management), 
where process standards are quite common. In sum, process standards are often 
considered problematic159 and, due to this, preference is given to performance 
standards. With this in mind it is interesting to note that Davies asserts on 
the basis of USA experience that the use of “pure” performance standards has 
proven difficult, also within programmes specifically designed for that purpose. 
Based on other research he claims that five barriers to developing performance 
standards have been identified, namely statutory requirements, industry 
reluctance to give up “guaranteed technology standards”, insufficient resources 
to develop and update performance standards, inadequate mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with performance standards and issues of compatibility 
with federal requirements.160
Standards regulating individual polluters may be either uniform or 
differentiated. Uniform standards are the same for each activity or installation 
belonging to a category. Differentiated standards, in turn, vary from case to 
case. Differentiation may be based on a number of factors, like prohibition to 
cause health effects, BAT principle and/or another principles guiding standard-
setting. Differentiated standards have the advantage that they make it possible 
to take into account the differences between regions, local needs and individual 
plants or even the preferences of the public,161 though only as far and so far as 
the rules of discretion determine. In practice the difference between uniform 
and differentiated standards disappears if the degree of discretion is very 
strictly defined. This may result in a situation where standards concerning 
polluters belonging to the same category are in practice similar, though they 
may differ in principle. Differentiated standards can easily be adjusted to 
the technological development, which is not the case for uniform standards. 
Uniform standards can be based on the best available technology of the date 
of their issuance, but upcoming technological developments would require 
frequent changes in the legislation. The option to take into account features of 
individual activity increases the cost-effectiveness of differentiated standards in 
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comparison to uniform ones.162 The amount of benefits depends, among others, 
on the amount of variety between individual installations. However, uniform 
standards also have advantages. Setting differentiated standards require 
information on environmental effects, technological possibilities and the costs 
of adopting technologies in each individual case. Often all this information is 
not immediately available for regulators and apart from environmental effects, 
they may find themselves in a situation where the only source of information 
is the regulated industry itself. Furthermore, the administrative costs required 
for gathering the necessary information may outweigh the benefits of 
differentiation. In other words, uniform standards are relatively speaking easy to 
formulate and enforce.163 Uniform standards are generally applicable and hence 
they make it possible to avoid using a resource-intensive permitting procedure. 
This would, instead, mean that there would be fewer opportunities for public 
participation at individual level. Public participation of the local community 
is in particular justified if the environmental impacts of regulated activity are 
local and their relevance varies from one locality to another. However, if the 
standards used in practice do not differ to any significant extent, a counter-
argument would be that participating in decision-making, which always results 
in similar decisions, is a mere show, not democracy.
Another distinction to be considered is that between rate-based and 
mass-based standards. Rate-based emission standards limit the amount of 
pollution per unit of activity. Mass-based standards, instead, limit the total 
mass of pollution. In practice, rate-based standards have been employed more 
frequently than mass-based standards. In the case of rate-based standards the 
total amount of pollution will increase if the production increases. Mass-based 
standards instead force polluters to find more effective solutions if they want to 
produce more. According to Driesen, mass-based standards “provide a built-
in economic dynamic that rate based limits lack.”164 By this, in particular, he 
means that mass-based standards provide a stronger incentive for technological 
development in comparison to rate-based standards. In addition, rate-based 
standards needs more repeated regulatory decisions, whereas a mass-based 
decision, if founded on sound quality standards and assuming that new 
polluters do no appear, may work for a longer time. No doubt strictly applied 
mass-based standards also have disadvantages, because they may prevent an 
industrialist from expanding his production.
Standards can be determined at different levels of government. Seeing the 
issue from the perspective of a non-federalist member state, there are typically 
three levels of government involved: European, national and local. For the 
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member states with federal administrative structures, there is one level more to 
consider. Currently, the most important choice of decision-making level relates 
to that between the European and national ones. Based on the subsidiarity 
principle165 laid down in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, general preference should 
be given to the national level, though this is not necessarily the case in political 
reality. Most uniform standards or standard-setting principles are determined 
at the European level, the national government transposes European standards 
to the national legal system with some modification and local authorities 
have the crucial role of setting installation specific standards. The subsidiarity 
principle can be supported by the notion that national government knows 
better the local needs and circumstances according to the lines of the theory of 
optimal specificity.166 Furthermore, a certain degree of freedom at the national 
level enables different regulatory approaches and these, instead, may provide 
valuable lessons on how to develop further regulatory machinery.
Three main arguments in favour of European-wide standards are 
evinced.167 Firstly, some activities may have impacts on another member state 
or activities may be of an international nature (like international shipment of 
waste). Secondly, national standard setting may result in what is called the race 
to the bottom, i.e. member states may lower the ambition level of standards in 
order to attract business. Thirdly, it could be argued that the European Union 
should ensure good and equal environmental conditions for all European 
citizens. With regard to the first argument (international nature of certain 
environmental problems) there is a general consensus on it, although there may 
be disagreement as to whether the argument applies to a specific environmental 
problem or not. The second argument, ‘the race to the bottom’ argument, is 
valid if the costs of environmental regulation are so high that they affect the 
location of companies. Faure and Lefevere seem to doubt this argument on the 
grounds that there is a lot of evidence available suggesting that environmental 
costs do not significantly affect the location of business. Thus, member states 
do not have sound economic reason to take part in the race to the bottom.168 
However, though one would agree with this notion, it could be argued that 
the problem is not merely the facts, but the perceptions. The competitiveness 
argument is frequently used in political debate and public administration 
may take these arguments seriously, though the research would not support 
the argument. With regard to the last argument it should be pointed out that 
it favours European-wide standards, but of other kinds than the race-to-the-
. See van der Berg 1995 and 1998.
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bottom argument. If the European Union (politically) commits itself to ensure 
equal environmental conditions for all Europeans, this can be best achieved 
through European-wide quality standards, whereas response to race-to-bottom 
requires European-wide source standards. Because environmental conditions 
vary across Europe, common quality standards may mean differentiated source 
standards and this, again, can open the race to the bottom discussion. Hence, 
there is a tension between the arguments.
A further consideration to be taken into account while making a choice 
between European and national standards relates to the size of market. As is 
known, the rationale behind the first European environmental standards in the 
1970s was related to the promotion of an internal market.169 Different national 
environmental standards hampered trade and it was acknowledged that 
common standards would create better competitive conditions. The increase 
in the size of the economy, which is an intended consequence of common 
markets, is often associated with negative consequences for the environment, 
and this is why common European standards have a contested nature in the 
eyes of environmentalists. The size of the economy, however, also has another 
side. One could argue that common European standards give a greater incentive 
for those developing environmental technologies in comparison to standards 
applicable to small national markets only. The potential of a bigger market to 
develop technologies is far greater than that of small market. Hence, European-
wide uniform standards could foster technological development and, hence, 
environmental protection. However, there is also a counter-argument, which 
relates to political dynamics. If standards-setting at the European level were 
slower in comparison to a system where the member states make the final 
decisions within a legal framework regulated by EU, uniform standards may 
slow down the process. This, in turn, could have negative impacts in the long 
run.
. E.g. McCormick 2001, 42–55.
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2.3. Traditional regulation in perspective
2.3.1. Introduction
Traditional pollution control regulation has been heavily criticized,170 though 
also defended.171 Criticism implies a comparison between traditional regulation 
and its alternatives (deregulation being one of them), which is often limited 
to economic instruments. This may be because traditional regulation and 
economic instruments are more often considered alternatives to each other, 
whereas procedural instruments or non-legal instruments are often seen as 
complementary rather than alternatives to traditional regulation.172 In political 
discussion, deregulation can also be seen as an alternative, though research-
based criticism typically assumes that the same ambition level of environ-
mental protection can be achieved through other means. On these grounds 
the discussion in this section will focus on differences between traditional 
regulation and economic instruments.
Many arguments used in this discussion relate to effectiveness, efficiency 
and impacts on innovations, i.e. the main topics of this study. Naturally, these 
arguments will be discussed. However, regulatory governance, based on the 
wider democratic governance model, also includes themes like transparency 
(or open government) and accountability, as noted by the OECD and others.173 
Hence, some notions on transparency and accountability are justified in 
order to achieve a more balanced view of the discussion on regulation. The 
form of regulation employed may have important consequences in terms of 
transparency, accountability and public participation. These implications are 
noteworthy regardless of the effectiveness, efficiency and impacts on innovations 
of the regulation. A political decision-maker may consider advantages related 
to transparency, accountability and public participation so crucial that they 
outweigh possible other disadvantages of a given instrument.
Undoubtedly, there would be still more themes which are generally 
relevant for regulatory governance and may have implications for the issue of 
what instruments should be preferred. One of them is environmental justice. 
Environmental justice has its roots in an empirical notion originating in 
the USA that environmental harms are greater in regions inhabited by the 
underprivileged. Conceptually the idea of environmental justice implies that 
the distribution of benefits and burdens of environmental regulation should be 
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fair.174 The so-called hot spot problem, which means that regulation strengthens 
the concentration of environmental problems in a certain region, typical for 
economic instruments, has promoted discussion on environmental justice. 
Though drawing final conclusions on fairness may require a strongly normative 
approach, an assessment of the distributional effects does not necessarily need 
a normative starting point.175 An analysis of environmental justice may focus 
on the distribution of benefits and burdens between regulated entities, between 
regulated industry and the public affected and distribution of benefits between 
different segments of the public affected.176 Furthermore, distributional effects 
may vary in many different ways, such as by region or between rich and poor. 
The impacts of regulation are often controversial in terms of environmental 
justice. Environmental taxation may be well grounded on the basis of the 
polluter pays principle, though the economic burden of such taxation is often 
harder for the poor than the rich.177 This view, however, is disputed by others. 
Hahn and Stavins note that environmental policy generally has redistributed 
welfare from lower income groups to higher income groups, but he rejects the 
view that economic instruments would be substantially more regressive than 
other forms of regulation. 178
2.3.2. Effectiveness
Effectiveness is often defined as the degree of achievement of the goals of 
a regulatory instrument that the instrument has produced.179 Hence, in its 
simplest form the evaluation of effectiveness can be done by comparing 
the outcomes affected by the regulatory instrument to the goals. Despite 
the principal clarity of the concept, the use of it is not always easy. The goals 
are often stated in a general and abstract way, without specific measurable 
statements which could be observed without fundamental difficulties. Jyrki 
Tala points out many difficulties in finding the goals of laws. He notes, for 
instance, that the information on the goals available is often insufficient, the 
goals are determined at a general level, they may be vague and controversial 
with a strong rhetorical element involved. 180 Laws may also be intentionally 
open-ended in the sense that they do not even aim to define goals in substantial 
terms but only procedures. The regulation of an environmental management 
system is a typical example of procedural environmental regulation. Another 
example of open-ended instruments is liability for environmental damage—or 
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any instrument governed by private law. For open-ended instruments, it may 
be very difficult to say what kind of environmental changes must occur before it 
can be claimed that an instrument is effective. However, also with regard to these 
instruments, it is crucial to understand whether they produce any substantial 
environmental outcomes. Perhaps due to such problems, it has been proposed 
that the effectiveness of law should ‘be read widely to refer to the impact of law 
in real life’.181 This definition, however, is too flexible, particularly because it does 
not make a distinction between intended and non-intended effects or positive 
and negative effects. There should be no leap from the practical difficulty of 
finding the goals to the use of intellectually unclear concepts.
Another factor, which may also complicate the use of the standard definition 
of effectiveness, is the ambition level of the goals defined. It is possible that the 
goals of regulation are so loose that any instrument will result in achieving 
them, or the goals may be so strict that no instrument could achieve them. In 
both cases a very straightforward way of interpreting the results of effectiveness 
may provide an incomplete picture of the instrument concerned. With regard 
to Finland, a former head of the environmental protection department at the 
Ministry of the Environment, has claimed that the setting of environmental 
goals has been very realistic indeed, or even cautious in Finland and, as a result 
of this, achieving them has not been difficult.182 Regardless of how close this 
comes to the truth, it at least implies that high effectiveness may be achieved at 
the expense of ambition level. This, of course, has important consequences with 
regard to comparison of the results to other countries or instruments.
Comparing outcomes to goals, which might be either very easy or very 
difficult, is only a starting point for effectiveness evaluation. It is at least equally 
important to identify the features of regulation which either promote or prevent 
effectiveness. Though it would not be possible to compare environmental 
outcomes to goals of open-ended or framework type regulation, it still may be 
important and possible to identify features of regulation, which either promote 
or impede the protection of the environment. Though the ultimate goal of 
open-ended instruments, such as environmental management and auditing 
systems, may not be expressed in quantitative and measurable way, it would be 
meaningful to ask whether, how and why this instrument has—or has not—
contributed to the protection of the environment.
Effectiveness has two sides. Many authors writing about the effectiveness 
of environmental law focus on the implementation and enforcement proc-
esses.183 Then the question may be, for instance, what kind of decision-making 
. Parker et al. 2004, 11. 
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structures are effective,184 have the goals of the environmental regulation been 
implemented through imposing binding requirements on individual plants, 
how is the monitoring of the installations organized and what kind of sanctions 
are effective.185 All these questions are relevant for the issue of effectiveness. 
However, it is also possible that regulation which is fully implemented and 
enforced does not achieve its goals. Waters may remain polluted though new 
legislation intended to clean them has been adopted, fully implemented and 
enforced. This may be due to a variety of reasons, like lack of understanding 
of human impact on nature, which, in turn, has affected how regulation is 
constructed. In the policy studies the difference between these two different 
sources of ineffectiveness is often described using concepts like ‘policy 
formulation problem’ and ‘policy implementation problem’,186 whereas in the 
evaluation literature apparently the same distinction is described by using 
expressions ‘implementation failure’ and ‘theory failure’.187 Implementation 
problem, as its name suggests, refers to problems of implementation and 
enforcement processes and the cure for this disease is the improvement of these 
processes. Policy formulation (or theory failure) refers to more fundamental 
problems of regulatory design, which cannot be overcome through better 
implementation. A policy formulation problems may, for example, mean that 
the output of decision-making (i.e. permit, ban, rule etc.) itself has features 
which make it difficult to achieve the goals of policy-instrument although the 
law is fully implemented and enforced.
Traditional regulation is often considered effective188 in comparison 
to other instruments. Partly this relates to the dependability of traditional 
regulatory instruments. Dependability refers to the formulation of policy and it 
means that the nature of instruments affects how the goals are set. Dependability 
implies that environmental policy-making is not a two-stage process, where the 
first step is the design of goals and the second step the selection of appropriate 
regulatory instruments.189 
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Due to the very nature of traditional regulation, the reactions of those 
regulated can be foreseen with greater clarity than the reactions of those 
regulated by some other instruments.190 This is because traditional regulation 
forces each installation or other unit either to fulfil certain minimum 
requirements or to face the threat of sanctions, but economic instruments leave 
a greater degree of discretion for industry. If the goals of environmental policy 
are set first and then the instrument is chosen, the predictability of outcomes 
is certainly a good feature. The advocates of traditional regulation strongly 
emphasize the predictability of it in comparison to economic instruments.191 
On the other hand, if formulation of the goals is heavily dependent on the 
chosen instruments, then effectiveness criterion loses some of its relevance.
The uncertainty of economic instruments with regard to effectiveness 
is due to the fact that they are based on decentralized decision-making. It is 
not the government but individual polluters whose decisions determine the 
concrete amount of discharges and emissions from each individual source of 
pollution. In the case of tradable permits the government decides on the total 
amount of pollution reduction, but its spatial distribution is uncertain. In the 
case of environmental taxes both the total amount of pollution reduction and 
its spatial distribution are uncertain.
Though the general acknowledgement that traditional regulation is 
 effective (or dependable), critics of it claim that the very nature of traditional 
regulation leads to effectiveness problems, which may be either due to formula-
tion or implementation problems. As examples of policy formulation problems 
particularly associated with traditional regulation can be mentioned the 
following: Traditional regulation is considered particularly vulnerable to 
regulatory capture,192 asymmetry of information confuses decision-making, 
traditional regulation does not provide any incentive to go beyond the imposed 
level of protection, old polluting installations are used longer than they otherwise 
would be used and the rigidity of regulation makes it difficult to handle changing 
conditions.193 The following, in turn, are examples of implementation and 
enforcement problems associated with traditional regulation: the complexity 
of regulation leads to negative consequences, there are severe delays in 
implementation, lack of resources makes implementation and monitoring 
impossible. Sometimes critics assert that traditional regulation may be effective 
with regards to certain environmental problems, but ineffective with regard to 
others.194
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One problem associated with traditional regulation is asymmetry of 
information between decision-makers and regulated industry.195 The asymmetry 
of information relates to technological and economic possibilities as well as 
to costs of reducing pollution. The regulated industries are better informed 
about technological and economic constraints and opportunities than the 
regulatory authority. Naturally, there may also be other information problems 
such as scientific problems concerning the causal link between pollution and 
its health and environmental effects, but these problems are common to all 
policy instruments. In particular this criticism is focussed on technology-based 
standards (performance or process standards), which have an important role in 
traditional regulation. The best available technology principle is, perhaps, the 
most import basis for emission limit values imposed in environmental permits, 
and emission limit values are crucial for the overall ambition level of pollution 
control. The critics claim that though regulators may have good information on 
end-of-pipe solutions, they have much less information on process technologies 
than the regulated industry. The point is not only to know the general 
technological options but also to know the technological and economic options 
and costs of each individual installation, which vary from one case to another. 
Furthermore the formulation of technology-based standards is a complicated 
and resource-intensive matter. In addition, even if the regulators once get the 
technology-based standards right, technological and economic development 
may soon out-date them. It has been claimed that one of the most important 
results from a change from traditional regulation to other instruments is the 
dramatic decrease of technological assessment by regulators.196
The existence of asymmetry of information on technological options 
is generally acknowledged and hard to deny. However, its relevance varies 
depending on the technological complexity of polluting activity. With 
regard to small and medium-sized enterprises, the level of technological 
knowledge of permit authorities may even be higher than that of operators. 
In addition, asymmetry of information does not always make a difference 
between instruments. To the extent the environmental standard can be drawn 
from health or ecological effects, there is no need to know much about the 
technological options of each individual polluter. An extreme case is a pollutant 
which is so dangerous that its use in any quantity should be prohibited. But 
in other cases, too, information on health or ecological impacts may have a 
dominant role in standard setting.197 Hence, the asymmetry criticism is limited 
in particular to situations where there are several sources of pollution, the 
effects of any particular source are not critical and sources of pollution differs 
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from each other in relevant ways from a technological point of view. No doubt 
these conditions are sometimes, albeit not always, met.
Lack of incentive to go beyond the legally binding limits, is another 
problem frequently associated with traditional regulation,198 and clearly it 
holds in principle. However, some additional notions are worth taking into 
account. First, lack of incentive to go beyond legal limits does not necessarily 
mean loose limits or lack of gradually tightening environmental limits. A strict 
and continuous pressure for improvement of environmental performance is 
possible through short intervals between permit cycles. The second notion 
concerns the fact that real emissions are typically well below the level imposed. 
This has been interpreted in two different ways. Driesen argues that firms emit 
less than required in order to ensure that they consistently comply with the 
standards.199 In other words, in his view the part of emission reduction that 
goes beyond legal limits is also at least partly due to regulation. On the other 
hand, Ollikainen considers the same fact to show that there are other factors 
than regulation which determine the real level of emissions.200 I find it difficult 
to make a conclusion on this matter applying generally to traditional regulation. 
To me traditional regulation may or may not motivate the regulated industry 
to go beyond the legal limits depending on the exact design of the regulation 
and other context related matters. Furthermore, in certain circumstances the 
whole argument may lose its relevance. If the environmental technologies to 
be adopted by regulated industry are of the ‘once-for-all’ type, the relevance 
of continuous incentives may be rather low for the environmental effects as a 
whole. Generally speaking, the argument does not apply to situations where a 
polluter must make a categorical choice: take it or leave it. Furthermore, lack 
of incentive is not only a problem of regulatory instruments. For example, 
in the case of target load taxes201, environmental incentive disappears (and is 
intended to disappear) when the (individual) target is achieved. In addition, a 
tradable permit scheme does not motivate the industry as a whole to go beyond 
the overall limit, i.e. the so-called cap of the scheme. Finally, it can be noted 
that from a conceptual point of view a lack of incentive to go beyond is not a 
problem for effectiveness so far as the (aggregated) goal is anyhow achieved. If 
the set limits ensure the achievement of ecological thresholds202 or other policy 
goals with a large enough safety margin, one may ask why regulated industry 
should go beyond.
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Another criticism of traditional regulation concerns the distinction 
between old and new sources. It is claimed that traditional regulation, which 
often imposes more stringent requirements on new sources of pollution than on 
old ones, makes the regulated industry unmotivated to replace old installations 
by new ones due to the high costs of environmental investments. Thus, industry 
may use old installations causing more pollution longer than they otherwise 
would have done due to regulation. Hence, the differentiation of environmental 
standards between new and old installations may lead to perverse outcomes.203 
On the other hand economic instruments do not distinguish between old and 
new sources and, hence, do not have this problem. Again, this criticism holds in 
principle. However, in cases where abatement technology has a positive impact 
on the efficiency of production or if the proportion of the environmental cost of 
total costs are insignificant, this effect is not likely to be remarkable.
The effectiveness of a regulatory instrument may vary over time. If socio-
economic conditions change an instrument which has earlier been effective may 
become ineffective. It is argued, for example, that a regulatory technique which 
employs site-specific standards is not able to control the market if the situation 
changes. Thus, if the number of installations increases due to changes in the 
market situation, the overall pollution increases.204 Instead it is thought that 
an instrument which set a cap for the overall pollution of an industrial sector, 
is better equipped for such changes. This may be true in certain circumstances, 
though a system based on numerous installation specific decisions may also be 
able react to increased pollution. The tightening of environmental policy may 
even, depending on the political situation, be easier through routine periodic 
reviews of permit conditions than through high profile decisions on overall cap. 
In addition, traditional regulation often contains a number of mechanisms to 
modify decisions even before the end of their validity if serious environmental 
reasons so require. No doubt, once effective regulatory instruments may 
become ineffective over time for a variety of reasons, but this claim applies to all 
kinds of instruments.
In addition to the problems discussed above, which mainly relate to 
the formulation of regulation, implementation and enforcement problems 
may affect the effectiveness of a regulatory instrument. Some researchers 
see traditional regulation as particularly problematic from this perspective. 
Ackerman and Stewart argue that tradable permits offer greater ease of 
enforcement in comparison to best available technology strategy.205 This 
argument is based on the assumption that marketability would eliminate 
most of information-processing tasks of environmental bureaucracy as 
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well as litigation inherently related to best available technology strategies. 
Furthermore, it is argued that most of the traditional regulatory regimes lack 
adequate resources and, thus, are not fully implemented. A regulated industry 
may oppose enforcement of a regulatory instrument (litigation) and thus make 
it difficult to implement the regime and cause long delays in implementation.206 
Moreover, economic instruments are said to encourage firms to monitor each 
other’s pollution in a given market.207 However, many scholars do not agree 
with the approach presented above. Enforcement of traditional regulation 
generally and technology-based standards particularly is by some scholars seen 
to be easier to implement than their alternatives.208 Other instruments also 
need a mechanism for monitoring and this mechanism is not necessarily more 
effective than that of regulatory instruments. Lack of resources may complicate 
enforcement of any regulatory instrument whatsoever.
An additional type of criticism of traditional regulation relates to 
the changing nature of environmental problems. A particular regulatory 
instrument may be suitable for solving certain environmental problems while 
other instruments are better equipped with respect to others.209 Traditional 
regulation is often considered to be an ineffective instrument for problems 
caused by diffuse, non-point sources of pollution or transitory, mobile or 
remote operations due, for example, to problems related to implementation 
and monitoring.210 Furthermore it is claimed that increased eco-effectiveness 
or changes in consumer behaviour cannot be achieved through traditional 
instruments. On the other hand, traditional regulation has been seen preferable 
for environmental problems causing only or mainly local or threshold effects.211
2.3.3. Efficiency
Efficiency as a general term refers to allocative efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
as explained in Chapter 1. Allocative efficiency refers to both benefits and costs 
and hence would entail valuing the environmental benefits, which is often 
considered problematic. The cost-effectiveness approach focuses purely on the 
costs of regulation and compare the costs of policy alternatives in relation to 
given goals.212 One could also include dynamic effects (changes over time), such 
as technological development, in the concept of efficiency.213 Here, the focus will, 
however, be on the static side. Innovation effects will be discussed in the next 
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chapter. In this study the term of ‘efficiency’ is used to refer to cost-effectiveness 
unless otherwise stated. In the meaning of cost-effectiveness an instrument can 
be said to be inefficient if there is another, cheaper way to achieve the same 
outcome. Alternatively, an instrument which directs the abatement measures 
to be taken at the cheapest sources can be considered efficient.214 The latter 
definition is more limited in the sense that it refers only to the cost of those 
regulated, not the cost of regulators.
Apparently the most common critical argument against traditional 
regulation relates to cost-effectiveness. It is considered inefficient in comparison 
to its alternatives in many circumstances.215 Unlike economic instruments, 
traditional ones do not include a mechanism which minimises the aggregate 
costs of achieving the desired level of environmental protection, because it 
is unable to completely distinguish between the marginal abatement costs of 
different firms. A consequence of this is that those polluters whose marginal 
costs are high are required to do as much as those whose marginal costs are low, 
though optimal efficiency would require that the marginal costs of different 
companies should be the same. On this basis particularly economists, but 
also others,216 have claimed that economic instruments are more efficient than 
traditional regulation.
Even many proponents of traditional regulation basically accept that 
the critics have their point, though only with reservation. As Driesen puts it 
“efficiency critique is correct, but incomplete.”217 Proponents admit in particular 
that in many cases it is likely that the compliance costs of traditional regulation 
based on uniform standards will be higher in comparison to the alternatives. 
Proponents claim, however, that the criticism partly goes beyond the point. 
Uniform standards do not have so dominant role as the criticism assumes. 
Particularly in Europe differentiated standards are commonly used. Driesen 
argues that this is also the case also in the USA.218 Through differentiation 
of standards according to firms, regions or sectors it is possible to increase 
the efficiency of regulation in comparison to uniform standards. However, 
because it is unrealistic assume that public authorities would ever know the 
(marginal) costs of firms, no differentiation made by public authorities can be 
completely efficient. Due to asymmetry of information it is not likely that even 
well designed ways of differentiating will lead to optimal efficiency, although it 
is a step in the right direction.
Though the line of reasoning of critics is accepted at least to a certain 
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extent, there are contradictory understandings about the empirical evidence 
for efficiency. Cole and Grossman claim219 that only one out of ten studies, 
which Tietenberg in his seminal article considers empirical,220 is in a true 
sense empirical, others are simulations or predictive studies based on models. 
According to Cole and Grossman, there is no empirical evidence to show that 
traditional regulation is inevitably less efficient than economic instruments. 
In addition they argue that traditional regulation—or command-and-control 
regulation as they called it—have in certain circumstances been more efficient 
than its alternatives.221 No doubt there is also research to support the inefficiency 
argument of traditional regulatory instruments in certain circumstances.222 
However, the critics have overstated the efficiency of economic instruments, 
particularly that of tradable permits, by not acknowledging the problems 
inherent to them. Davies notes that in the construction of models for tradable 
permits, the following costs and drawbacks are often overlooked: (1) transactions 
costs for firms to find potential buyers of their surplus credits, for the agency 
to keep track of the trades, and to maintain a stable system in general; (2) 
uncertainty about the actual emissions reductions achieved and the value of 
a given permit (i.e. imperfect information), about the definition of property 
rights, and about the conditions under which such rights could be weakened 
or strengthened; (3) socio-economic consequences and societal opportunity 
costs resulting from the institution of a tradable permit system.223 Furthermore, 
efficiency is, after all only one criterion among many, and the overall picture 
may be different when other criteria also are taken into account.224
With respect to administrative costs, the views of critics and proponents 
seem to differ. Some critics of traditional regulation claim that the administrative 
costs of it are higher than those of economic instruments.225 Proponents argue 
that the opposite may be the case.226 The role of administrative costs may be 
crucial for the overall conclusion. Cole and Grossman have shown in their 
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analysis based on an economic theory that in certain circumstances economic 
instruments are more efficient than regulatory instruments and vice versa. 
They claim that “standard economic account of the comparative efficiency of 
alternative regimes are insensitive to historical, institutional, and technological 
contexts. Most importantly, they tend to assume perfect (and, incidentally, 
costless) monitoring, or they assume that monitoring costs are the same 
regardless of the control regime that is chosen.” In contrast to the foregoing 
Cole and Grossman show that while institutional and technological costs are 
taken into consideration, traditional regulation can be relatively the most 
efficient alternative. This particularly is true in cases involving high monitoring 
costs.227
Another aspect of the efficiency discussion is the nature of environmental 
problems. The nature of an environmental problem may significantly affect the 
potential efficiency gains of different instruments. There are environmental 
problems which require that local conditions, like varying ecological thresholds 
of waters, are taken into account. If an economic instrument is used to tackle 
such a problem, it may require changing tax rates or a weighted trading scheme. 
Adding these features to economic instruments may, however, make them 
complex and inefficient. With regard to wastewater control from pulp and paper 
mills in the Nordic countries, where the ecology of waters varies significantly, a 
group of economists came to the conclusion that theoretical gains from using a 
tradable emission permit are unlikely to be realized, because so many balancing 
measures would be required due to differences in natural conditions.228 
Traditional regulation, which uses decisions directed at individual installations, 
may be more suitable to tackle location specific problems. On the other hand, 
efficiency gains of economic instruments become particularly evident in the 
case of global problems like climate change. For climate change, unlike for 
many traditional environmental problems, it is the same from where the cuts 
of greenhouse gases are made. Only the amount of the cuts is relevant from the 
environmental point of view.
2.3.4. Innovations and their diffusion
A technological innovation has been defined to be the first commercially 
successful application of a new idea. An invention is the development of a new 
technological idea and diffusion of an innovation refers to the adoption of an 
innovation by those who did not develop it.229 Often the distinction between an 
innovation and an invention is not so clear in practice.230 Nor is the line between 
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an innovation and diffusion so clear, because new users of an innovation usually 
modify the original one.231
Markets give a continuous incentive to make and adopt innovations. 
However, their relevance for the promotion of social goals, such as environmental 
protection, can be neutral, negative or positive in a sporadic way. To make 
a distinction between different kinds of innovation Stewart calls product and 
process innovations that create benefits gained by firms through the sale of 
goods and services ‘market innovations’, whereas ‘social innovations’ refers to 
innovations that create social benefits. These two types of innovations are not 
mutually exclusive; a social innovation may reduce the compliance costs of 
the regulated industry or give a competitive advantage, if it enables cheaper 
production or if the innovator gain revenues from the sale of the idea or the 
technology.232
Economic instruments are often considered to be better at inducing 
innovations because they provide an incentive to innovate regardless of the 
level of pollution,233 whereas traditional regulation has been criticized for 
hampering innovations.234 According to some authors traditional regulation, 
unlike other instruments, provides no incentive to innovate, but do not obstruct 
the emergence of innovations. Rehbinder writes that “traditional command 
and control regulation does not contribute to the development of technology 
but assumes that it develops of itself.”235 The logic of the criticism is that the 
standards of traditional regulation may be a barrier to adopting new kinds of 
technological solutions and provide no incentive to develop technologies. The 
barrier argument applies in particular to those standards defining the products 
or technologies to be used. If only a specific product or technology is allowed to 
be used, then alternatives are excluded, even though they might enable the same 
environmental outcome. Due to asymmetry of information, public authorities 
tend to draw attention to the end-of-pipe technologies and neglect the options 
related to future process technologies (clean technologies). Because process and 
end-of-pipe technologies can be interlinked, an obligation to use specific end-of-
pipe technologies works as a barrier to the development of process technologies.
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Technology-based performance standards, such as those based on the best 
available technology principle, do not define the technologies to be used. They 
merely define the level of performance and, hence, an industrialist is then free 
to choose whatever technology she deems to be appropriate. Still it is argued 
that technology-based standards discourage technological development. If the 
regulated industry develops new technologies and delivers this information to 
the public authorities, this might result in the setting of higher standards, which, 
in turn, may increase the compliance costs. Hence, the regulated industries 
have only an incentive to develop technologies enabling the achievement of 
the existing standards at lower costs.236 This is why Sunstein has labelled the 
best available technology principle a regulatory paradox. He claims that it 
has pervasive impacts with respect to its primary goals. Sunstein also rejects 
the possibility that suppliers could have an incentive to innovate by arguing 
that there is are well-functioning markets for pollution control technology. 
This—according to him—is because outsiders lack the relevant information, 
the regulated industry in unwilling to co-operate with them, and regulation 
is continuously changing.237 Stewart considers that the unpredictability of 
regulatory policy (“moving targets”) reduces the incentive of suppliers.238
These arguments, however, are theoretical, and empirical research has shown 
that the relationship between regulation and innovations is more complicated. 
In addition, the criticism concerning the use of specific technologies is partly 
wrong, because most of the real-world standards do not require the use of 
defined technologies. Many standards are health-based standards, which 
define only the target and the technology-based standards do not require that 
reference technologies are used.239 One can also note that the relevance of the 
distinction between process and end-of-pipe technologies may have been 
over-stressed. Berkhout, based on a study of two industrial sectors, namely 
pulp and paper and PVC production, claims that though “process change is a 
significant driver for environmental performance, …abatement continues to 
be an important way for process industries to achieve improved environmental 
performance. … There is little evidence that process change really generates 
more rapid improvements … than abatement.”240 This diminishes to some 
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extent the weight of the asymmetry of information –argument, which tends to 
be most serious with regard to process technology.
Perhaps the strongest claim on the positive relationship between regulation 
and innovations is presented by Porter and Linde and has been labelled the 
Porter hypothesis. They argue that regulation may signal potential technological 
improvements, focus on information gathering and create pressure to 
innovate, and in these ways contribute to technological development and the 
competitiveness of an economy.241 According to the Porter hypothesis strict 
environmental regulation may result in innovations, which generate gains for 
first-movers, which may even over-compensate the costs of the adoption.242
Though the Porter hypothesis as a whole lacks sound evidence, there is at 
least evidence that regulation has spurred innovations. It has been shown that 
even a most straightforward intervention in markets, like banning the production 
and use of a product, may work as an innovation stimulus. Often a ban on use 
or production of a substance results in the development of its substitute by 
regulated industry or others. Based on a study concerning the responses of 
regulated industry to bans on certain products under chemical regulation it 
has been concluded that “the review confirms that product regulations tend 
to call forth product innovations, that component or pollutant regulations 
tend to elicit process innovations, and that the stringency of regulation is 
an important determinant of the degree of technological innovations.”243 Of 
course, an appearance of a substitute does not prove that the overall impact of 
state intervention has been positive from the technological development point 
of view. It is also possible that the innovation effects induced are outweighed 
by other costs of regulation.244 However, it shows that not only carrots but also 
sticks may work as innovation stimuli. More recent studies have also established 
that traditional regulation has spurred innovations even though standards are 
set on the basis of existing technologies245 or a standard is loose at the moment 
when it finally enters into force.246 These studies stress that the anticipation of 
future regulation can influence the development of technology.
The foregoing points out that the possible superiority of alternatives to 
traditional regulation in terms of innovations is not categorical but a relative 
matter. Even the relative superiority has been challenged. Driesen acknowledges 
that economic instruments, like emission trading, are often more cost-effective 
in comparison to traditional regulation, and therefore preferable. However, 
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unlike others he is unable to see emission trading as generally superior to 
traditional permits in terms of innovations. He argues that emissions trading 
does not give any incentive to continue reducing emissions after equilibrium 
(=efficient allocation of resources in relation to a given goal) has been reached. 
In fact, he goes even further and claims that “emission trading probably 
weakens net incentives for innovations … by shifting reductions from high-
cost to low-cost facilities”247 The main argument of Driesen is not that emission 
trading or any other economic instrument does not foster innovations, but that 
a comparable traditional regulation could do the same—or even more. Because 
innovations may turn out to be much more important in the long run, impacts 
on innovations may be considered an even more crucial feature of regulation 
than its cost-effectiveness.
Though one would not accept that traditional regulation is generally 
superior to economic instruments, a real-world economic instrument may 
promote innovations to a lesser degree than a real world traditional regulation. 
Analysis based on theoretical models has been criticized for not taking into 
account the political reality, where regulatory instruments are prepared. Kemp 
claims with regard to environmental taxes that the tax rates are usually so low 
that they tend to have smaller impacts on the technological development than 
traditional regulation.248
Environmental regulation is not the only type of regulation which 
may affect environmental innovations.249 Foster et al. claim that traditional 
regulation may induce significant innovations only if it is complemented by 
other policy measures, such as research and development programmes and 
education. They further argue that the impacts of environmental regulation 
depends on many non-environment related contextual factors, such as the 
general technological level of companies and similar kinds of regulation do not 
necessarily have similar impacts in different countries.250 In addition, it has been 
pointed out that the major technological changes relevant for environmental 
performance have been due to other than environmental factors.251 Seen 
from this perspective, the evaluation of the innovation impacts of regulation 
is even more demanding than that of effectiveness and efficiency. Still it is 
important to stress that environmental regulation may influence innovations 
and their diffusion either positively or negatively, and the technological effects 
of environmental regulation are a crucial issue for the development of future 
regulation.
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2.3.5. Transparency and accountability
Traditional regulation has also been challenged by claims related to the 
decision-making process. Some researchers prefer economic instruments 
instead of traditional regulation, because they believe that democratic values 
can so best be fostered. Traditional regulation has been seen as problematic on 
the grounds that it directs political discussion to complicated matters of means 
instead of ends, reduces accountability and increases vulnerability to regulatory 
capture. It is the overall amount of allowable pollution which should be at 
the heart of political debate and decisions on technological means to reduce 
pollution should be left to the polluting industry. Ackerman and Stewart argue 
from the US perspective that traditional regulation and BAT as a key concept of 
such regulation focus political discussion, as well as administrative and judicial 
proceeding upon arcane technological questions, “which rapidly exhaust the 
time and energy that most politicians, let alone the larger public, are willing 
to spend on environmental matters.” As an alternative Ackerman and Stewart 
present tradable permits, which make it possible for the public to focus on a 
different question: how much the total amount of pollution should be decreased 
every year.252 Sunstein253 concurs with Ackerman and Stewart. He claims that 
economic instruments offer a better decision-making framework because the 
weighting between different values must be done explicitly and openly.
Other scholars reject the view that economic instruments increase 
transparency and direct decision-making to essential matters. Heinzerling, 
based on a case analysis, rejects that trading schemes have in practice opened 
up a larger discussion on “the ends of environmental policy” by elected 
bodies. Her overall conclusion is that “‘democracy’ cannot be counted on the 
side of pollution trading”.254 Generally speaking, it can be noted that in the 
case of traditional regulation there is also a need to decide on ‘the ends’ of 
environmental policy and this can be done in the form of a overall pollution 
reduction objective. This is certainly not an easy task, taking into consideration 
the problematic balancing between environmental and other values (like 
competitiveness), but in this respect traditional regulation does not differ from 
other kinds of regulation.255
In a democratic country, public decisions are made by democratically 
elected bodies or the public administration accountable to them. The means 
and needs of accountability vary from one policy instrument to another. 
Advocates of economic instruments argue that there will be fewer decisions in 
need of accountability in the framework of economic instruments. There is no 
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need to make a decision on environmental standards, for example, at the level 
of individual installations either in the case of environmental taxes or tradable 
permits, and all major decisions can be made by democratically elected bodies. 
Thus, the number of decisions in need of accountability is reduced remarkably. 
This argument is opposed by noting that the reduced number of decisions does 
not reduce the need for accountability. The need for accountability in the case 
of the major decisions, like the overall cap for a tradable permit scheme, is 
much stronger than any individual decision of the numerous decisions made 
under a traditional permit mechanism.256 In addition, installation specific 
decisions do not necessary disappear under a regime of economic instruments, 
although their nature is changed. Installation-specific decisions may be needed 
for a variety of reasons, like the need to take local conditions into account.
The fact that traditional regulation employs installation-specific decision-
making is also seen, contrary to the critics of traditional regulation, as an 
advantage. The very existence of installation-specific decisions makes it possible 
to have an ex ante accountability mechanism.257 Due participation of the public, 
transparency of procedures and accountability of authorities are seen as merits 
of traditional regulation based on administrative law.258 Economic instruments, 
instead, do not provide opportunities to build participation mechanisms and 
the members of the public have difficulties in obtaining information on where 
and what kind of decisions are made and how much individual companies 
are polluting under such a regime. In addition, the general public are not 
consulted when decisions in the framework of an economic instrument are 
made at the level of an individual company.259 This means that differences in 
the opinions of people in different regions are not incorporated into decision-
making. In addition to the safeguards preceding the decision-making, the 
traditional regulation offers an opportunity to create effective judicial review. 
Economic instruments do not always offer such a possibility. Rehbinder has 
even doubted whether macro-level decisions on economic instruments—like 
the cap of pollution under a tradable permits scheme—could be subject to 
judicial review.260
The dispute, if the existence of installation specific decision-making 
procedure is a value of its own, comes back to the theory of democracy 
employed. If the main emphasis is put on the role of democratically elected 
bodies, the conclusion may be different than if it is put on the position of 
citizens affected. Thus, the advocates of economic instruments may, at least to 
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a certain extent, defend their position by claiming that the strengthening of 
the position of those individuals affected is of minor relevance in comparison 
to strengthening the position of democratically elected bodies and vice versa. 
Hence, transparency and accountability differ as an evaluation criterion from 
effectiveness, efficiency and innovation in the sense that the question of which 
instrument is preferable does not depend only on the impacts of the policy 
instruments, but also on the democratic values used.
Each constitution is based on certain democratic values. Hence, one 
may ask what the values of a constitution are in a particular country and if the 
constitution could guide the choice of forms of regulation. As Rehbinder has 
indicated, the constitution may set some limits to the development of regulation. 
He writes: “The question is then whether the State is under an obligation based 
on constitutional law, or at least an obligation derived from basic political value 
judgements, whereby it has to tackle environmental problems primarily by 
administrative regulations.”261 In the Finnish discussion it has been stressed 
that the constitutional right for the environment (Section 20 of the Finnish 
Constitution) requires the maintenance of the achieved level of environmental 
protection. Furthermore, it has been called into question whether it would be 
possible in the name of the development of regulation to lower the existing level 
of environmental regulation.262
Some limits may, indeed, follow from the Constitution. As Rehbinder 
notes, a risk to human life and a risk of severe or irreversible harm to human 
health, may belong solely to the sphere of administrative regulation, because 
such impacts should not be allowed at all. Furthermore, it can be agreed that 
an essential lowering of the level of environmental protection could violate the 
Finnish Constitution. However, the problem is to define what the deterioration 
of existing environmental regulations really means. If the choice is to be made 
between regulation of high a environmental ambition level and regulation 
of a low ambition level, the answer may be clear. However, even in this case 
new evidence on the health or environmental effects may change the picture. 
Furthermore, the answer to the question which of alternative ways of regulating 
is “the best”, may depend on the evaluation criteria used. A change of regulation 
does not necessarily mean a change of the (aggregated) environmental goal, 
although it may affect efficiency, innovations and procedural values. One might 
also ask if the judgement should be made at the level of individuals (the public, 
installations, protected species) or at aggregate level (industrial sectors or 
ecosystems). If evaluation criteria point in different directions, judging whether 
the overall impact of a change of regulation is an attenuation or an improvement 
of existing regulations, may become difficult. In particular, with the exception 
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of immediate health effects, it is extremely difficult to give a general preference 
to a certain form of regulation and claim that replacement of this or that form of 
regulation by other forms is not possible. Hence, it is most demanding to draw 
general conclusions on how the Constitution limits the choice of regulatory 
instruments, though this aspect may turn out to be relevant with regard to a 
specific regulatory reform.
Regulatory capture, i.e. unjustified influence of special interests, may 
affect the design of instruments in various ways, such as exceptions to the main 
rule or even as specifications of measuring techniques. Critics of traditional 
regulation claim that it is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture, because 
the relationship between regulators and the regulated is too close.263 There is 
some evidence showing that the interests of certain groups have influenced the 
formulation of regulation,264 though sound evidence showing the difference 
between different forms of regulation seems to be lacking. Some regulatory 
capture theories claim that all regulatory instruments are equally prone to 
capture, whereas other theories combine legal techniques and vulnerability to 
capture.265 According to the latter group, if the law leaves a wide discretion to 
local authorities, the system is more vulnerable to regulatory capture than in 
the case of legal technique, which leaves a limited role for the decisions of local 
authorities. Because the discretion of local authorities is generally greater in 
the case of traditional regulation than in the case of economic instruments, it 
follows that instruments of traditional regulation are more prone than economic 
instruments to regulatory capture according to these theories. In this context, 
one might note that there are also differences between instruments of traditional 
regulation as well. If regulatory technique is based on uniform standards, the 
amount of discretion of the administration implementing the regime is smaller 
than in the case of differentiated standards. Uniform standards may have other 
disadvantages, as discussed earlier, but with regard to regulatory capture of 
lower authorities they can be seen as safer.
The problem of regulatory capture is not necessarily limited to lower 
authorities. According to Rehbinder, economic instruments are particularly 
vulnerable to regulatory capture just because there are only few important 
decisions within the framework of economic instruments, like the overall cap 
of emission in the case of tradable permits and the tax rate in the case of taxes. 
He asserts that it would be easy for industry to exert all possible pressure on 
these decisions in order to achieve favourable decisions.266 Interestingly, many 
environmental taxes are rather low, contain many exceptions and have different 
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kinds of rebate mechanisms, all of which make the life of certain groups easier. 
Whatever the exact role of special interests is for these, at least it would be 
irrational to exclude the possibility that there is a regulatory capture behind this.
As can be seen from the discussion above, the approaches of different 
researchers towards capture have varied widely. No one has managed to present 
a convincing argument that the possibility of regulatory capture, i.e. undue 
influence of special groups, is more likely in the case of a certain kind of 
regulation than in the case of some other kind. The regulatory technique used 
has a role to play mainly in the sense that the sensitive stages in decision-making 
procedures vary from one instrument to another. In each case some public 
authority must make substantially relevant decisions and it cannot be ruled out 
that special interests are then taken into account. Hence, I tend to agree with 
those who take the view that regulatory capture is possible with regard to all 
instruments, though regulatory technique may affect how it could take place.
2.3.6. Interplay between regulatory instruments
Hardly any environmental problem is nowadays regulated by a single instrument 
alone, but by a policy mix. In practice, the number of regulatory instruments 
in use has increased and hence also the potential constraints between the 
instruments. Though one could agree with an argument that there are only few 
circumstances when the use of single instrument is the most effective way of 
regulating an environmental problem,267 not all combinations of instruments 
are necessarily effective.
While thinking of the interplay between instruments from the impacts 
point of view, three factors in particular should be taken into account: the target 
groups, environmental problems and impacts mechanisms of each instrument. 
No doubt policy mix is often understood to refer to instruments regulating the 
same environmental problem and the same target group. However, the links 
between instruments go beyond this situation. Even two instruments regulating 
different problems and target groups may be interlinked if the environmental 
problems are interlinked. For example, there is such a link between greenhouse 
gases and traditional air pollutants (SO2 and NOx). If climate change policy 
succeeds in reducing greenhouse gases, it, luckily, will most likely also reduce 
other pollution (like SO2 and NOx emissions). The situation is not always this 
good, and negative spillover into other policy areas is also possible.
Instruments which regulate the same target group and the same 
environmental problem may be complementary or counter-productive.268 The 
intervention theories of instruments may be so alien to each other that their 
simultaneous use distort their combined outcomes. In this case instruments 
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can be considered to be counter-productive; in the opposite situation the 
relationship is complementary.
Generally speaking, economic instruments leave greater space of freedom 
for the target group to choose the way of behaviour considered appropriate for 
individual actors than does traditional regulation. In fact, the relative advantage 
of economic instruments is based on freedom of action. This is not to say that 
economic instruments are always a good solution to manage environmental 
problems, but if this is the case, then the freedom of action of individual 
actors is an important feature of intervention theory. Therefore a traditional 
regulatory instrument which limits this freedom, also reduces the relative 
advantages, like efficiency, attributed to economic instruments. However, from 
the notion that the freedom to make decisions is important for the functioning 
of economic instruments it does not follow that all kinds of restrictions of this 
freedom would adversely affect the functioning of economic instruments. 
Hence, it is important to find what kind of restrictions are counter-productive 
and what kind not. I approach this issue by two examples. The first concerns the 
relationship between emission trading and permitting.
Well-functioning permit markets are at the heart of emission trading 
schemes. Public authorities determine the total amount of allowances and make 
the first allocation of allowances, either through auctions or grand-fathering. 
Thereafter the distribution of allowances (and real emissions) is left to the 
markets. One factor which may distort the functioning of an emissions trading 
scheme is a parallel traditional regulation. It is not possible to say whether the 
relationship between emission-trading and traditional permits is generally 
counter-productive or complementary, but it depends on the details of the 
instruments. Certain kinds of permit conditions of traditional regulation may 
be counter-productive, whereas others are not. If the functioning of markets 
is distorted, it will mean that efficiency gains are (at least partly) lost, although 
it would not have impacts on the total amount of allowances. Thus, emission 
trading scheme and traditional regulation, like environmental permits, are 
counter-productive to the extent that the permit conditions used distort the 
allowances markets. In the opposite case then, traditional regulation may be 
complementary in relation to an emission trading scheme. For greenhouse gases 
most permit conditions regulating other pollutants than the greenhouse gases 
are not a priori counter-productive, whereas permit conditions concerning these 
gases are. Energy efficiency requirements are a borderline case. A requirement 
to carry out an energy audit is complementary to trading, because it aims to 
improve the information basis, not to determine what the industry should do. A 
requirement to invest in energy efficiency equipment may, instead, be counter-
productive, because it ties the hands of what has been regulated.
Another example concerns the relationship between environmental 
taxes and traditional permits. Environmental tax is planned to serve as an 

incentive. Its effectiveness is based on the idea that there are alternative courses 
of action available and the target group is free to choose any alternative, 
though tax makes one alternative economically more attractive than others. 
This should lead to efficient use of resources in relation to a given goal, where 
some polluters choose to pay tax and others to reduce pollution. In the case 
where the same environmental objective is pursued through the mandatory 
requirements of traditional regulation, there is the threat that tax will become 
punitive. However, tax and environmental regulation, if rightly designed, can 
also complement each other. This is the case if the tax is directed to reduce 
pollution which exceeds the mandatory level. The use of uniform standards for 
a sector as a part of policy mix is preferable, because the use of differentiated 
standards may lead once again to punitive taxation and differentiation based on 
the principle of the best available technology principle, would reduce efficiency 
gains of (additional) taxation.
2.3.7. Concluding remarks on pollution control regulation
In this chapter the relative strengths and weaknesses of traditional regulation 
in comparison to economic instruments have been discussed. Often different 
evaluation criteria point in opposite directions. It could be possible to draw 
the general conclusion from the discussion that traditional regulation is often 
effective and provides good opportunities for public participation, whereas 
economic instruments tend to outweigh traditional regulation in terms of 
efficiency. With regard to impacts on innovations, it is more difficult to draw 
a general conclusion. However, the reality is much more complex. Firstly, what 
instruments should be preferred depends partly on values, like those related 
to democracy. Secondly, there is not sufficient evidence on various points. For 
example, it is unclear what the relationship is between the choice of instruments 
and regulatory capture. Thirdly, the role of context-related factors, such as the 
nature of the environmental problem in question,269 exact formulation of an 
instrument, technological possibilities, socio-economic constraints and the 
legal-administrative environment, is significant and relevant for the choice 
of instrument. Traditional regulation is not always effective and economic 
instruments are not always efficient, depending on the context-related factors.
Often general conclusions regarding preferability of an instrument are 
based on ideal types of regulation and hence the conclusions are limited to those 
ideal cases. In sum, drawing of general conclusions apart from the notion that 
. Apparently many authors referred to in this chapter have had in their minds a comparison 
between traditional pollution control regulation, like environmental permits and economic 
instruments for pollution control, like tradable permits (e.g. Ackerman, Driesen, Hahn, Hilson, 
Latin, Sunstein, Rehbinder, Stewart and Wagner). This leaves open to what extent it is possible 
to extrapolate the features found in these types of regulation into regulation tackling other 
issues. 

traditional regulation is not a cure for all environmental problems,270 is difficult. 
As Hahn and Stavins write: “No single approach will be ideal for all problems. 
The real challenge is to identify the right policy for each specific situation. The 
best set of policies will typically involve a mix of market and more conventional 
regulatory processes. Design and implementation of improved policies will 
require policymakers to adapt, rather than abandon, present programs.” 271 Why, 
then, is it valuable to compare different forms of regulation. The answer to this 
question is simple: it helps to identify the potential problems and draw attention 
to important issues related to different regulatory instruments. Theoretical 
comparison is not the final answer to which kind of regulation is preferable, but 
it gives an analytical basis, a framework of interpretation, to make research on 
concrete regulation. As noted in Chapter 1, empirical evidence on regulation is 
often incomplete due to data problems and difficulties in establishing a causal 
link between regulation and outcomes. The point in this chapter is to show 
some of main features, strengths and weaknesses, of traditional regulation so 
that the following analyses in coming chapters concentrating on the experience 
from one country, could be seen in a broader perspective.
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Chapter 3
Regulatory change
In this chapter the evolution of environmental regulation is explored. National 
traditional pollution control regulation is set in a broader context before the 
following chapter, which concentrates solely on this type of regulation. The 
development of regulation is studied from different angles in order to gain a 
variety of insights. The chapter begins with theoretical notions on the recent 
development of environmental policy, regulation and law. This part of the 
chapter is based on the literature and not directly linked to Finnish environ-
mental legislation. Thereafter the national legislative development is explored 
on the basis of quantitative data concerning legislative change. The data 
gathered covers the years from 1988 until 2003. Part of legislative change, 
though concerning environmental regulation, is irrelevant for substantial 
environmental policy and the relative size of manifestly irrelevant legislation will 
be discussed. Trends in legislative change, such as variation in new legislation 
between sectors and how Europeanization has affected development will be 
explored. Furthermore, the issue of regulatory shift in terms of instruments will 
be tackled. Trends and quantities of new legislation may give an incomplete 
picture on regulatory change. Therefore the relevance of new policy instruments 
in solving environmental problems is explored using research related to Finnish 
instruments in order to better understand how regulatory shift has affected the 
pollution control of industrial activities.
3.1. Evolution of regulation
The evolution of environmental regulation is not an isolated phenomenon, 
but a part of a larger societal change. Among environmental sociologists and 
political scientists it has become popular to understand the recent change in 
industrialized societies through the theory of ecological modernization,272 
though the societal process of ecological modernization does not limit itself 
to the issues of regulation or interventions taken by government. Although 
. Weale 1992, Mol 1995, Hajer 1995.

different authors see the role of regulation differently, there is a consensus that 
change of regulation is either one factor affecting the change or a result of change. 
Regulatory reform is frequently seen as a part of ecological modernization.
The concept of ecological modernisation273 has many meanings: it can 
be seen as a sociological theory concerning the relation between industrial 
society and the environment; as a conceptualisation of a new paradigm of 
environmental politics and policy; as a concrete programme of environmental 
policy.274 It includes analytical and normative dimensions. Partly it aims to 
serve as a theoretical model to describe and understand the on-going change 
and partly the theory can be seen as a model of how society should be changed 
so as to respond to the changing challenges of environmental problems.275 
It must be recalled that the basic criticism of any normative theory is that it 
rather reflects the wishes of the promoters of the theory than what is happening 
in the real world. Ecological modernisation theory represents optimistic (as 
opposed to apocalyptic) understanding of the relationship between society 
and the environment. The optimism is based on the assumption that economic 
development and the protection of the environment can be combined in such 
a way which leads to win-win situations. In addition, it includes an idea that a 
reform of institutional structure is possible (although not necessarily always 
successful), unlike the most pessimistic analyses, which were more popular still 
1970s and 1980s.276 The theory also suggests that the change has already started, 
though only to an insufficient extent.
In the ecological modernisation literature two important turning points 
in recent environmental history have been identified dividing the development 
of environmental policy into three waves. The first turning point is located 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s by promoters of ecological modernization 
theory as well as many others.277 Although environmental issues, in particular 
nature conservation, was an already important issue before this (during the 
first wave), the environmental discourse thereafter became more controversial 
and many environmentalists started to demand radical changes in the socio-
economic structures in order to avoid serious consequences to society as a 
whole. However, the demands made during the second wave did not result 
in significant institutional transformations and the societal environmental 
. On the concept of ecological modernization, Sairinen 2000, 76–.
. Mol 1995.
. The major contributions to the development of the ecological modernisation theory have been 
made by scientists coming from a small number of western European countries (in particular 
from the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom). This has caused a discussion to 
what extent, if any, it is applicable to other societies either in Europe, other OECD countries 
or third-world countries. See reflections on this by Mol, one of the major contributors to the 
theory, Mol 2003, 63–70.
. Mol 2003, 47–70. 
. Haila 2001, 26–32.
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discussion of that day was dominated by social scientists with very pessimistic 
views on the ability of capitalist society to react to environmental challenges. 
The second turning point, which started the third wave, is of crucial importance 
for ecological modernization theory. The promoters of the theory see it as the 
dominant sociological theory for the third wave.278 This change can be located 
roughly in late 1980s and early 1990s, between the publication of the Brundtland 
Report279 in 1987 and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. There are two 
important differences between the second and the third waves. The third wave 
meant “the commencement of actual environment-induced transformations 
of the industrial order of the modernity” and the emergence of ‘global change’ 
issues.280 The transformation process also means different kinds of institutional 
changes. The roles of science and technology, the market, nation-state and social 
movements are changing and new ideologies are emerging.281 For the evolution 
of law and regulation, the transformation relates, in particular, to the changed 
relations between the state and market282 as well as the state and citizens.283 
The changed relationship between the state and markets means a new kind of 
market-orientation and the use of markets, whereas the changed relationship 
between the state and the public means more participation in policy-making 
and its implementation. In addition, concepts and policy principles like 
‘proactive’ or ‘preventive approach’, ‘the precautionary principle’, ‘the polluter 
pays principle’ ‘public right to know’, and ‘shared responsibility’ have been 
associated with ecological modernisation.284 This is, however, misleading in the 
sense that many environmental principles have roots which go back far beyond 
the late 1980s.285 Though the temporal distinctions between different waves may 
not be sharp, they can been seen as illustrations of the ideological evolution 
behind the actual environmental policy.
Regulatory reform,286 a part of the overall transformation of different social 
institutions, has been seen as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, precondition of 
ecological modernisation. Indeed, a ‘fundamental transition’ in environmental 
policy is seen to be taking place.287 The references to the changes of regulation 
. Theory can also be understood an ideology, see e.g. Rinkevicius 2000.
. World Commission on Environment and Development 1987.
0. Robinson 1998, 39- and Mol 2003, 47–70, 
. Mol 2003, 61–62.
. Gouldson and Murphy 1996, 13. 
. Weale 1992, 31.
. Rinkevicius 2000, 166 and Cederlöf 2001, 124–127.
. The OECD adopted to recommendation on the polluter pays principle in 1972 and 1974 
(OECD 1975). On the origins of the polluter pays principle, the principle of prevention and the 
precautionary principle, see de Sadeleer 2002, 23–33 (the polluter pays principle), 62–72 (the 
principle of prevention) and 93–149 (the precautionary principle).
. The OECD is a major organisation promoting regulatory reform towards increased market-
orientation, see e.g. OECD 1997a and OECD 1997b. 
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in the ecological modernisation literature are numerous.288 In essence, this is 
seen to mean the emergence of new instruments (called ‘New Environmental 
Policy Instruments’ NEPI) and a diminishing role of traditional regulation. 
Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, who name as NEPIs eco-taxes and other market-
based instruments, voluntary agreements and informational devices such as 
eco-labels, have found indications that the rise of new policy instruments is 
a world-wide phenomenon, not something related to individual countries 
or regions like Europe. They claim that the total number and diversity of 
environmental policy instruments has grown generally and in some countries 
amazingly fast.289 Another related change concerns the increasing relevance of 
the integration of environmental requirements into other policies.290
The theory of ecological modernisation concerns societal change at large 
and it assumes that a large number of social institutions is changing. A societal 
change of the magnitude that the theory suggests cannot take place without 
extensive changes of law as well. Hence, it is not surprising that observations 
similar to those presented in the discussion on ecological modernisation are 
also common among legal researchers. There are similarities between the 
‘waves’ of the ecological modernisation theory and the evolutionary stages of 
the curative model, the preventive model and the anticipatory model presented 
by de Sadeleer.291 New kinds of state-market relationships and increased 
market-orientation have been considered a challenge for legal development 
in general292 and environmental law in particular.293 The change has long been 
particularly obvious with regard to pollution control regulation.294 The changing 
relationship between state and citizen requires the finding of a new balance 
between environmental demands, human rights and the protection of the 
traditional rights of individuals. The development of increased legal safeguards 
for the health environment has well documented.295 The new balance is seen to 
be achieved through the on-going process towards a Rechtstaat of Sustainable 
Development (Kestävän kehityksen oikeusvaltio)296 or Eco-social Rechtstaat 
(Ekososiaalinen oikeusvaltio).297
A profound change according to the lines of ecological modernisation 
does not touch only (administrative) environmental law, though the develop-
. For example, Leroy and Tatenhove 2000, 198–205 and Rinkevicius 2000, 166, Cederlöf 2001, 
124–127 and Sairinen 2000, 76–81.
. Jordan et al. 2003, 3–12.
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ment, where this branch of law becomes more effective and efficient, is a part of 
it. It is clear that apart from environmental law in a strict sense, environmental 
considerations have increasingly become in-built in many branches of law, 
which regulate economic activities related to the use of land or natural resources, 
like agricultural or forestry law, during the last twenty years or so. The change, 
however, seems to be even greater than this, also touching such traditional 
branches of law, as liability law, company law and contract law.298 If law is to 
be ecologically modernized it requires changes in the domains of legislation, 
legal practice as well as theoretical thinking (legal science). The most influential 
single changes with regard to the impacts on the environment can be assumed 
to take place through changes in legislation. However, if legal doctrine (legal 
thinking) would stick to the old traditions and legal practice (partly as a con-
sequence of less developed legal thinking and, thus, lack of intellectual tools 
to tackle with new problems) interpret law in a conservative way, this certainly 
would influence the modernisation process. More radical interpretations of law 
and well-developed legal thinking could accelerate the modernisation process 
even if the legislative development is slow. The evolution of law is typically 
a combination of all of these, where changes in legislation, legal practices 
and doctrine follow each other and give stimuli to new changes in different 
domains. Tuori, based on his model of three levels of law (surface of law, legal 
expert culture, deep structure of law) sees the development of law taking place 
at all three levels, but at different speeds. The most fundamental changes are 
those which through sedimentation from above happen at the level of deep 
structure, which to large extent consists of human rights.299
De Sadeleer in his book on environmental principles links the development 
of environmental law to the more general development of law from modern to 
post-modern.300 He is not alone, while stressing a significant increase in the 
number of sources of law, in particular at international level (EC, WTO), but 
also at national level. The role of private or semi-private bodies (ISO, CEN) has 
become increasingly important in standard-setting, the speed of production 
of norms has become faster, the nature of intervention has changed towards 
more extensive use of soft law (recommendations, resolutions, statements of 
. Steele 1999, Wilhelmson 2000, 42–45, Ong 2001, Pöyhönen 2000, 21–22.
. Tuori 2002, 147–196.
00. He considers that at the moment we are living in the era of post-modern law. Other authors, 
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law (which preceded modern law), we still are living the era of modern law. However, the 
emergence of modern law is a centuries long process and its time-frame cannot by any means 
be equated with the time-frame of ‘ecological modernisation’. The time-frame of concepts like 
‘mature modern law’, ‘late modern law’ or ‘post-modern law’ come closer to that of ‘ecological 
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intent). As a result of this dynamic change, law in general and environmental 
law in particular, has become fragmented. Furthermore, the simplicity, 
systematization, and coherence of legal system have partially abounded so that 
legal norms might respond more rapidly to urgent and complex social needs. 
Law has become pluralistic, soft and negotiated.301 Sometimes the concept 
of soft law is associated in particular with international law. However, Tapio 
Määttä has recently documented with regard to Finland that soft law also has 
a significant, and apparently increasing, role in national environmental law.302 
The development of law reflects general societal development. New, more 
flexible modes of action, which better adapt to the dynamics of social realities 
in order to ensure the effectiveness of public policy, have developed.303 Despite 
this the development also has certain potentially negative outcomes regarding 
the steering capacity of legislation and public policy in general. “This new 
approach tends to downplay the role of legislation and dilute the responsibility 
of public authorities in formulating and implementing public policies.”304 
Tapio Määttä points out that soft law has increased the flexibility of law in the 
sense that part of soft law is general and abstract (as opposed to precise and 
exact), but even a greater part of it is detailed technical guidance.305 From the 
governance point of view a problem is that the practical relevance of soft law 
instruments differs from their legal nature.306 This may, indeed, downplay the 
role of legislation and cause serious confusion with regard to responsibilities. 
According to de Sadeleer, at the same time than the fragmentation process 
described above, general principles of law (‘directing principles’), which are 
linked to specific public policy, have come into existence within the post-
modern legal framework. In the field of environmental law examples of such 
principles are the polluter pays principle, the principle of prevention, the 
precautionary principle. These principles have filled gaps or alleviated the 
obscurity of the legal system.307
There is a rich literature based on different disciplines showing that a 
significant societal change relevant to environmental matters is taking place. 
The change is deep and it goes beyond legal regulation, though legal regulation 
is also changing. The change in legal regulation has many dimensions; not 
only are the instruments governed by law changing, but also the way in which 
the (legal) governance mechanisms are structured, is changing. The change 
concerns environmental regulation, but it has a broader context and it would not 
0. de Sadeleer 2002, 233–261
0. Määttä, T. 2005, 348–381.
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0. de Sadeleer 2002, 246.
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be necessarily correct to associate it purely with ecological modernisation (now 
understood as a political programme). Increased market orientation, in line with 
ecological modernisation, is a case in point. One may wonder whether increased 
market-orientation is due to the inability of previous environmental regulation 
to achieve its goals, or whether it is just is a reflection of a more general societal 
change, which does not have its primary roots in environmental issues. However, 
a change of regulation is taking place and it is assumed to produce better 
environmental outcomes. One important implication of this change concerns 
a shift from traditional regulation to other forms of regulation. Many authors 
stress the change towards economic instruments, procedural regulation and non-
governmental regulation are taking place as pointed above. Another implication 
relates to the distinction between public and private law. It is seen to become 
blurred, which means that distinguishing regulatory law (like environmental 
administrative law) from other branches of law becomes more difficult. 
Examples of this development are producer liability, environmental liability, 
extended producer responsibility. Another implication is that the law governing 
regulatory instruments is changing itself. The sources of law and particularly the 
amount of soft law not produced according to formal legislative procedure, is 
increasing. The adjudication of law is becoming more context-bound and open 
to the extra-legal sphere308, which may decrease its predictability309 and which 
stresses in substantial terms the importance of environmental principles as well 
as the transparency and accountability of decision-making.
The development of regulation in recent years can be described as a part 
of the wider ecological modernisation of industrial societies. As noted above, 
the world view of the theory of ecological modernisation is optimistic; both 
economy and ecology can win. However, the future development will not 
necessarily continue as one dimensional—as the discussion of the contested 
concept of better regulation shows. Some commentators claim that EU’s better 
regulation policy has meant since its birth at the Edinburgh summit of 1991 
“hidden efforts” of deregulation.310 Others, instead, assert that the EU’s initial 
‘better regulation’ agenda, which originally aimed to improve effectiveness, 
efficiency, transparency and public consultation, has recently narrowed to 
an issue of economic growth. As a result the concept of ‘better regulation’ is 
becoming close to that of ‘deregulation’.311 This certainly is the case, if any effort 
0. Pöyhönen (2000, 186–201) has pointed out his with regard to private law and de Sadeleer (2002, 
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0. Määttä T., however, claims that the recent development of environmental law has not increased 
its flexibility. On the contrary, environmental law—due to established legal practice and more 
specific soft law and other guidance—has at least partly become more detailed and precise. 
(Määttä T. 2005, 291–296). This would indicate that the predictability of law has not decreased. 
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to use alternatives to traditional regulation, like economic and procedural 
instruments as well as privatization of environmental services (drinking water 
supply, waste disposal, waste water treatment) is considered deregulation, as 
some are doing.312 For me, however, deregulation refers to lowering the ambition 
level of environmental protection. Seen from this perspective labelling better 
regulation as deregulation may still today be an exaggeration, although future 
development will depend on what kind of interpretation of better regulation 
emerges from political struggles. Though one would oppose a narrow definition 
of better regulation and stress the fact that maximization of perfect allocation 
of resources is not a primary goal of environmental regulation,313 it seems hard 
to avoid better regulation discussion while pondering the challenges for future 
reforms. Better regulation policy can be understood as an effort to strike a fair 
balance between efficiency and other evaluation criteria and at least in political 
rhetoric it aims not to lower the ambition level of environmental protection.
As a reaction to requirements related to efficiency demands and wider 
better regulation discussion, attempts to lighten environmental regulation have 
become reality in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark,314 which have a 
strong reputation for being forerunners in environmental matters. Deregulation 
can be understood as a change of environmental regulation, which lower the 
environmental ambition level of it. Lightening, instead, refers to efforts to 
reduce the use of administrative resources without affecting the ambition level. 
A recently established working group315 is a reflection of lightening attempts in 
Finland. Though a single working group may have only minor impacts on the 
overall development, the issues discussed now are unlikely to disappear in the 
near future.
What is the economic logic behind the lightening of environmental 
regulation? The most immediate pressure to lighten environmental regulation 
comes from the need to use public resources in more efficient way, i.e. from the 
need to control public expenditure. Governments are generally under pressure 
to maintain or reduce the relative size of public expenditure in relation to 
. Rehbinder 1999, 93–94.
. Baldwin and Cave, based on Dworkin (1980) and others, criticize Posner (1979, 1985) for 
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economies as a whole and this pressure may be coming even stronger in the 
future due to the ageing of the population and other demands.316 However, 
there seems be no end of new environmental needs. From the combination of 
financial constrains317 and ever changing needs follows a continuous need to set 
new priorities to ensure that the resources available are used in the best possible 
way. From this perspective efficient use of administrative resources without 
lowering the effectiveness of regulation can be seen behind lightening attempts. 
In the real world, different motives and goals are often mixed, and a single 
regulatory reform hardly aims purely to reduce administrative cost, but also 
has other goals such as increasing generally efficiency and effectiveness.318 Be 
that as may, the role of efficiency requirements as a driving force for regulatory 
reforms seems unlikely to diminish in the future.
Lightening understood as an attempt to improve the efficient use of public 
resources is a narrower concept than better regulation. Better regulation policy 
aims to promote general efficiency of regulation (which can be interpreted to 
include allocative efficiency and cost-effectiveness considerations) as well as 
effectiveness, transparency and public consultation. Lightening, as I understand 
it, instead focuses on the efficient use of public resources without a relevant 
change of policy goals. With this regard it is important to note that the amount 
of public resources directed to environmental protection is generally much 
smaller than that of private resources. Furthermore, administrative costs, which 
are borne both by private and public actors, are much smaller than compliance 
costs, which are typically borne almost solely by private actors.319 These are, 
however, generalisations and it cannot be excluded that with regard to specific 
activity administrative costs would exceed compliance costs.
As the literature discussed above shows, many important contributions 
have been made with regard to the understanding of the recent regulatory 
change. Often the contributions have combined visions and facts and drawn less 
attention to the systematic nature of those facts. Next, I will explore regulatory 
change in Finland using data on legislative change as a point of departure. In 
order to gain further insight into regulatory shift, the relevancy of selected new 
instruments for the regulation of industrial activities will be discussed.
316. OECD 2005, 9.
317. Government aims to reduce the number of officials working for the environmental 
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3.2. Development of legislation
The amount of legislation has been increasing for decades in Finland as also in 
many other countries. Though there is some variation between years with regard 
to amount of legislation, the longer trend is obvious.320 This has been seen to 
result in so-called legislative inflation.321 However, in a recent OECD review of 
Finland it was reported that there are indications of a change. The OECD found 
that the increase of annually adopted pieces of legislation reached its highest 
point in the first half of the 1990s and thereafter a slight drop took place in late 
1990s. The OECD reports that “Finland has been successful in controlling the 
rate of growth of new regulation.”322 The even more recent figures presented 
by Tala, however, suggest that, with the exception of a peak in mid 1990s, the 
amount of legislation continues to increase.323
The increase in the amount of legislation takes either the form of expansion 
or differentiation. Expansion means that new matters or/and activities 
are regulated, differentiation, instead, means that the legislative apparatus 
becomes more sophisticated.324 In practice, the line between expansion and 
differentiation is blurred, because an expansion often involves some sort 
of differentiation. For example, the regulation on new kinds of waste (like 
electrical and electronic waste) involves, to be exact, regulation of new matters 
(=expansion), though from a broader perspective it can be seen as “only” 
differentiation of law: the law on waste becomes more sophisticated by making 
a difference between types of waste. Expansion and differentiation are both 
dimensions of juridification. Blinchner and Molander325 also distinguish 
four other dimensions of juridification as follows: constitutive juridification, 
juridification as increased conflict solving with reference to law, juridification 
as increased judicial power and juridification as legal framing.
Not all legislative changes increase the body of legislation. Even if the 
amount of regulation does not increase, regulation may become tighter/
looser—for example, through a change of environmental standards. In terms 
of environmental policy, this type of change is equally important, in particular 
with regard to technological development, regardless of whether regulation 
affects technological development or technological development affects 
regulation.
The amount of legislation is in general increasing. How is it with environ-
mental legislation? This issue will be studied next on the basis of information 
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collected from ‘Statutes of Finland’ concerning the period between 1987 and 
2003. Before embarking on this analysis and keeping in mind the distinction 
between law and legislation, a clarification of what here is meant by 
‘environmental legislation’ is needed. Following the integration principle of 
environmental matters, many branches of legislation traditionally considered 
as something distinct from environmental legislation nowadays include 
provisions promoting environmental protection. In other words, the regulation 
of environmental matters has dispersed widely over the legal system and a piece 
of legislation intended to affect society in such a way as to improve, or to prevent 
the deterioration of, the quality of the natural environment326 can be found 
in many places in legislative systems. In the following analysis, to minimise 
subjective judgements, any piece of new legislation or amendment to an existing 
one aiming to promote the goal mentioned above is considered a piece of 
environmental legislation. In those cases where a piece of legislation has many 
goals, it is considered environmental if at least one of the goals is environmental. 
Furthermore, all amendments to legislation expressly environmental in nature 
were considered as environmental legislation regardless of the nature of the 
particular change. Hence, all changes to pollution control legislation, such as the 
Air Pollution Control Act and sub-legislation under the Act, were considered to 
be pieces of environmental legislation, even if the change was of a formal nature. 
During the research project all published statutes were gone through with the 
help of Internet services. A preliminary assessment was made on the basis of the 
title of the statute and in the case of uncertainty the full text was checked.327 All 
statutes were classified to one of the following sub-categories of environmental 
legislation: pollution control, natural resources, nature protection, chemicals, 
waste, energy and land use. Due to the huge number of statutes (more than 
1,000 items are published annually), there is a risk of misjudgement. Hence, the 
statistics should be understood as indicating trends rather than exact numbers.
Figure 2 shows that the total number of pieces of environmental legislation 
adopted has varied significantly from one year to another. The highest peak 
was reached in mid 1990s. After a fall thereafter, the number has gradually 
approached the level of 1994. The preparation for EU membership partly explains 
the peak in the mid 1990s.328 Due to EU membership all existing legislation was 
reviewed in the light of EU law. This was a resource-intensive effort resulting 
in many changes in the legislation, though many of these were technical; the 
ambition level of national environmental regulation mainly corresponded or 
. Lundqvist 1996, 16.
. Research assistant Minna Kettunen was responsible for the assessment and production of the 
statistics. 
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exceeded the European level, though regulatory technique differed. To describe 
the same phenomenon Glachant distinguishes environmental compliance 
from (formal) legal compliance. By environmental compliance he means 
compliance with policy goals,329 whereas legal compliance refers to compliance 
as it is understood normally in legal literature. Later, in Figure 3, the portion 
of national legislation formally implementing EU laws will be presented. This 
figure shows that the formal impact of EU laws alone does not explain the 
variation. On the other hand, in 1993–1994 the transposition of EU legislation 
was something additional to the adoption of other legislation already in the 
pipe line for other reasons. Thereafter, is can be assumed, the national legislator 
has been in a better position to incorporate the transposition of EU legislation 
into other needs to develop legislation. Hence, it is likely that the impact of EU 
legislation on the number of pieces of legislation adopted was stronger just 
before accession than thereafter.
Excluding the peak in the mid 1990s, the quantity of annually adopted 
environmental legislation has been increasing. During the last seven years 
legislation has increased, practically speaking, every year. The notion that 
the length of legal texts has generally been growing even faster than their 
number, strengthens this observation.330 Hence, the trend has been towards 
more legislation. Apart from 1993–1995, there is no other period of three years 
which exceeds the number of pieces of legislation adopted in 2001–2003. In 
329. Glachant 2001, 6. 
330. Tala 2005, 215–216.
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1993–1995 the impact of Finland’s accession has more directly affected the total 
amount of legislation, which I interpret to be an exception from the basic trend. 
Hence, there are no signs of stabilisation of environmental regulation. The 
relative size of different sectors varies from year to year. However, pollution 
control regulation has been the biggest sector more often than any other sector. 
In addition, the total amount of pollution control regulations (230) during the 
15 years studied was clearly more than any corresponding number in other 
fields of environmental regulation. The quantity of new pieces of legislation 
concerning both natural resources and nature conservation were about 120. The 
figure for chemicals regulations was 90 and that for waste was 50. Regulation 
on natural resources (e.g. agriculture and forestry) seems to have relatively 
increased.
One possible explanation for the ever-increasing amount of legislation 
is that the life cycle of legislation is short. A short life cycle is not, however, 
necessarily an indication of manifestly irrelevant development. Replacement 
of existing legislation with new legislation may contribute to the expansion 
of regulated activities, or it can change the nature of regulation. In any case, it 
can be assumed that the replacement of the whole statute is more significant 
than that of part of it. This being generally true, there is also an example of a 
significant reform, which formally speaking was merely an amendment of an 
act. The amendment of air pollution control in 1995 (by Act 1711/1995) changed 
the basic form of control from notification to permit,.
The age of statutes (not sections or paragraphs) was assessed during the 
course on this research using the collection of laws and regulation to be found 
in the web-pages to the Ministry of the Environment.331 The assessment was 
restricted to legislation located under the title of pollution control law. In 
practice the web-pages also included references to laws which mainly deal with 
other environmental issues than pollution control (like planning legislation). 
These statutes were also included in the assessment. This collection of legislation 
is not complete, although one can assume that a major part of the legislation is 
to be found there. Furthermore, it can be assumed that this source is biased 
towards traditional regulation, because the Ministry of the Environment has 
competence with regard to this type of environmental regulation, whereas most 
legislation related to economic instruments falls under the competences of the 
Ministry of the Finance or the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture. Because 
traditional regulation should, according to standard understanding, be the 
oldest part of legislation, this tends to increase the average age of legislation.
On the basis of the more than 100 pieces of environmental law found in 
this source of information and studied, the following observations were made. 
. Source: www.ymparisto.fi, Page: Lainsäädäntö (legislation), ympäristönsuojelulainsäädäntö 
(pollution control legislation), October 2005. 
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A little less than one third of statutes were less than 5 years old, a little more than 
one third 5–10 years old and another slightly more than one third was more 
than 10 years old. Four statutes in force at the time of the research were enacted 
in the 1980s, four in the 1970s and three in the 1960s. Though these statutes 
have not been totally revised, some of them were amended several times. The 
conclusions is that the life cycle of environmental legislation is rather short 
according to this assessment. Most of the legislation in force at the time of the 
analysis was reformed less than 10 years ago and almost all of the legislation in 
force prior to 1990 was replaced. These observations confirm the assumption 
that life cycle of legislation is short.
The information on the relative rate of change between sectors is relevant 
for the overall development, though it still is a rough indicator. The observations 
concerning the quantity of new legislation does not tell how the legislative 
principles and rules in force at a given moment are substantially changing. 
Tala stresses the importance of seeing the development of regulation from the 
perspective of those regulated, and asking what changes mean for them.332 It 
is easy to agree with this view as well as with Tala’s further note that studying 
the general development of regulation from this perspective is challenging. 
It is, however, generally possible to note that radical changes seldom occur 
and clearly the vast majority of changes have only limited implications for 
the overall substantial development. Beyond the environmental field, it has 
been estimated that about 2/3 of all new legislation amends legislation in force 
and only roughly 5% regulates new, previously unregulated phenomena.333 
Such estimates cannot, however, be precise, because it is open to discussion 
when a phenomenon should be considered unregulated. Often phenomena 
which at first glance are considered unregulated have links to regulation, when 
studied more carefully. Although most of the amendments may be minor 
and promote incremental development, this does not rule out the possibility 
that the amendments as a whole ultimately cause radical changes with major 
substantial implications. Hence, there is a need to improve our understanding 
of the relevancy of legislative change.
The relevance of legislative change will be approached from two opposite 
directions. Later the relevance of certain key changes of pollution control 
regulation will be discussed (in Chapter 3.5). Here the focus is on the assessment of 
the number of changes which are manifestly irrelevant for the substantial goals of 
environmental policy. Any change in legislation, which expands, differentiates or 
increases/decreases the ambition level of environmental regulation is considered 
relevant and other changes manifestly irrelevant. If the share of such legislation 
is high, then it shows than the relevance of legislative change has been smaller 
. Tala 1999, 20–24.
. Tala 1999, 4.
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than the figures presented suggests. Instead of aiming to give empirical evidence 
of the share of manifestly irrelevant legislation, the goal is to identify sources of 
such legislation and in this way help to understand whether the legislative change 
shown in Figure 1 reflects a real change in environmental policy. It should be 
noted that though legislation is manifestly irrelevant for the substantial goals of 
environmental policy, it does not necessarily mean that the changes are needless. 
There may be many other good reason to adopt legislation.
The first category of potentially manifestly irrelevant legislation is laws 
repealing obsolete legislation without bringing new requirements instead. The 
abolition of obsolete legislation is not intended to cause substantial change 
in terms of the environmental performance of regulated entities, though it 
may have other (intended) effects such as a reduction of regulatory load of 
the regulated industry. Deregulation, which is intended to abolish substantial 
environmental requirements and let the (previously) regulated industry 
decide whether to change their environmental performance or not, should 
conceptually be kept apart from the abolition of obsolete legislation. In the 
case of deregulation the legislator has accepted the possibility that the change 
can result in negative environmental outcomes, whereas with regard to the 
abolition of obsolete legislation this is not the case. In other words, deregulation 
is relevant for environmental policy, and the repeals of obsolete legislation 
are not. A quick analyses of the changes suggests that the share of legislation 
which repeal old obsolete legislation seems to be small. It is hard to identify 
such legislation where the legislator has only abolished obsolete environmental 
legislation during the 15-year period studied. The rule has been that when old 
legislation has been repealed, new substantial legislation has been enacted. In 
few cases, however, has a legislative technique been used where old legislation 
has been repealed by a separate act and new legislation introduced by different 
acts. The use of this technique affects the figures presented above, though only 
to a small extent.
A second category of potentially manifestly irrelevant legislation relates to 
the organisation of public administration. This kind of legislation is not intended 
to change the environmental performance of those regulated. The organisation 
of public administration should, however, be kept apart from legislation 
concerning decision-making procedures. A legislator may expand, differentiate 
or increase the ambition level either through substantial or procedural 
provisions. Environmental impact assessment procedure is an example of doing 
this through procedural norms. Environmental impact assessment is not (only) 
re-organisation of public administration and aims at substantial improvements 
through production of better information. Admittedly the borderline between the 
organisation of public administration and substantial/procedural environmental 
regulation is blurred. The (re-)organisation of public administration, like the 
creation of new administrative bodies or merging existing ones, may indirectly 
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affect the environmental performance of those regulated. This is because a 
change of the management of public administration may indirectly affect its 
outputs, such as the content of environmental permits. Though implications 
of re-organisation of public administration cannot be included in statistical 
analysis, it is interesting to find that the portion of environmental legislation 
concerning the organising of public administration is rather small. According 
to the analysis, less than 5% of all environmental legislation adopted during 
the period explored can clearly be located to this category. The major part of 
legislation relates absolutely to the substantial or procedural rights and/or duties 
of citizens.
Thirdly, a change of national legislation made in order to fulfil an 
obligation based on international or constitutional law, may be of purely formal 
nature. This kind of formal adoption of legislation does not necessarily expand 
or differentiate legislation or make it tighter, and again, it may not change the 
environmental performance of polluters. European environmental law—as 
well as international law generally—may require that the regulatory technique 
used in national legislation must be changed regardless of substantial needs. 
Furthermore, a similar kind of change of a formal nature may be due to the 
national constitution or a change in regulatory style. In Finland, due to a 
change of constitutional law as well as the development of perceptions on good 
legislative technique, parliamentary legislation is nowadays used more and 
sub-legislation less than previously. The starting point is that the (main) legal 
effects on citizens should be decided in the form of parliamentary law and 
sub-legislation should have a complementary and technical role.334 Hence, it is 
possible that the legislator considers it necessary to make a change in legislation 
in order to fulfil all constitutional requirements, though she may not intend to 
cause any substantial change for environmental policy.
It is undeniable that EU law and international law have caused purely 
formal or technical changes in national legislation, which can be considered 
manifestly irrelevant in terms of environmental policy. However, there is 
no adequate information available to what extent this has occurred, though 
examples can be found. An example of formal transposition of European 
law without expectations of changes in administrative or legal practice is the 
incorporation of general water pollution standards into the Finnish regulatory 
system. Previously there were no general standards, only individual ones, 
designed for each individual regulated entity separately. Because the standards 
(emission limits) of individual installations set in permitting process were 
. The new Constitution was adopted in 1999 and entered into force on 1 March 2000. In Section 
80 is stated as follows: “… The principles governing the rights and obligations of private 
individuals and the other matters that under this Constitution are of legislative nature shall be 
governed by Acts.” See more in Tala 2005, 216.
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already higher than the general standards adopted through legislative acts, 
the new legislation has not caused a change in environmental performance.335 
It can, however, be assumed that this phenomenon was stronger during the 
preparatory phase of EU membership than thereafter. After this period the main 
differences between European and national regulatory techniques have been 
resolved and disappeared and, as a result, the need to adopt this kind of formal 
legislation has decreased. Another matter is that EU policy frequently forces 
member states first to accept and then to implement EU laws which they have 
originally opposed. The Water Framework Directive is a case in point. Finland 
opposed the adoption of the proposed directive, because it was seen to require 
significant changes in national administration without environmental benefits. 
There is no indication that anything like the system of the directive would have 
been adopted in Finland without a legal obligation to do so. However, after the 
adoption of the Directive, a very work-intensive implementation process with a 
great variety of activities and measures was initiated. It is difficult to judge now 
whether this process has resulted in changes in environmental performance or 
other positive environmental outcomes not previously envisaged. It can only be 
noted that the mechanisms created produce, or at least are aimed to produce, 
new knowledge for future policies. Because this new knowledge may prove 
relevant, the legislation adopted due to the Directive cannot be considered 
manifestly irrelevant. The formal implementation of originally undesirable 
changes in legislation and administrative practices may work as an avenue of 
change and have environmental outcomes not previously taken into account. 
With regard to constitutional law, one can note that there is apparently no reform 
of environmental legislation initiated purely to fulfil the new constitutional 
requirements, though constitutional law has affected how reforms initiated 
for other reasons have been formulated. However, an amendment to the Land 
Extraction Act (Act 468/2005) is an example of a environmental law reform 
which was remarkably influenced by the Constitution requirement. Even in 
this case the reform was not limited to changes related to the Constitution, but 
substantial changes were also made (e.g. Sections 10 and 16).
There are still some other potential sources of manifestly irrelevant 
legislative changes in terms of environmental policy. Changes which result 
from the need to maintain the coherency of the legal system are not necessarily 
intended to change the behaviour of polluters. In a complex legal system one 
change of legislation can result in other changes due to linkages between 
different strands of the system.336 Furthermore, technical details, like the 
entry into force of the main legislation, the revision of the amount of subsidies 
. Vihervuori points this out with regard to water pollution directives, Vihervuori 1998a, 78.
. On the factors in general affecting the increase of legal regulation, see Tala 2005, 220–222 and 
the literature referring thereto. 

and bureaucratic information requirements can be decided in the form of 
legislation or sub-legislation and these changes increase the number legislative 
amendments, though they do not cause any relevant change in the behaviour 
of those regulated. Again, lack of systematic information prevents quantitative 
assessments.
In sum, though there is no solid quantitative basis for the precise assess-
ment of the amount of legislation manifestly irrelevant for environmental 
policy, the magnitude of such legislation should not be overstressed. There is 
no evidence showing the opposite. Only a small portion of the new legislation 
concerns the organisation of public administration or is purely of a technical 
nature. It is true that there are examples where European legislation has 
not caused any such change in national legislation, which can be expected 
to change the environmental performance of those regulated. However, it is 
much easier to find examples of European legislation which cause a significant 
change than vice versa. In addition, practically no deregulation in the sense 
that the legislator has intended to free (previously) regulated entities from 
environmental regulation has so far occurred in the field of environmental 
regulation.337 Neither the liberalisation trend in other countries has reduced the 
ambition level of environmental and other social regulation.338 Thus, one can 
make a hypothesis that most changes in environmental legislation have meant 
either expansion, differentiation or increase of the ambition level of regulation. 
However, this is not to say that the change has been radical. Apparently most 
legislative changes are of minor importance, though they in some sense expand, 
differentiate or higher the ambition level. However, from the notion that most 
changes are small, it does not follow that the cumulative change is small.
3.3. Europeanization of regulation
Jordan and Liefferink have found five different definitions for Europeanization.339 
One of them is the top down impact of the EU on its member states, which refers 
to the influence deriving from European decisions and impacting on member 
states. Next this definition of Europeanization will be employed, though it is 
acknowledged that this definition only partly captures the dynamic relationship 
between the EU and its member states. It neglects the influences of member 
states on the EU and influences between member states.
Europeanization—and internationalization more generally—is often 
considered as one of the main trends in the development of regulation in 
. However, few and rather insignificant examples have been found, Ranta 2001, 28. 
. Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 515–512.
. Jordan and Liefferink 2004a, 5–7.
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general, not only that of environmental regulation.340 However, Matti Wiberg 
has claimed with regard to the whole Finnish legislation, that there is no 
statistical basis for these claims.341 According to his analysis only a small portion 
of the legislation is of European origin and the vast majority of national origin. 
As a general conclusion Wiberg claims that EU influence on national legislation 
is less than is generally assumed in public discussion, and that the national 
legislator is still a powerful actor. It is worth noting that Wiberg excludes certain 
possible interpretations which would significantly change the picture, for 
example, that small and minor changes are of domestic origin, important and 
principal changes are of EU origin.342 With regard to environmental regulation, 
the degree of Europeanization is almost universally considered to be high. It 
is claimed that about four fifths of national environmental regulation in EU 
member states is of European origin, though this is only a rough estimate.343
The number of laws transposing European legislation can be used as 
an indicator of Europeanization.344 This analysis completes the research of 
Europeanization of Finnish environmental regulation based on more general 
observations of others.345 In each legislative act implementing EU law there is a 
mandatory reference to European law. Thus, on this basis it is possible to identify 
those legislative acts which are of European origin in this formal sense. However, 
this method has certain restrictions. All statutes with a reference to European 
law are considered to be of European origin without taking into account the 
amount of European influence. Many laws implementing EU laws also include 
to a varying degree provisions of purely national origin and European law often 
leaves a degree of discretion to member states to decide how the implementing 
measures are designed in detail. The Environmental Protection Act, which 
transposes the IPPC Directive and is affected by a number of other pieces of EU 
environmental law, is, according to this logic, of European origin, though the 
Act also includes plenty of provisions of national origin. For example, municipal 
environmental protection regulation, which is a new instrument introduced by 
the Act, is of national origin.346 In addition, this method ignores influences based 
on anticipation of coming EU law. A member state may for various political 
reasons anticipate higher European standards, though the negotiation process in 
the EU has not been finalised. If national legislation is amended already before 
0. Tala, 2004, 384.
. Wiberg 2004. 
. Europeanization has many different forms and effects, which may also be indirect or hidden. 
The Finnish Constitution, for example, does not make many references to EU, though the EU 
has affected constitutional issues in many ways, see Viljanen 2003. 
. See e.g. National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, 2004, 10–11. 
. Wiberg used same source of information for his analysis. 
. Sairinen and Lindholm 2004.
. Article 19.
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formal approval of the directive, there is naturally no need to transpose it any 
more afterwards. Hence, from the documentation point of view there will be 
no references to the anticipated directive in any piece of legislation published 
in the ‘Statutes of Finland’. In addition, a change of a provision of law due to 
EU law may result in a need to change another law in order to maintain the 
coherence of the legal system, though the other change may not formally be an 
implementation measure of EU law. Thus, EU law may have indirect impacts 
which are not recognized through this method. Despite these deficiencies, the 
data makes it possible to approach Europeanization is a systematic way and it 
covers all cases where national law is intended to fulfil the formal requirements 
of EU law. The results of the analysis are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
Finland joined the EU on 1 January 1995, however, the first pieces of 
legislation linked to the EU were already adopted in 1993 as a part of preparation 
for The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force 
on 1 January 1994, one year before Finland’s full EU membership.
Figure 3 shows that the number of legislative acts of EU origin is only a 
part of all environmental regulation. Between 1993 and 2003 about 30% of all 
environmental regulation was of EU origin. Not surprisingly, the amount was 
at its height in 1994, when Finland worked hard to fulfil all requirements of 
EU membership. One can assume that a misfit347 between the national and the 
European regulation was at its highest level prior to membership, and then the 
development was smoother. After the peak in the mid 1990s, the number of 
statutes transposing EU law has varied annually without any clear trend. The 
annul variation in the total amount of national legislation cannot be explained 
by the variation in laws of EU origin.
The level of Europeanization varies from sector to sector (figure 4). The 
most Europeanised areas are waste, chemicals and pollution control. About 
49% of waste legislation, 44% of chemicals regulation, and 40% of pollution 
control legislation are of European origin.
To complement the analysis, the link between EU law and national law 
was also studied on the basis of the legislative proposals in preparation. In 
October 2005348 there were 13 legislative proposals related to environmental 
protection349 in preparation at the Ministry of the Environment. Eight out of 
13 of these legislative projects were implementation measures of European law. 
Furthermore, one of the five which were not formally linked to EU law, was a 
direct result of EU enlargement: a bilateral treaty between Poland and Finland 
had lost its relevance due to the Polish accession. The remaining four proposals’ 
. Jordan and Liefferink 2004a, 4.
. Based on information on the web pages of the Ministry of the Environment, visited 3 October 
2005.
. All these proposals relate in one way or another to the Environmental Protection Act. 
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Figure 3. EU connected legislation.
Figure 4. EU connected and domestic legislation sector by sector.
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aims were not directly and formally linked to EU law, although they regulate 
in detail matters for which EU law provides a broader legal framework. Hence, 
EU law does not directly require any national action in these regards, but sets 
certain limits, which must be taken into account. This observation suggests that 
EU influence is more significant than the figures presented above show.
The figures presented above can be compared with those of Wiberg. 
According to him, 12% of all legislation adopted between 1995 and 2003 is of 
European origin. Above it was noted that 30% of all environmental statutes 
were of European origin and hence it shows than environmental regulation 
is more Europeanized than legislation in general. One should note that this 
applies to environmental regulation generally, covering regulation prepared by 
the Ministry of the Environment as well as by other ministries. The Ministry of 
the Environment also has responsibilities with respect to other legislation than 
that included under the concept of environmental regulation in my statistics. 
In fact, according to Wiberg, the Ministry of the Environment does not prepare 
significantly more legislation of European origin than the ministries in average. 
His figure for the Ministry is 13.4%.350
The figures above are based on formal transposition of EU law and 
hence they do not include information of the nature of influence. To provide 
another, more substantial, insight into the relationship between international 
and national legislation, the substantial influence of EU law on water and air 
pollution regulation are studied. With regard to air pollution regulation the 
issue was explored in a project concerning the influences of international air 
pollution policies generally, not only those of the European Union.351 In this 
project particularly the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, adopted in 1979 and entering into force in 1983, and the protocols 
adopted under the framework convention, were in focus. Hence the scope of 
this evaluation goes beyond Finnish EU membership and substantially it was 
restricted to NOx and SO2 emissions from large combustion plants.
In the evaluation it was found that all nine decrees studied setting 
environmental protection standards and adopted under national air pollution 
control law, have a direct link to international policy, though the link was stronger 
in some cases than in others. It was noted that prior to EU membership the 
national policy was clearly more ambitious than the international policy. After 
the mid 1990s the gap between either EU or other international law and national 
law has become smaller. Though EU membership did not immediately cause 
significant changes in Finnish air control law, a general gradual convergence 
development has taken place. Since EU membership no major national initiative 
has occurred in this field but all major changes in regulation have related to the 
0. Wiberg 2004.
. Mickwitz and Kivimaa (eds.) manuscript.
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development at European level. The convergence of international and national 
legislation has not removed all differences between international and national 
law. Finnish air pollution law still has stricter rules than what is required by 
international or European law, though to a lesser degree than it used to have. 
International law and policy did not only affect substantial requirements; the 
general nature of regulatory instruments was also profoundly influenced. Even 
the adoption of the Air Pollution Control Act in 1982 was influenced by the 
Geneva Convention, though it would not be possible to associate the adoption 
of this law purely with international policy. There were also national reasons 
behind the adoption. A reform of the Air Pollution Control Act in 1991 was not 
directly linked to the implementation of any international obligation, but the 
revision of the Act in 1995 was markedly affected by EU law. In this revision, the 
control mechanism was changed from notification to permit and this change 
can be attributed to EU law (the Framework Directive 84/360). The next major 
reform, namely the adoption of the integrated permit mechanism in 2000, was 
also much influenced by EU law, in particular by the IPPC Directive (96/61). 
Many important features of air pollution control mechanism, like the adoption 
of best available technology principle are due to EU law.352
The case of water pollution is different, in particular with regard to the 
impact of EU law. The traditional approach of Finnish water pollution control 
differs from that of the European Union, because the Finnish water pollution 
control law has not employed general standards. Instead, in European law 
there are a number of standards, like quality objectives or emission limit 
values. When Finland joined the EU the EU standards were to be adopted into 
national law. However, because the European approach to water pollution was 
considered to be alien to the Finnish system, the impact of EU legislation on 
the national legislation was limited to a minimum. The rather loose European 
standards were transposed into the national legal system as such with no aim 
to affect the existing administrative or legal practices. As a result, the practical 
relevance of the European standards has been rather small. As Vihervuori puts 
it: “In practice, the effect of these additional provisions has been minimal, as the 
interpretation of the general ban leads most often to the same result.“353 Only 
rather few directives like the Nitrates Directive (91/676) and the Urban Waste 
Water Directive (91/271) have reportedly affected permitting practice.354 There 
has emerged no evidence to prove these initial assessments to be wrong in a 
fundamental way.
In the case of air pollution regulation it is certainly correct to speak about 
Europeanization. Not only air pollution standards, but also the procedures, like 
. Similä and Kivimaa manuscript.
. Vihervuori 1998a 105.
. Vihervuori 1998a, 237. 
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the permitting mechanism, have been ‘Europeanized’, i.e. the EU influence has 
been strong. The national air pollution policy has always been influenced by 
international policies, but since Finland joined the EU in 1995 the development 
has been linked in particular to the EU. No major political initiative of purely 
national origin has emerged since then. As a result, the ambition levels of 
European and national air pollution law and policy are converging. Partly 
the convergence process is due to the rather detailed nature of EU law, which 
leaves less room for national discretion and regulates the instruments used for 
pollution control more directly. Partly it can be understood as a reflection of 
the success of previous policy. There is less need for new action than before. 
This applies particularly to traditional pollutants like sulphur and—though to 
a lesser degree—nitrogen. This trend is likely to continue in the future in the 
sense that the need for further development will be seen from the international 
(=European) perspective. The recently adopted programme for air pollution 
policy is a case in point.355 The fundamentals of air pollution policy were 
assessed and the programme adopted as required by the National Emission 
Ceiling Directive (2001/81), though the underlying idea of the programme is 
that practically nothing new needs to be done, because international law and 
policy do not require it.
No doubt Europeanization has also affected water pollution regulation, 
though not to the same degree as air pollution regulation. The general standards 
of water pollution control adopted due to EU law do not have a major practical 
relevance for the formulation of permit conditions and the regulatory approach 
still has many features inherited from the era before Finland’s EU membership. 
The role of individual discretion is greater in water pollution regulation than 
that of air pollution and the discretion is to a large extent based on principles and 
rules of national origin. However, the Water Framework Directive may change 
this situation, because it affects the overall regulatory approach. Interestingly, 
the different national traditions of air and water pollution regulation have made 
their way into integrated permitting, as will be discussed at length later. Hence, 
although a piece of national legislation may formally be an implementation 
measure of EU law, the national regulatory tradition may significantly affect its 
final content.
. Air Pollution Control Programme 2010. 
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3.4. Change of regulatory instruments
One core argument in the discussion on the development of regulation is the 
increasing use of so-called new policy instruments (NEPIs).356 The concept of 
‘new policy instruments’ covers roughly all other instruments than traditional 
regulation, including economic and procedural instruments as well as non-legal 
voluntary approaches. It has been repeatedly suggested that that the use of new 
instruments is growing in comparison to that of old. What does the development 
in the amount of legislation tell about this? Clearly, the amount of legislation is 
a deficient, albeit still interesting, way of measuring the development. One may 
assume that some forms of regulation rely more heavily on frequent changes of 
legislation than other forms. Procedural instruments may last longer than others 
without a need to make changes, because they do not necessarily contain technical 
information which easily becomes outdated. Making a general distinction in this 
respect between traditional regulation and economic instruments is more difficult. 
Both need frequent changes, the former, for example, when technical standards 
become outdated due to technological development and the latter, for example, 
when the amount of subsidies must be re-defined due to inflation. Hence, the 
need for frequent changes most likely depends more on the exact details of the 
instrument than the broad category in which it is located.
The argument that new instruments have become increasingly important 
is based on the assumption that previously traditional regulation has had a 
dominant position in environmental regulation. Figure 5 suggests that tradi-
tional regulation has kept its dominant position in comparison to other legal 
regulation throughout the period studied—at least if measured though the 
number of annually adopted items. However, it is interesting to observe that 
legislation related to economic instruments became more common towards 
the end of studied period and some procedural legislation was also adopted. 
Most economic instruments (almost 90%) concern fuels, electricity, agricul-
ture, and forestry and are prepared by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry. In other words, the use of economic instruments 
is strongly focused on certain issues. The remaining 10% relates mainly to 
subsidies for environmental investments, waste oil fees and the oil pollution 
compensation fund, which fall under the competence of the Ministry of the En-
vironment. With regard to traditional regulation, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment is typically responsible for their preparation.
About 30% of all pollution control legislation and natural resources 
legislation can be considered economic. However, there are only three fields 
of environmental policy (pollution control, natural resources and energy) 
. Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, 2003. 
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where economic instruments have a significant role. In all other fields, the 
number of economic instruments was negligible. Legislation concerning energy 
issues was mainly economic apart from nuclear energy, which was regulated 
through traditional regulation. The number of pieces of legislation classified as 
procedural instruments was seven. All of them established or modified public 
voluntary programmes (EMAS and eco-labels). These laws set procedural 
requirements, but firms are free to decide whether they want to participate in 
these programmes.
Environmental taxes can be divided into fiscal and regulatory taxes, 
though the distinction between the two categories is often blurred.357 Though 
the environmental effectiveness of taxes do not necessarily depend on the 
amount of revenue they generate, it is interesting to combine the information of 
legislative development with that of tax revenues. The development of revenues 
gives background information for the overall development.358 A major part 
of revenue from environmental taxes comes from rather few sources. Traffic 
fuels, other energy products and vehicle based taxes constitute roughly 98% 
of all revenue in Finland.359 This phenomenon seems to be international, 
though the number of tax instruments is reported have increased at least in EU 
countries.360 According to Eurostat, energy taxes made up around three quarters 
of environmental tax receipts, transport taxes around fifth and pollution and 
357. Määttä, K. 1997, 218–225.
358. With regard to effectiveness marginal tax rate is more important that the overall revenues, see 
Määttä, K. 2003, 178–181.
359. Ministry of Finance 2004, 18. With regard to all OECD countries the figures are: 75.1% comes 
from energy products, 23.6% from the use of motor vehicles, waste management makes 0.7%. 
Ministry of Finance 2004, 45–46.
360. Eurostat 2006, 70–80, European Environment Agency 2006, 24–33.
Figure 5. Legislation and the type of instrument, 1988–2003.
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resource taxes together made up just 3% of total environmental tax revenue in 
the EU. In the EU countries, environmental tax revenues have increased when 
measures as a share of total revenues and as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) between 1980 and 2004. However, since 2000 environmental tax 
revenues have slightly decreased both in relation to GDP and as a share of total 
taxation. 361 The overall GDP share of environmental taxes has also in Finland 
been rather decreasing than increasing between 2000 and 2004.362 Similarly, the 
data from OECD countries indicates that the revenue from environmental taxes 
decreased between 1994 and 2001 both in comparison to total tax revenue and 
to GDP.363 In 2004, environmental taxation in the EU accounted for 6.6% of all 
taxes and social contributions and 2.6% of GDP.364 Another way of measuring 
ecological tax reform is by comparing the tax rate on labour to that on energy. 
On this basis the European Environmental Agency has reported a shift of the 
tax burden from labour to energy in the EU–15 countries.365 It is important to 
note that occasional reasons may explain some changes and to some extent 
facts point in different directions. Nevertheless it can be concluded that these 
figures do not suggest that a radical shift to increasing use of tax instruments is 
under way.
3.5. Relevance of alternatives to 
traditional regulation
The legislative change explored above concerns environmental legislation 
generally. Now, in order to enhance the analysis, the focus is narrowed to 
pollution control regulation, more precisely to regulation intended directly to 
regulate pollution from industrial sites. This limitation excludes such regulation 
that indirectly affects pollution from industrial sites. No doubt, for example, 
a successful product policy may also affect emissions or other environmental 
harms originating from an industrial site, though the chain of influence how 
this happened is complicated and indirect. The limitation is justified on the 
basis that the analysis aims to cover instruments which could be considered 
as alternatives to environmental permit system, which is a traditional form of 
control of industrial sites. Environmental permit system itself will be explored 
in the next chapter and is hence excluded from the present analysis.
. Denmark had by far the highest ratio of environmental taxes to GDP, at 4.8% followed by 
Cyprus, the Netherlands, Slovenia Luxemburg, Finland, Malta and Portugal (all more than 3%). 
At the other end of the scale some countries were below 2%. Eurostat 2006, 71–72. 
. Ministry of Finance 2004, 49.
. OECD/EEA database on instruments used for environmental policy and natural resources 
management, http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm. 
. Eurostat 2006, 70.
. European Environmental Agency 2006, 30–32.
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While it is undeniable that the diversity of instruments controlling 
pollution from industrial sites has become greater than before, not all of them 
are necessarily equally relevant. The information on the amount of legislation 
adopted gives an incomplete picture on the overall development. In principle, 
one piece of legislation introducing a new instrument may cause more significant 
change in the environmental performance of polluters than tens or even hundreds 
of others. In addition, not all regulation is legal and the legislative change does 
not tell anything about the use non-legal instruments, like environmental 
agreements. In order to fully understand the development from the effectiveness 
perspective, it would be ideal to make a full range effectiveness analysis of all 
instruments in use. This, however, is beyond the scope of present study. Instead 
I explore to what extent new instruments are relevant for pollution control. 
The aim is therefore to link instruments with the environmental problems 
caused by industrial activities in order to increase the understanding of how 
significant the regulatory shift has been. In the evaluation literature this kind of 
examination is called relevance analysis and the relevance criterion is defined 
as a question, whether the goals of the instrument cover the key problems of 
environmental policy. 366 Here I will be more precise and link the instruments 
and problems by posing the following question: “Has the instrument been 
used to handle pollution problems caused by industrial activities?” Thus, I do 
not only ask whether it would be possible to use an instrument to address some 
environmental problems, but also if it has really been used.
In addition to the relevance analysis, results from research on effectiveness 
of new instruments are presented, when such results are available. The focus 
is on research concerning Finnish instruments, though references to the 
international literature are made to complement the picture. It is a fact that the 
research done so far is inadequate, thus exhaustive exploration of this issue is 
not an option. However, the evidence already available may show general lines, 
though the picture may remain somewhat incomplete.
The analysis will cover the following instruments: environmental 
agreements, environmental management systems, energy taxes and liability. 
These instruments were selected, because they are among the most important 
alternatives or supplements to permitting with regard to the pollution control 
of industrial activities. Naturally, there are also other instruments intended to 
regulate pollution from industrial sites, like subsidies and technology policy. 
Furthermore, the tradable permit is a new instrument, which may prove very 
influential in the long run and the public debate around tradable permits 
indicates that this instrument has had effects. It is, however, excluded here 
because it is so new and its impacts are likely to occur in the future.
. Hildén et al. 2002, 18, Mickwitz 2006, 30.
0
3.5.1. Negotiated agreements and 
environmental management schemes
There are many types of voluntary approaches available for environmental 
policy. In an OECD report four main types of voluntary approaches was 
identified: unilateral commitments made by pollutants, private agreements 
between polluters and pollutees, environmental agreements negotiated 
between industry and public authorities, and voluntary programmes developed 
by public authorities.367 The two last approaches are linked to the activities of 
public authorities, whereas the two first belong totally to the private sphere. 
A threat of legal regulation may be behind non-mandatory action, though 
there are also other (=economic) reasons for voluntary action.368 Later I will 
take a look at the two last mentioned types of voluntary approaches. It must 
be stressed that there is little research-based information available on the use 
and development of private agreements in Finland and it is not know to what 
extent such agreements exist. According to Börkey, Glachant and Lévèque lack 
of proper analyses is also typical in other countries.369 Neither is there much 
analytical information available with regard to unilateral commitments in 
Finland, though some research has been done with regard to the Responsible 
Care Programme, which is the largest unilateral commitment in the chemical 
industry.370
Many voluntary approaches do not necessarily need any specific legal 
framework. This clearly applies to unilateral commitments and private 
agreements, but also to negotiated agreements. Despite this the legal base 
for negotiated agreements in the field of environmental policy has in some 
countries been specifically created.371 Public voluntary programmes, where 
participating companies agree to follow standards of performance, technology 
or management set by public bodies372 may be created by legislation. Major 
examples for environmental policy are the EMAS regulation concerning 
environmental management and auditing system373 and the ECO-label 
scheme.374
Next I will briefly assess the relevance of negotiated agreements and 
environmental management systems with regard to pollution control of 
. OECD 2003c, 18–19. 
. Börkey, Glachant, and Lévêque 1999. 
. Börkey, Glachant and Lévèque, 1999, 5.
0. Hildén et al. 2002, 75–81, see also Börkey, Glachant and Lévèque 1999, 41.
. This is, for example, the case in Denmark (Section 10 of the Environmental Protection Act). 
Particularly, in the Netherlands, negotiated agreements are incorporated in the general system 
pollution control and, hence, the agreements are given much greater legal status than in many 
other countries. 
. Börkey, Glachant and Lévèque 1999, 10.
. EC regulation 761/2001
. EC regulation 1980/2000
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industrial activities in Finland. European and national eco-labels schemes, 
which are instruments of product policy, are excluded from the scope of analysis 
following the definition of focus given above.
Environmental agreements. An EU-wide study concluded that environmental 
agreements have had a fairly small role in Finnish environmental policy. Only two 
environmental agreements were found in Finland, whereas in certain other EU 
member states, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany, the numbers were 
greater.375 The total number for all 15 member states included in the study was 
more than 300.376 While the real number of environmental agreements in Finland 
is greater than two, the report still correctly indicates the general line: Finland 
rather belongs to the group of countries seldom employing voluntary agreements 
as instruments of environmental policy than the opposite group.
Sairinen has identified 17 environmental agreements in Finland which 
relate to four different issues: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) reduction, packaging 
waste, energy conservation and remediation of contaminated soil.377 All these 
environmental agreements relate to environmental harms caused by industrial 
activities. Hence, they are relevant for this study as a point of departure. 
Recently, voluntary approaches have drawn increasing attention in Finland in 
another field of environmental policy, namely in nature conservation. In the 
framework of the Forest Biodiversity Programme for Southern Finland 2003–
2007 (METSO)378 new instruments are being developed and experiences sought. 
However, for the purposes of this study these attempts are not of interest.
The agreements concerning CFC reduction and packing waste were 
temporary. Of the two CFC reduction agreements, one was made with the 
aerosol industry in 1987 and the other with the plastics industry in 1988. 
In addition, an agreement on packaging waste was made in 1995. All three 
agreements lasted two years or less and thereafter were replaced by traditional 
regulation. They were initiated by respective industries to avoid or postpone the 
anticipated regulation. The level of ambition was equal to that of the Montreal 
Protocol and Waste Directive (of 20 December 1994). In other words, the 
agreements concerned implementation, not target setting. They helped the 
industries to adapt to the new situation, and their environmental benefits have 
been assessed to be minor.379
There are two layers of energy conservation agreements, one at the level 
of industrial sectors and another at installation level. In framework agreements 
. European Environmental Agency, 1997. See also Börkey, Glachant and Lévèque, 1999, 31.
. Jordan, Wurzel and Zito.
. Sairinen 2000, 214–244.
. http://www.mmm.fi/metso.
. Sairinen, 2000, 219–228
0
industrial sectors and the Government of Finland agree upon general conditions 
for energy conservation, while concrete measures (such as environmental 
auditing) are agreed at installation level. Subsidies for environmental auditing 
are also provided. Generally speaking, the first set of framework agreements 
(agreed since 1992) has been assessed not to have achieved major environmental 
benefits in comparison to the business-as-usual scenario.380 The second set of 
framework agreements (agreed since 1997 and still in use) seem to be more 
promising. By the end of 2003, 8 framework agreements have been concluded 
concerning the following sectors: industry, energy production, municipalities, 
real estates and construction, housing, bus services, truck and van business, 
and oil heating. In contrast to the early 1990s these led to active participation at 
installation level; by the end of 2003, more than 150 companies accounting 81% 
of all industrial energy consumption had made an agreement. Taking all sectors 
into account the agreements covered activities responsible for 55% of all energy 
consumption. The Information Centre for Energy Efficiency (MOTIVA), a 
body established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, has reported positively, 
on the basis of evaluations, on the impacts of energy agreements.381
Though energy conservation agreements are basically voluntary, there 
exists a link between the energy conservation agreement and traditional 
regulation. New environmental permits often –but not always382—include 
a provision to carry out energy auditing. It is still unclear to what extent the 
permitting practice reflects development which would have happened in any 
case and to what extent the permit conditions on energy auditing result in 
additional measures and environmental benefits.
An agreement, based on a Danish model, for treatment of contaminated 
soil in service stations was made in 1996 between the Finnish Petroleum 
Federation, the Ministry of the Environment, the Association of Finnish Local 
Authorities and three oil companies (SOILI programme). Later two other 
companies joined the agreement. The agreement aims to promote treatment 
of contaminated soil of defunct service stations. The inclusion of functioning 
stations was rejected on competitive grounds. The implementation of the 
agreement is funded directly by the industry or on the basis of public funds, 
which, in turn, gather funds from the same industry through obligatory fees. 
Under the agreement several hundred sites have been treated in order to meet 
the criteria established in law. The motivation of industry comes from the fact 
that the soil of most sites is contaminated and the service station owners would 
potentially be liable for the treatment in any case. However, it would not have 
been easy to identify the person liable without dispute and through agreement 
0. Sairinen 2000, 228–235.
. www.motive.fi. 
. Kautto et al. 2003, 78.
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costly lawsuits have been avoided. From the environmental protection point of 
view, the agreement has been considered a success, because the number of sites 
treated—and to be treated—is assessed to be higher than it would otherwise 
have been. In addition, the agreement is claimed to have resulted in efficiency 
gains for society as a whole.383
The overall conclusion is that the relevance of environmental agreements 
for Finnish environmental policy has been rather limited. Firstly, the number 
of environmental agreements has been low and they have concerned only a 
few environmental problems. Secondly, some environmental agreements have 
worked in the shadows of traditional regulation without any recognisable 
environmental benefits. CFC agreements and packaging agreements were 
initiated due to anticipation of coming regulation and they soon lost their 
relevance, when regulatory instruments were introduced. The environmental 
targets of the SOILI programme are firmly based on the liability rules and the 
standards of public law. Thus, the point of having an agreement is not to set 
new environmental standards, but to find a more effective and efficient way of 
implementing them.384 The agreement has apparently improved the efficiency of 
implementation in comparison to costly and time-consuming litigation. Energy 
efficiency seems to be the only environmental issue where negotiated agreements 
aim to contribute to the ambition level of environmental policy. Though research-
based evidence on the effectiveness of these agreements is lacking, it is not only 
possible but likely that they have had positive environmental impacts.
Environmental management systems. The firms use different kinds of 
environmental management systems on a voluntary basis and only one of them, 
namely EMAS385, is directly related to specific legislation. EMAS is a typical 
public voluntary programme, where public standards are set, but participation 
is decided by the firms. ISO14001, the main alternative to EMAS, is a product 
of standardisation organisation and, hence, the standards of the management 
system do not have to be decided in a democratic process. The previous ISO 14001 
scheme and environmental managements systems based on EMAS regulation 
differ in numerous points, but nowadays requirements under EMAS are equal 
to ISO14001 with the additional features of public reporting and auditing.386 The 
environmental management systems do not require the achievement of stricter 
environmental standards than those already stipulated in public law, though the 
adoption of such a system may improve environmental performance. However, 
. Sairinen 2000, 236–239, Tuomainen 2001, 309–320.
. On the difference between target-based and implementation based voluntary approaches, see 
Börkey, Glachant and Lévêque 1999, 12.
. EMAS = an environmental management and auditing system. The new EMAS regulation 
(761/2001) is implemented by law 914/2002.
. Based on Article 9 of the EMAS regulation.
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the main benefits relate rather to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
implementation than to new substantial targets. Hence, the very nature of these 
systems is complementary to other instruments.
With regard to impacts of the environmental management system a 
major problem it that is has spread to only a rather small number of plants in 
Finland. This applies in particular to EMAS, but to some extent also to ISO 
14001. Not surprisingly, the environmental management system is used much 
more in different installations of large companies as the records of EMAS 
authority shows.387 At the beginning of 2005, there were 40 EMAS registrations 
from 17 different companies. This number includes 13 registrations made by 
different installations of large pulp and paper companies. Due to the fact that 
one registration may include several installations, the number of installations 
covered by the registrations was higher being 48. The ISO 14001 environmental 
management system is much more common in Finland. According to the 
Finnish Standards Association the number of registered environmental 
certification was 919 at the end of 2005 and some organisations have adopted the 
standard without registration.388 Still this is far from the number of installations 
in need of environmental permits, which is estimated to be about 26,000.389
In a study on the pulp and paper industry, the effectiveness of environmental 
management systems was evaluated.390 The very nature of the instruments makes 
it difficult to distinguish the impacts of environmental management system 
from other incentives, because environmental management system is an integral 
part of overall management. However, in line with observations from other 
studies it was found that management systems are likely to identify possibilities 
for environmental improvements. The study concludes that an environmental 
management system may result in positive impacts. Furthermore, it was found 
that the perception of continuous improvement varies greatly from installation 
to installation. In some installation environmental management system was not 
much more than a haphazard collection of measures, whereas in others it was 
used in a clearly more systematic way to get a comprehensive picture of present 
environmental effects. In other recent research related to Finnish industries it 
was found that although the attitudes to environmental management systems 
are positive, their real influence on company behaviour is still subject to further 
investigation.391
In the international literature, too, the existence of a causal link between 
environmental management systems and environmental benefits has turned 
. www.ymparisto.fi> yritykset ja ja yhteisöt > ympäristöjärjestelmät ja johtaminen > EMAS 
 rekisteri.
. The information received from the Finnish Standards Association SFS in May 2006. 
. Ekroos 2005, 18. 
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out to be difficult to prove. According to an interim report related to a review of 
EMAS, the scheme “is perceived to bring improvements to on-site environmental 
performance” and “seems to have positive effects” on environmental innovation 
in companies. But differences between certified and non-certified firms in 
resource use and emission levels are “not statistically significant”.392 In a OECD 
report general doubts about effectiveness of voluntary approaches covering 
e.g. negotiated agreements and voluntary public programmes were raised. 
It was reported that “there are only few cases where such (=voluntary—JS) 
approaches have been found to contribute to environmental improvements 
significantly different from what would have happened anyway.” Furthermore, 
the economic efficiency was found to be “generally low”. It is therefore not 
surprising that the OECD experts recommend that a first best alternative would 
be to replace command-and-control regulation by “economy wide economic 
instruments” and that a second best option would be to improve the flexibility 
of existing command-and-control regulation instead of a “piecemeal approach” 
that lets only few companies attain environmental improvements in a more 
flexible way.393
3.5.2. Taxation
The use of taxes and fees as environmental instruments is restricted to rather 
few, albeit important, environmental problems. The main taxes and fees are 
energy tax, car tax, vehicle tax, motor vehicle tax (including so-called ‘diesel 
tax’), waste tax, surtax on alcohol beverages, surtax on soft drinks, oil protection 
tax, waste oil charge, pesticide charge.394 The water protection charge was 
repealed, while the Environmental Protection Act was introduced in 2000. 
Hence, no new water protection charges have been determined since 1 March 
2000, although previously determined charges will produce revenue for some 
years to come.
With regard to pollution emitted by point sources the energy tax is 
particularly relevant.395 A tax based on carbon content of fuels was introduced 
into Finland in 1990, although other considerations also affected tax levels of 
different fuels. Thereafter there have been rather many changes. In 1995 the 
tax structure was changed so that all sources of primary energy came to be 
taxed on the basis of energy content. Additional tax based on carbon content 
was imposed on fossil fuels. Wind energy, wood and waste fuel were exempted 
. Hertin et al. 469.
. OECD 2003c, 14–15. Ashford, on the basis of similar kind considerations, see voluntary—as 
well as consensus-based approach generally—rather problematic with regard to innovations. 
Ashford 2005, 167–169.
. Hiltunen 2004, 7. 
. For a detailed and critical analysis of the design of energy taxation in Finland, see Määttä, K. 
1997 and 2000a, in particular 111–150 and Määttä, K. 2003. 
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from the tax.396 In the early 1990s it was assumed that some kind of European 
energy/environmental tax was emerging and Finland aimed to anticipate this 
coming development. This assumption turned out to be false. Instead, import 
tax on electricity used in Finland was deemed illegal by the European Court 
of Justice.397 This Court judgement and the opening of the Nordic electricity 
market affected the next energy tax reform, which entered into force from the 
beginning of 1997. The use of fuels in electricity production is not taxed directly; 
instead, tax is focused on the consumption of electricity.398 The reasons for this 
are related to the problems of using (domestic) tax on open Nordic electricity 
markets. Severing the link between the carbon dioxide content of fuels and the 
amount of tax has reduced the effectiveness of electricity tax, though due to 
the factual difference between the marginal production costs of different forms 
of electricity production, electricity tax may favour the use of fuel containing 
less carbon dioxide.399 With regard to energy production the link between the 
amount of tax and carbon dioxide content is not full and direct: some fuels, such 
as natural gas and peat, have a lower tax rate than they should have according to 
carbon dioxide content of the fuels. Furthermore, fiscal aspects have always had 
an important role, while the rate has be determined.400
The impacts of Finnish energy taxation have been assessed in some 
studies—with somewhat different results. It has been acknowledged that the 
objectives set down in the Bill for Parliament introducing the CO2 tax, have 
been achieved with certain reservations related to the underlying factors.401 
The objectives included 1 per cent reduction on the growth of CO2 emissions 
compared to the development without the tax, and the reduction of nitrogen 
oxides and hydrocarbon by 2 per cent. In an evaluation project focusing on the 
impacts of regulation on pulp and paper mills, it was pointed out that taxation 
may have had an indirect impact through energy saving agreements, though 
it is difficult to show to what extent this has occurred. In other words, the 
energy tax may have encouraged the companies to take energy conservation 
measures to reduce tax.402 According to Kivimaa and Mickwitz403 the tax has 
not been a contributory factor to efficiency improvements by new technologies 
in pulp and paper mills. This is apparently due to the low level of taxation 
and refund mechanisms. Kivimaa and Similä404 found that the impact of the 
. Governmental Bill, HE 237/1994, On the development of energy taxation, see Määttä, K. 2000a, 
111–150.
. C–213/96 (2 April 1998). 
. Governmental Bill, HE 225/1996, Act 1260/1996.
. Määttä, K. 2000b, 60–62 and Määttä, K. 2001, 127–128.
00. Määttä, K. 2003, 178–181.
0. Economic Council of Finland 2000.
0. Hilden et al. 2002, 72–73.
0. Kivimaa and Mickwitz 2004.
0. Kivimaa and Similä manuscript, see also the Economic Council, 2000, 46–47.
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Finnish energy taxation on the acidifying emissions from electricity production 
is likely to have been negligible, whereas for heat production, the energy tax 
may have been one of the factors facilitating change from coal and fuel oil to 
natural gas and biofuels. With regard to heat production the tax has affected 
the price structure. It has made certain fuels relatively cheaper than they would 
be without tax. The arguments for rather weak effectiveness have varied to a 
certain extent. Kalle Määttä405 stresses the importance of frequent changes 
and Hildén et al. consider the low level of the tax even more import.406 The 
level of energy tax in Finland is rather low in comparison to other western 
countries,407 and in addition the refunding mechanism lowers it even further. 
The refunding mechanism has been criticized for leading to a situation where 
raising energy taxes would mainly have impacts on other operators than the 
most energy intensive industry.408 Seemingly all factors have contributed to 
the outcome. The predictability of tax policy is of special importance for long 
term expensive investments, which in many cases, like energy production, are 
crucial for environmental effects.409 The combination of low level of tax and 
its unpredictability suggests that taxation may be seen as rather weak signal 
for further environmental investments by company directors. Naturally, this 
argument says nothing about the potentiality of tax instruments as means to 
reduce greenhouse gases or other pollutants if designed and used differently.
3.5.3. Liability for environmental damage
The need for specific legislation on environmental damage comes from 
deficiencies in traditional tort law. Specifically the following problems reduce 
the influence of tort law as a means to prevent pollution: (1) proving the existence 
of a causal link between pollution and damage is difficult; (2) the damage is 
born by a large number of people and the interest of each individual person 
may be rather low, (3) proving who of many polluters has caused the damage is 
difficult; (4) only damage to private interests is compensable. Furthermore, the 
long latency periods and solvency problems should be added to problems.410
As a response to problems associated with traditional tort law the Environ-
mental Damage Compensation Act (737/1994) was passed in 1994 and this is a 
major piece of legislation concerning damage caused by pollution from industrial 
activities. Prior to the adoption of this act damage caused by water discharges was 
determined on the basis of the Water Act. Under the Water Act the compensation 
of anticipated damage caused by discharges allowed in a permit was assessed 
0. Määttä, K. 2000a, 130.
0. Hildén et al. 2002, 73.
0. Economic Council of Finland 2000, 7.
0. Hiltunen 2004, 27, Määttä presents similar criticism, Määttä K. 2003, 180.
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ex officio and ordered to be compensated as a part of permitting procedure. It 
was also possible to obtain a retrospective compensation for damages caused by 
‘illegal’ pollution, i.e. damage caused by pollution exceeding emission limits. The 
adoption of the integrated permit procedure in 2000 did not bring in a principal 
change in the sense that damage caused by permissible water pollution can still 
be determined in advance as a part of permitting procedure, though not in the 
case of other types of pollution. However, also with regard to water pollution the 
substantial basis for compensation is regulated by the Environmental Damage 
Compensation Act. Because compensation of permissible water pollution is based 
on ex ante assessment, the problems related to the proving of a causal link have 
diminished. It is enough that be the damage is a likely result of water pollution. 
As a result, compensation for water pollution has frequently been ordered in 
conjunction with the granting of permits. Recently this has started to change, 
because in many cases the activities under permitting discharge significantly 
less than before.411 In this chapter the focus is on the recent regulatory change 
(since 1987 or so). Hence the compensation system of the Water Act is beyond 
the scope of this chapter.
The Environmental Damage Compensation Act covers damage caused by 
activities carried out in certain areas and resulting from (1) pollution of water, 
air, or soil; (2) noise, vibration, radiation, light, heat, or smell; or (3) or other 
similar nuisance. It includes a number of features which increase the likelihood 
that compensation will be ordered in comparison to the general civil liability 
law.412 First, it imposes strict liability for the person liable to pay damages. In 
addition, proving causality between the activity and losses was made easier; 
probable causality is enough to constitute liability. Bodily injury and material 
losses as well as financial losses are compensated assuming that the loss is not 
minor. Furthermore, in the case of several polluters the Act provides that they 
shall be jointly and severally liable. One important feature of the Act is that 
persons comparable to the persons carrying out the activity are liable. This 
unconventional extension of liability means, for instance, that a parent company 
can become liable. A lender, if the relationship between the borrower and the 
lender is typical, is not liable. However, in a specific situation, where the lender 
has a strong control of the borrower’s activities, the lender may become liable.413
. The approach of how compensation is determined had varied in practice from one water court 
to another, as the permit authority was previously called. In some cases the compensation 
has been calculated based on the assumption that the pollution was permanent. If so, only an 
increased amount of pollution has resulted in further compensation in the next permitting 
cycle. In other cases, compensation covered only the period of validity of the permit. If so, 
damage must also be assessed and compensated in the next permit cycle. 
. Legal practice based on traditional tort law to some extent developed in the same direction even 
before the Environmental Damage Compensation Act entered into force (1 June 1995). See e.g. 
KHO 1989:7 and also KKO 1995:108. Hollo and Vihervuori 1995, 218–227.
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It may be questioned whether the primary intention of the Environmental 
Damage Compensation Act was indeed the reduction of pollution. The 
formulation of the Governmental Bill for the Compensation for Environmental 
Damage Act suggests that the main goal is not to affect pollution levels in 
general, but to give legal protection for the victims of pollution.414 The fact 
that the Act regulates compensation for losses sustained by a private interest, 
not losses for the public interest (ecological damage), also supports this. 
However, reasonable costs of restoration of the environment can be ordered to 
be compensated.415 The Act also covers reasonable costs incurred by authorities 
for measures to prevent the threat or the effects of a nuisance or to reinstate a 
polluted environment to its original state. This way damage to the environment 
(ecological damage) may also be covered.
Although the intended goal of the Act was not the general reduction of 
pollution, it could have such an effect. There is, however, no proper evaluation 
available to what extent the Environmental Damage Compensation Act has 
influenced the polluters and the reduce of pollution. Hence, the impacts of 
it are still subject to further investigation. Internationally the potentiality of 
liability as an instrument to reduce environmental harms—and even to spur 
innovations416—has been widely discussed, though mainly on a theoretical 
basis.417 Still the preventive effect of liability is disputable and convincing 
evidence of such an effect is lacking.418 It has been claimed that the preventive 
effect of civil liability law has been overestimated.419 Only a high enough likeli-
hood that the liable party will actually pay for the damage resulting from 
her behaviour, will make this potentiality a reality.420 If this assumption is 
correct, lack of cases can be interpreted as an indirect indication of poor 
effectiveness. From this perspective it is interesting to find that only few cases 
have been brought before the Supreme Court and in the literature the number 
of cases is generally considered to be low.421 The number of lawsuits related to 
. The Governmental Bill (HE 165/1992) states as follows: ”The compensation of environmental 
damage should be distinguished from the above-mentioned means of environmental policy 
and environmental protection (such as permitting and taxes—JS). The principal goal of rules 
on environmental damage is to provide legal protection, not the achievement of certain 
environmental policy goals. However, the application of damage compensation rules may also 
to a varying degree prevent the deterioration of the environment.”
. Hollo and Vihervuori 1995, 19, Steiner 1998, 289
. Hemmelskamp 1997, 184–187.
. There is abundant, albeit mainly theoretical, literature concerning the relevance of tort law for 
public policy goals, E.g. Shavell 1984a, 1984b. 
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environmental damage is claimed also to be rather low in other countries.422 
However, some, though weak, empirical evidence of the preventive effect of 
liability schemes has been found,423 and liability for environmental damage 
has been shown to increase the costs of firms.424 Apparently the increase in the 
costs concerns soil protection in particular. Hence, the external costs are to 
some extent internalised, which is a prerequisite for the preventive effect. This 
alone, however, does not directly show that the behaviour of the polluters has 
changed.425 In sum, though the lack of sound evidence restricts the drawing of 
definite conclusions, it is likely that the Environmental Damage Compensation 
Act has affected air and water pollution level only to a lesser degree.
3.6. Concluding remarks on regulatory change
The amount of environmental legislation is increasing and the rate of 
legislative change is high. The annually adopted environmental legislation 
tends to increase, though variation between years is significant. A part of 
legislative development can be considered as manifestly irrelevant for the 
goals of environmental policy. Manifestly irrelevant legislation does not seek 
to change the behaviour of those regulated, though it may be needed for other 
reasons. There is a number of types of legislation, which potentially, though 
not necessarily, are irrelevant in the sense referred to above, like the repeal of 
obsolete legislation, legislation concerning purely the organisation of public 
administration, change of legislation intended to fulfil formal implementation 
of international or constitutional law without any substantive goals, measures 
intended to maintain the coherency of law without substantial goals, and 
changes concerning technical details such as the date of entry of substantial 
requirements. Though the exact amount of manifestly irrelevant legislation 
could not be precisely determined, there are no reasons to overstress its portion 
of all legislative changes. A major part of changes in environmental legislation 
contribute to the expansion, differentiation or tightening of legislation. This is 
not to claim that most changes are highly significant; clearly the opposite is the 
case. However, the observation that individual changes are typically minor does 
not permit the conclusion that the overall development will not be significant 
in the long run.
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Though deregulation of environmental regulation has not occurred in 
substantive terms, the liberalisation of the energy market and privatization 
of utilities has indirectly affected pollution issues. The public authorities have 
nowadays fewer direct channels than before to influence energy producers. 
Hence, the liberalisation of utilities as well as the other forms of increasing 
the use of markets, stresses the importance of regulation, as is generally noted 
in the discussion on the “New Regulatory State”.426 This applies to all forms of 
regulation. The role of taxation as a regulatory instrument also becomes more 
important, when energy markets are liberalized.427
Finland is considered an especially law-intensive428 country in comparison 
to other European countries. This applies in general to public policies in 
Finland, not only to environmental policy. The assumption of law-intensity 
suggests that in Finland non-legal regulation is seldom used. While answering 
this question properly would require a comparative analysis, the rather 
minimal role of negotiated agreements in Finnish environmental policy 
supports this assumption. However, the great number of examples of national 
soft law instruments presented by Tapio Määttä429 shows that extensive use of 
legal regulation has not cut the needs to use also other means of regulation to 
complement formal regulation. Most of his examples can be seen as a part of 
a differentiation process, where soft law instruments more precisely define the 
content of hard law. The law-intensity of Finnish policy is often explained by 
referring to the constitutional requirements and legalistic tradition of Finland.430 
The Constitution stresses the importance of using parliamentary legislation as 
the means to define the rights and duties of citizens. This has contributed to 
the increasing use of Parliamentary Acts instead of sub-legislation, but it also 
generally promotes the use of all kinds of legislation in comparison to other ways 
of exerting influence. The plentiful use of soft law instruments is, however, in 
contrast with this development and creates a constitutional constraint within 
regulation.431 Another fact affecting the plentiful use of (hard and soft) legal 
regulation is a sharp division of powers between legislative and enforcement 
bodies. The Council of State and the ministries as part of it wield the main 
regulatory powers and the regional state authorities “only” implement the laws. 
The regional state authorities as well as the municipal environmental boards 
have an independent position and the ministries are not allowed to intervene 
in the decision-making concerning individual activities or installations. Thus, 
it is mainly by means of hard and soft law and producing information, what the 
. Majone 1997, 149–50, Parker et al. 2004, 6, Tala 2004, 384.
. Määttä, K. 2000, 16.
. Ministry of Justice 2005, 3.
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ministries can fully ensure the correct implementation of policy.
Is the increasing amount of environmental legislation a problem? At 
least in the rhetoric of the better regulation initiative the amount of legislation 
seems to be a problem per se. The European Commission has set the target of 
reducing the acquis by 25%, corresponding to about 22,500 pages of the Official 
Journal.432 This goal is general, but it involves also environmental regulation. 
The increasing amount of legislation may, indeed, have undesirable impacts. 
The steering capacity of law may diminish, if those regulated are not able 
to follow continuously changing legislation and its uncertainty and internal 
constraints increase.433 Furthermore, a great number of laws may also have 
side-effects, like an excessive amount of administrative costs. While these 
challenges must be taken seriously, reducing legislation through simplification 
may also have negative side-effects regardless the direct impact on the level of 
environmental protection.
The relationship between the quantity of legal texts and its quality is not a 
straightforward matter. Clear and specified legal expressions may require more 
and longer texts.434 Confusing and ambiguous expressions may be a much worse 
alternative in comparison to high quality but lengthier expressions. Cutting 
the amount of legal texts does not necessarily mean that law becomes less 
open to various interpretations nor does it necessarily increase predictability. 
In Finland, water pollution regulation435 does not employ sub-legislation to 
the same extent as air pollution regulation does.436 From the fact that there 
are more relevant legal texts regulating air pollution than water pollution, it 
does not necessary follow that decision-making on water pollution based on 
broadly defined legal standards is less open to various interpretations than 
air pollution control standards, which use more exact technical expressions. 
Apparently the opposite is the case. The use of broadly defined legal standards 
also has the consequence that a significant part of decision-making powers is 
delegated to permit authorities and judicial bodies reviewing permit decisions. 
This contributes to another aspect of juridification, namely juridification as 
increased judicial power.437
Equally important to the numerical goals of better regulation policy 
are the methods used to achieve the goals. The base forms of reducing the 
amount of existing regulation are simplification (simplification of legislation, of 
. European Commission COM (2001) 726, see also COM (2003) 71.
. On the problems related to excessive amount legislation, see Tala 2005, 223–225.
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administrative procedures for public authorities and of administrative burdens 
for private actors), codification (reorganising law by gathering obligations and 
rights from different pieces of law into one), consolidation (making updated 
versions of legislation in order to facilitate the finding of law) and removing 
obsolete legislation.438 This approach reflects a belief that the problem is not in 
substantive requirements set in environmental regulation but in the form of it. 
Furthermore, it implies that changing legislation in the spirit of better regulation 
does not necessarily result in looser standards. Interestingly, simplification and 
codification of legislation may increase, not decrease the number of annually 
adopted legislation, because they require new legislative efforts. This becomes 
clear from the following quotation related to better regulation initiative: “The 
review of acquis must become a continuous and systematic process enabling 
the legislator to revise legislation taking all legitimate private and public interest 
into account“.439 Hence, the better regulation initiative may increase the rate of 
legislative change.
In this regard attention can be drawn to the fact that a vast majority of 
the Finnish environmental legislation currently in force is of recent date. It 
was observed in the course of this study that in autumn 2005 a little less than 
one third of the pollution control statutes were less than 5 years old, a little 
more than one third 5–10 years old and another little more than one third 
was more than 10 years old. Only few pieces of present law were made prior 
to 1990. Partly this is because the matters regulated are new, but it also shows 
that most of the old legislation has recently been revised. Hence this indicates a 
high rate of re-regulation. Until now re-regulation has typically involved more 
specific rules than previous legislation (differentiation), regulation of new 
matters (expansion) and/or tightening existing rules, and this development is 
clearly something other than pure simplification or codification of legislation. 
However, re-regulation has most likely also reduced the amount of obsolete 
legislation, whose negative side-effects outweigh its benefits.
A common trend in all regulation is that of Europeanization. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, Wiberg has claimed, on the basis of statistical 
information, that only a minority of all national (not only environmental) 
legislation is affected by European law.440 Despite the fact that the statistical 
information gathered for this research with regard to environmental legislation 
gives some support to thinking along the lines of Wiberg, I hesitate to do so. 
Though the national legislator still produces most of its legislation without a 
formal link to EU law in all sectors of environmental regulation, EU influence 
is strong.
. European Commission COM (2005) 466. 
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It is claimed that the EU has generally speaking not had a significant effect 
on policy instrument selection at the national level.441 With regard to the Finnish 
pollution control regulation this generalization can be considered justified in the 
sense that both the EU and the Finnish pollution control regulation rely heavily 
on traditional regulation. On the other hand, the general development of the 
major instrument, namely the environmental permit system, can be associated 
with EU regulation. In addition, the EU has affected the taxation system and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (468/94) as well as the emission trading 
scheme (683/2004) were adopted due to the EU.442 Environmental standards 
adopted in the form of legislation, are likewise strongly influenced by EU law, as 
the case of air pollution regulation indicates. One could even hypothesise that 
most of new legal ideas adopted during the last few decades have come from 
abroad, though this hypothesis would require further studies. The main value of 
the statistical information on annually adopted legislation is that it reveals the 
differences between sectors of environmental regulation, while combined with 
the results of Wiberg it supports the view that environmental legislation is more 
Europeanized than legislation in general. Furthermore, it shows that waste, 
chemical and pollution control regulation are the most Europeanized sectors 
of environmental regulation. The amount of EU influence has varied from one 
year to another and it is not possible to identify any clear trend with regard to 
the rate of Europeanization since Finland joined to the European Union.
Though the Europeanization of environmental regulation is strong, the 
national legislator—as well as national administration—also has a significant 
role for a variety of reasons. First, the administrative structures are mainly 
in the hands of member states. Secondly, there are fields of environmental 
policy where the EU does not have competence, like land use planning and 
environmental taxes. Thirdly, most EU environmental regulation has a 
minimum character, which means that the national legislator may impose 
stricter requirements or enlarge the scope of activities under regulation in 
comparison to what EU law requires. In the case of environmental permitting 
the installations under the IPPC Directive consist of only a small portion of all 
regulated installations, albeit the biggest ones.443 Fourthly, EU directives are 
often—and are meant to be—incomplete in the sense that they do not define 
exactly how the implementation should be done. This aspect is different than 
that concerning strictness, because not all options can be judged on the basis 
. Jordan and Lieffrink, 2004b, 226.
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of strictness. Thus, the national regulatory styles may greatly affect the exact 
form of legislation. Depending on the exact nature of the national legislation, 
the stricter requirements may be decided either at legislative or administrative 
level. Water pollution regulation in Finland is an example where EU standards 
have, after all, had rather limited impacts with regard to the permit conditions 
imposed by regulatory agencies.
During the last two decades environmental regulation has significantly 
changed in general and pollution control regulation in particular. The 
emergence of new policy instruments has hit pollution control regulation 
particularly, where the diversity of instruments is nowadays greater than in 
many other fields of environmental regulation. About 30% of the new pollution 
control legislation adopted during the period explored related to economic 
instruments. The diversity of environmental regulatory instruments is, in turn, 
greater than in many other fields of regulation.444 Despite this, the traditional 
regulation still has a dominant role with regard to pollution control of industrial 
activities, when the whole range of environmental matters is considered.445 
Most legislation relates to traditional regulation and only few non-legislative 
instruments have been adopted. The scope of activities and range of matters 
covered by traditional regulation often outweigh those of its alternatives.
In the literature, it has frequently been repeated that the number of new 
instruments is increasing.446 This is undoubtedly true, but at the same time 
it should be noted that the number of traditional regulatory instruments 
has also increased and most of the traditional regulations have undergone 
reforms, which have—more or less—changed their nature. Both hard law and 
soft law instruments of traditional regulation have increased at national and 
international level. In other words, environmental regulation of all kinds has 
increased and changed. These observations can be made on the basis of the 
changes of the amount of annually adopted legislation. Though the amount 
of annually adopted legislation is an insufficient indicator of change due to 
the variety of reasons as explained above, it has the advantage that it covers all 
instruments in need of legislative action. Data on legislative change gives some 
basis to explore relative changes between different types of instruments.
To provide additional insight into the development, the relevance 
of some key new instruments in relation to industrial sites was discussed. 
Often in the discussion on the new policy instruments the exact scope of 
application of different instruments is given little attention. While this may 
be understandable in the sense that new instruments may contain interesting 
qualitative features, there is a danger that too loose discussion leads to confusion 
. OECD 2003b, 30. 
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and misunderstandings. If real-world regulation has very specific character 
and a narrow scope of application, their role for the overall effectiveness of 
environmental regulation is likely to be small.
The research-based evidence available does not support the view that new 
instruments, in particular the EMAS scheme or negotiated agreements, have 
had a major impact on the environmental performance of industrial activities 
in Finland. Internationally critical—or should it be called ‘realistic’—attitude 
towards new policy instruments has increased while experience of them have 
grown. Knill and Lenschow, for instance, are generally rather critical with regard 
to the effectiveness of new policy instruments. They stress the importance 
of contextual factors as opposed to the features of the policy instruments. 
Hence, they do not claim that the instruments per se do not work, but the 
real-world instruments have often not worked well in the context in which 
they are implemented. Their analysis covers instruments like EMAS, eco-label 
and access to information adopted in the European context. 447 In an OECD 
report generally sceptical views about ecological effectiveness and economic 
efficiency of voluntary approaches have been presented. The report, based on 
case studies, concluded that: ”The review above provides only a few examples 
where a voluntary policy approach is deemed to have contributed significantly to 
the fulfilment of a given target. In most cases, factors other than the given voluntary 
approach seem to explain the major part of any environmental improvement that 
has taken place.”448 Furthermore, it is stated in the report that “the environmental 
effectiveness of voluntary approaches is still questionable.”449 However, voluntary 
approaches can be seen as good choices when there are no other better ones 
politically available.
With regard to economic instruments the overall picture is more complicated. 
No doubt environmental taxation as a whole has had positive impacts on the 
environment (in particular on traffic). With regard to industrial installation 
the most relevant tax, energy tax, has been criticized for its design as well as its 
observed effectiveness. At the same time it must be stressed that some positive 
impacts in terms of effectiveness have also been identified. However, there are 
rather few research-based results on the effectiveness of Finnish energy taxation, 
which makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions. With regard to liability for 
environmental damages the situation is even worse in terms of research. In the 
international literature, the effectiveness of liability for environmental damages 
is disputable. Perhaps this is why the primary goal of the act, as presented in its 
preparatory documents, was to protect individuals suffering damage rather than 
to affect pollution overall. One can conclude that there is little evidence showing 
. Knill and Lenschow 2000, 25–27. 
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that the Environmental Damage Compensation Act has significantly affected 
the environmental performance of polluters.
Despite the foregoing a moderate regulatory shift towards new instru-
ments can be observed. One reason for this development is the changing nature 
of environmental problems. Traditional regulation is often considered to be 
unsuitable to regulate new environmental problems and, hence, there is a 
need for some other kind of regulatory instruments. While hardly anyone 
doubts this, a more interesting question is, whether perceptions with regard 
to the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory instruments have to any 
extent resulted in a replacement of traditional regulation by new regulatory 
instruments. Based on the Finnish development the main conclusion is that 
replacement has not occurred to any significant extent. Old legislation has 
been repealed and new, better legislation adopted, but this has not involved the 
replacement of traditional regulation by new instruments. To the extent new 
instruments have been adopted, it has meant an expansion of regulation, not 
a move from old to new instruments. The pollution control legislation is a case 
in point. New instruments, like energy tax, liability for environmental damage, 
environmental management system or negotiated agreements have not resulted 
in limitations of traditional regulation. On the contrary, traditional regulation 
has at the same time continued its expansion and differentiation process. In 
this sense the evolution of regulation has been incremental. It must at least be 
queried whether the constant change of traditional regulation has been even 
more important in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and innovations than the 
moderate shift of the types of regulatory instruments.
In the next chapter, the focus lies on traditional regulation concerning 
industrial activities. Both regulation on integrated environmental permits, 
which is a major development in Finnish pollution control regulation, and one 
sectoral permit (water pollution permit) preceding it will be discussed.
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Chapter 4
Traditional regulation
The general theme for this chapter is pollution control through environmental 
permits. This chapter, unlike Chapter 2, aims to shed light on effectiveness and 
efficiency issues on the basis of the analysis of legal regulation in one country, 
namely Finland. Before going to specific topics related to environmental 
permits, a general overview of the permit mechanisms is presented. In order 
to accomplish this task the development of a legal framework for pollution 
control, with a particular focus on air and water pollution, is presented. The 
examination covers previous sectoral regulation and ends up with integrated 
pollution control regulation. The first topic is the development of water 
and air pollution standards prior to the adoption of an integrated permit 
mechanism. The purpose is to investigate how the legal framework modifies 
the general nature of standards and what implications follow from this in terms 
of effectiveness and efficiency. As a second topic the influences of permits on 
technological development will be explored. This investigation is limited to 
pollution permits under the Water Act. The analysis is divided into two parts. 
First the key elements of regulatory approach are explored and thereafter the 
impacts on the pulp and paper industry are evaluated on the basis of permit 
decisions, related material and interviews. The third topic is integrated 
pollution control and the aim is to understand, whether the goals of integrated 
permitting, namely increased effectiveness and efficiency, have been achieved. 
To accomplish this task the legislative material relevant to integrated pollution 
control was studied so that exact goals and the mechanisms for achieving them 
can be identified. Also, following on from the first topic, the legal framework for 
standard setting under an integrated pollution control mechanism is explored, 
taking into account the previous analysis of sectoral regulation. Thereafter, the 
mechanisms to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of pollution control 
are discussed first at a general level and then on the basis of material gathered. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn and findings discussed with special reference to 
integrated permits.
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4.1. Legal framework for sectoral pollution control
Environmental harms originating from point sources have traditionally been 
regulated through various permits.450 The core idea of the environmental 
permit is that environmental control of an activity causing environmental 
harms should take place before the activity commences.451 A permit system is 
used to control a wide range of different environmental problems, like pollution 
control, risk management, use of natural resources and land use.452 All of these 
could be called ‘environmental permit’, though here the expression is used in 
a narrower sense referring solely to the permit mechanism regulated by the 
Environmental Protection Act (86/2000) and preceding legislation. This use of 
the expression corresponds to the terminology used in the legislation.
The focus in this chapter will be on the control of water and air pollution 
from point sources, hence, most traditional forms of environmental control 
exercised by public authorities. The goals of the environmental permit 
mechanism are broader than the mere prevention of pollution,453 though 
pollution control is undeniably at the heart of the mechanism. The scope of 
environmental permitting as a control mechanism has gradually enlarged 
and nowadays it covers a wide variety of activities from small and temporary 
activities or projects to large, complex and permanent plants. Different point 
sources of pollution from an industrial plant to waste water treatment plants 
and from agricultural activities to mining may come under the control.
Pollution control has long roots in politia regulation and elsewhere,454 
though the emergence of modern environmental pollution control occurred 
only some decades ago. As noted in Chapter 3, the late 1960s was a turning 
point for the historical development of environmental policy in Finland as 
well as in many other countries, and it was then that modern environmental 
pollution control started to take shape. Thereafter forms of pollution control 
mechanisms have been developed and changed several times. The existing, 
integrated permitting mechanism is fairly new, adopted in 2000. The pollution 
control mechanism in use now is a result of historical process and some of its 
features only become understandable through the process.
The Water Act (264/1961) was the main piece of legislation with respect 
to water pollution between 1962 and 2000. The Water Act also regulated other 
water related issues than pollution, like construction in waters. At the beginning 
of the 1960s these other aspects had a dominant role in decision-making, but 
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gradually the role of pollution control has strengthened. The control was based 
on prior authorization (i.e. permit) and the central decision-making body 
for the whole mentioned period was called—rather confusingly—‘the Water 
Court’.455 Certain minor matters were decided by the municipal environmental 
protection board.456 The National Board of Waters and Environment457 with 
its district organisation was responsible for enforcement and monitoring 
between 1970 and 1995. The establishment of the Board can be considered a 
symbol of the policy change in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, the 
legislative development of water pollution has much longer roots than modern 
environmental awareness, which started to emerge in the late 1960s.458 Since 
1995 the Regional Environment Centres, which were constituted from the 
district organisation of the Board and the Environmental Departments of the 
State Provincial Office (earlier responsible for pollution control of air and soil), 
have been responsible for enforcement and monitoring. At the same time the 
nature of the central administrative unit of the Board was changed to a research 
and development institute (the Finnish Environmental Institute) along the lines 
of the general reform of the central administration in Finland. The position of 
the Regional Environment Centres is relatively independent and the Ministry is 
not empowered to intervene in individual cases.459
Generally speaking, the regulatory powers are nowadays devolved to 
ministers in Finland whereas the executive powers is to large extent decentral-
ized,460 though the development is not uniform. The main provision of the 
Constitution with this regard (Section 80) sets strict limits for the delegation of 
regulatory powers to independent agencies. This, however, has not prevented 
the founding of some new regulatory agencies such as the Communications 
Regulatory Authority, and the Energy Market Authority as a part of the privat-
ization of former state functions.461 However, with regard to pollution control, 
there is no independent rule-making agency in Finland and its seems highly 
unlikely that such an agency would emerge in the foreseeable future. The 1995 
reform of environmental administration is to be seen as a part of general change 
of state administration in Finland, where regulatory and executive powers 
were separated as a part of reform inspired of the administrative doctrine 
. On the different categories of matters handled in Water Courts, see Vihervuori 1981, 15–27.
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called new public management.462 Originally the National Board of Waters, 
which was metamorphosed into the Finnish Environment Institute, did have 
regulatory functions, but the new institute does not have such functions with 
the exception of certain function of minor relevance.463 Most of environmental 
regulation is given in the form of legislation,464 though the municipalities have 
powers to issue general rules as well. The Ministry of the Environment has a key 
role with regard to the preparation of legislation, though it has a lesser role with 
regard to the implementation and enforcement of it. Technical standards are 
prepared by the Ministry, decided by the Council of Ministries and given in the 
form of legislation.
Contrary to what its name suggests, the main function of the Water Court 
with respect to water pollution was to issue wastewater permits and make 
other related decisions with regard to enforcement. The initiative to bring a 
matter to the Court came from outside. If the operator did not bring a permit 
application to the Court as required, it was the responsibility of the supervisory 
authorities to initiate action. The supervisory authorities did have an important 
role in decision-making due to the fact that they were always consulted and 
in most of cases made their own proposals for the essential conditions of a 
permit.465 Although the initiative for all kinds of enforcement actions came 
from the supervisory authorities, it was the Court which made the decision e.g. 
with respect to administrative sanctions. In keeping with its name the Court 
functioned as a judicial body in certain types of civil and criminal matters. 
Particularly matters concerning compensation for damage caused by water 
pollution went to the Water Courts and were handled at the same time and 
in the same procedure as permits. The issue of whether an offence had been 
committed against the Water Act was resolved by the Water Court as well. It 
exercised judicial control over permit decision made by local water boards. 
Furthermore, the Water Court was empowered to make decisions on a wide 
variety of issues related to the use of water. An appeal against a permit decision 
of the Water Court was to be made to the Superior Water Court and thereafter 
to the Supreme Administrative Court. There were three different Water Courts 
for different territories and one Superior Water Court. All these bodies had 
legal, technical and, since 1987, ecological experts at their disposal. The three 
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Water Courts466 were transformed into three Environmental Permit Authorities 
in March 2000, when the pollution control legislation was radically reformed.
The centrepiece of air pollution law between 1982 and 2000 was the Air 
Pollution Control Act (67/1982). Before 1982 air pollution regulation was mainly 
based on the Public Health Act 1965 (469/1965)467 and the Neighbourhood 
Relations Act (26/1920).468 These did not constitute a coherent legal basis for 
air pollution prevention policy, because impacts on the environment as such 
were not covered; only impacts on health or neighbourhood relations were 
considered. The Air Pollution Control Act (APCA) covered major industrial 
installations releasing emissions into the air. It set a general framework for 
decision-making in air pollution policy.
The regulatory mechanism of APCA was based on a combination of 
general standards applicable to a certain category of installations and installation 
specific regulatory decisions. The installation specific regulatory decisions have 
three different functions: to ensure the implementation of general standards, to 
modify them taking individual circumstances into account, and to complement 
them. The general standards were to be set by decrees469 adopted by the Council 
of State. The rather high number of decrees470 reflects the central position 
of general standards for the air pollution policy. The Council of State made 
decisions on the general standards on the basis of preparation by the Ministry 
of the Environment. Furthermore, the Ministry itself gives general rules of less 
importance. Originally, installation specific regulatory decisions were made by 
the State Provincial Office (between 1982 and 1995), though this task was 
transferred in 1995 to the Regional Centres created as mentioned above. After 
the integration of permit procedures in 1992 a municipal board had some 
competence to grant permits. The State Provincial Office as well as the Regional 
Environmental Centre were responsible both for decision-making and super-
vision. Thus, these two functions were not separated as was the case in water 
pollution.
Originally the installation level decision making was based on a notif-
ication procedure. On the basis of notification the competent authority was 
to make a decision, where it set requirements for each installation belonging 
to listed activities. Under the notification procedure—unlike under a permit 
. The number of employees just before the transformation was 75 (31 members of the Court, 
including lawyers and other experts, 44 other staff). At the same time there were more than 
2000 employees at the Regional Environment Centres.
. A profound reform of the act took place in 1994 (763/1994).
. On the development of emission based control, see Kuusiniemi 1992, 38–92 
. Formerly decrees were called ‘Decisions of Council of State’. Hereinafter also these decisions are 
called decrees, because their nature is of similar kind (a norm setting substantial environmental 
requirements, like emission limits).
0. The total number of decrees is about 30, if those decrees replaced by newer ones are also taken 
into account.
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mechanism—the operator of an installation was allowed to start or continue 
the operation of the plant, even before the decision had been made by the 
authority. The notification procedure was changed into a permit mechanism 
through two reforms during the first half of the 1990s. Through the enactment 
of the Environmental Permit Procedure Act (736/1991), the decision-making 
procedures of all the environmental permits except for the water (pollution) 
permit relevant for industrial installations, were incorporated into one permit 
from 1 September 1992 onwards. This reform was based on an idea of one-stop 
shopping: an operator needs to stop only once, while visiting in all shops.471 
In legal terms, this meant that the substantial provisions still remained in 
separate acts (the Air Pollution Control Act and the Public Health Act, the 
Neighbourhood Relations Act and the Waste Act472). Thus, the substantial 
legal basis was still incoherent until the introduction of the Environmental 
Protection Act in 2000. However, only one application was needed for all those 
permits covered by the Environmental Permit Procedure Act and the procedure 
produced a single document called ‘environmental permit’, though strictly 
legally speaking this document included several permits. Practically, albeit 
not terminologically, the reform changed the nature of the control mechanism 
from notification to permit: with respect to new installations the decisions were 
to be made before the start-up of the installation or its significant change.473
In 1995 the Air Pollution Control Act was thoroughly amended. The 
main aim of the reform was to fulfil EU requirements and establish a permit 
mechanism as required in the Framework Directive (84/360) on air emissions 
from industrial installations. Thus, not only the nature but also the wording 
was changed from a notification into a permit. This reform changed almost 
all sections of the Act and it was significant in principle, though its immediate 
impacts were rather slight in the sense that it did not result in immediate changes 
of already made regulatory decisions at the level of installations. In other words, 
the amended law applied immediately only to new decisions and because the 
old regulatory decisions lack a renewal mechanism, only new installations or 
significant changes of existing installations immediately required a regulatory 
decision under the new act. However, a timetable according to which existing 
installations had to apply for a new permit was also determined. This timetable 
partially overlapped with the corresponding timetable of the subsequent 
reform, i.e. the adoption of the Environmental Protection Act in 2000, and the 
former timetable was incorporated into the latter one.
In 2000, pollution regulation was reformed in Finland. The main piece 
. This response to fragmentation to permits is also used elsewhere. For the USA, see Davies 200, 
33–35.
. The Waste Act 1072/1993 replaced the Waste Management Act (673/1978).
. See Vihervuori 1998a. 
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of legislation then adopted was the Environmental Pollution Control Act 
(86/2000),474 which came into force in March 2000. The Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control Directive (96/61) was transposed through the reform, 
though the reform also covered a number of issues not directly linked to the 
directive. The reform integrated water (pollution) permits475 and the permits 
already procedurally integrated in 1992. Furthermore, the notification 
procedure under the Noise Abatement Act was removed to new legislation. The 
Air Pollution Control Act and the Noise Abatement Act were repealed and the 
Water Act, the Public Health Act, and the Neighbourhood Relationships Act 
were significantly amended.
Since 2000 there have been three kinds of permit authorities, two regional 
and one local. The existence of two regional permit authorities in a system 
of integrated permits reflects more the difficulties to change institutional 
structures than the needs for effective and efficient administration. The water 
courts were transformed into the environmental permit authorities and the 
regional environmental centres retained their position as a permit authority. In 
addition, the regional environmental centres are responsible for supervision. 
The dual role of the centres as decision-makers and supervisors has been much 
criticized and to respond to criticism these two roles have been separated within 
the centres.476 The criticism stems from an assumption that an administrative 
body promoting environmental interests (=supervisor) cannot be competent to 
make balanced decisions between environmental and other interests. Though 
the logic of this argument may be challenged, the starting point in the on-
going discussion on the development of administration is one regional permit 
authority.477 In terms of personnel, the reform resulted in almost no immediate 
changes, though to facilitate the solving of a backlog of permits, some new 
resources were directed to permit authorities. Thus, to a large extent the reform 
meant a re-organisation of the work of old staff.
During the process where the former water courts were transformed 
into the environmental permit authorities the functions of the body were 
significantly changed. As a point of departure all matters of civil or criminal law 
previously handled by the water court have been transferred to ordinary civil 
courts. However, the matter of compensation for the damages caused by water 
. For a general presentation of the main elements of the reform, see Vihervuori 2000 and 
Kumpula 2001, 1111–1322.
. Prior to the reform water construction and water pollution issues were handled together, in the 
same procedure. The same permit covered both aspects. In this reform these two aspects were, 
as a point of departure, separated from each other.
. The relevant section of effective legislation is Section 4 of Decree 950/2004. It requires that 
environmental permits be decided in a separate unit, which may not be responsible for 
conflicting functions. 
. Ekroos 2005, 73–75.
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pollution is, in principle, processed at the same time and in the same procedure 
as the permit. The division of competence between two regional authorities was 
built on their previous expertise to the extent that it was possible. In practice, 
this meant that the competence to grant permits for activities where water 
pollution has a dominant role tended to be given to the environmental permit 
authority and, in turn, for activities where air pollution or waste management 
have a dominant role, competence was typically given to the regional centres. 
Furthermore, the environmental permit authority tends to have authority over 
bigger activities than the regional centres. The municipal environment board 
continues to have competence with respect to minor activities. The Superior 
Water Court was incorporated into one of nine administrative courts (that one 
located in the same city—Vaasa—as the Superior Water Court did) in 1999. 
An appeal concerning a decision made under the Environmental Protection 
Act (such as an integrated pollution permit) or under the Water Act from any 
environmental authority, either regional or local, goes to the administrative 
court in Vaasa. According to the tradition of the Superior Water Court, other 
experts than lawyers may also take part in decision-making as members of the 
court when such a matter is processed in the administrative court in Vaasa. 
Thus, although there is no independent environmental court in Finland, the 
administrative court in Vaasa has to a certain extent the same function, because 
some environmental matters are concentrated in it and it has environmental 
specific expertise that courts normally do not have. However, appeals from 
other environmental decisions than those made under the Environmental 
Protection Act and the Water Act go to Regional Administrative Court in 
question.478 This applies, for example to land use plans.
4.2. Effectiveness and efficiency of standards
The effectiveness and efficiency of traditional regulation largely depends on the 
standards applied. In Chapter 2 different forms of standards as well as various 
issues related to them were discussed on a general level and this chapter focuses 
on the national legal regulation. Next an excursion into water and air pollution 
control regulation prior to the integration of permits in 2000 will be made. 
The legal framework for standard setting, the forms of standards and their 
implications in terms of effectiveness and efficiency will be explored. As will 
be shown later, the national tradition of sectoral regulation has to some extent 
been transferred to integrated permits and hence, some of the implications of 
previous approaches are still relevant. Integrated pollution control regulation 
will be investigated later in a separate sub-chapter.
. For a judicial review on environmental matters, see Kuusiniemi 2002.

4.2.1. Water pollution
The control of wastewater discharges in the Water Act (264/1961) was based on 
in principle on the prohibition of pollution of water unless it was authorised 
in the form of permit (Section 1:19).479 The ban on polluting waters was not 
absolute, but it defined what kind of activities required a permit. Originally 
there were no general standards applicable to certain sectors in the system of 
the Water Act, which governed the granting of permits. Instead the decision-
making was based on individual discretion guided by the principles and rules 
in the relevant part of the Water Act.480 In other words, the legally binding 
standards were imposed individually in each permit. The main elements of 
discretion were as follows.
The discretion was divided into two steps. Firstly it was considered 
whether there was an absolute obstacle to grant a permit. Threats to public 
health, far-reaching changes in natural conditions, essential deterioration in the 
conditions of local populations or local economic life constituted an absolute 
obstacle already in the 1960s. The wording of the relevant provision has been 
subsequently slightly amended.481 In addition, pursuant to 1994 amendments,482 
two other absolute obstacles were inserted into the Act. Finland’s international 
agreements in the field of the protection of waters or of the sea constituted 
such an absolute obstacle as did pollution of the sea outside the territorial 
borders. It is worth noting that the absolute obstacles to granting a permit have 
very rarely applied. For instance, these provision have never prevented the 
granting of permit for the pulp and paper industry, which is—and previously 
was even more so—of crucial importance in terms of water pollution (as well as 
prosperity) in Finland.
The second step was the weighing of public and private interests. A 
permit could be granted if the adverse effects of discharges were relatively 
minor compared with the benefits gained. Different kinds of public and private 
interests were taken into consideration. In addition, the Act required as a 
precondition for issuing a permit that the elimination of wastewater or some 
other substance polluting the water body was not possible in any other way at 
reasonable cost. Thus, all pollution prevention measures which did not exceed 
the level of reasonable costs were required to be taken. In substantial terms 
this principle resembled the best available technology principle, which was 
introduced into the Act in 1994.483 The wording of the law was admittedly rather 
. Hollo 1976, in particular 91–120 and 297–319. For a thorough description of the Water Act in 
English, see Vihervuori 1998a.
0. The most relevant provisions were to be found in Chapter 10, which was overridden by the 
Environmental Protection Act.
. Act 467/1987.
. Act 1416/1994.
. Act 1416/1994.
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flexible. In practice an approach was developed which was based on individual 
discretion using a combination of an assessment of technological options484 
and the state of water (according to the so-called recipient principle).485
Despite the lack of legally binding technical standards, non-legally binding 
objectives for different sectors, e.g. the pulp and paper sector, or for industry 
as a whole (last programme) have been set in the National Water Protection 
Programmes. The first programme established 7 August 1974 covered the years 
until 1985, the second (6 October 1988) until 1995 and the third (19 March 1998) 
until 2005. Hence the time period of each programme has been approximately 
10 years. The programmes have been rather general in nature and they have 
not contained recommendations for individual decision-making.486 The nature 
of the normative status of the programmes was not totally clear. The law did 
not recognize the programmes and because the permits were so-called legally-
bound decisions,487 the programmes were in the nature of extra-legal material 
in legal decision-making.
The flexibility of the water pollution regulation, which is an outcome of 
the lack of general standards and the existence of flexible rules, had important 
implications in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Firstly, new kinds 
of activities could be included under control without the rigidity related to 
legislation.488 The scope of regulation was defined through the environmental 
impacts, not through listing of regulated activities. Though the regulatory 
technique of listing the regulated activities common in many countries and also 
in European regulation has the advantage of being clear about the issue who 
should apply for a permit, the political struggles related to law-making would 
easily slow down or even prevent the inclusion of new regulated activities. 
There is no major indication that the impacts based approach would have 
caused significant confusion about who should apply for a permit.
Secondly, new types of standards were adopted through permitting 
practice, not through legislative changes. The establishment of the National 
Board of Waters in 1970 had significant consequences in this respect. Before 1970 
permit conditions related to pollution were typically expressed in qualitative 
terms, which were rather difficult to monitor and enforce. As a result, the 
effectiveness of pollution control was rather poor. The Board promoted the 
adoption of a new regulatory technique, i.e. emission limits, which expressed 
the allowed amount of pollutants in quantitative terms, and hence, facilitated 
monitoring. From 1970 onwards emission limits values were gradually adopted 
. Hollo 1976, 338.
. On the recipient principle, see Hollo 1976 141, 337, Hollo 1993, and Hollo 1995c, 517–518.
. A summary of the essential objectives is presented in Hildén et al. 2002, 40. 
. The concept of legally-bound decision is explained in Chapter 1.
. See Vihervuori 1998a, 73–77. An example of this is the regulation of peat production from peat 
bogs. KHO 1992 A 94.
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through new permitting decisions. However, the process was slow. First, only 
fairly few types of emission limits were initially used. With regard to pulp and 
paper mills the main types of emission limits were those concerning suspended 
solids and biological oxygen demand. Secondly, it took about a decade before 
most of the pulp and paper mills were regulated by any emission limit. Later 
in the 1980s, when new perceptions and need of environmental problems 
arose, new emission limits were adopted in permitting practice. However, the 
adoption process was still slow. For example, in the case of phosphorus limits, 
it took a further decade before the most of the mills were regulated by this new 
permit condition.489
Thirdly, the use of differentiated standards made it possible to increase 
efficiency in comparison to the use of uniform standards. As noted in Chapter 
2, the efficiency criticism of traditional regulation applies, in particular, to 
uniform standards. Variation in standards enables, at least theoretically, the 
most crude efficiency problems to be avoided.490 In the case of water pollution 
control in Finland the different costs of installations had—according to the 
law—to be taken into consideration. Although the principle that all pollution 
prevention measures not exceeding reasonable costs might not be exactly the 
same as the concept of marginal costs of environmental economics, it became 
possible to take the variation of costs into consideration. However, a principal 
and a practical problem impaired the achievement of efficiency. The principal 
problem hindering the full realisation of efficiency came not from individual 
rules but from a structural problem; asymmetry of information between the 
regulator and those regulated made it impossible to achieve optimal efficiency. 
The regulator can never know exactly what the marginal costs of different 
installations are. The practical problem was related to the permitting practice 
adopted. In practice, the standards regulating a category of installations (like 
waster water treatment plants) were designed to be rather similar, apparently on 
the fairness basis, though the needs (the state of the waters) and opportunities 
(technological options) for reducing discharges varied from case to case. This 
practice was adopted though the law not only allowed but also required the 
decision-makers to take into consideration the individual circumstances (en-
vironmental and economic) of each case. In the legal literature this practice 
was criticized on the grounds that the legal requirement of fair treatment of 
applicants should not be interpreted in such a way that resulted in diminished 
effectiveness and efficiency of regulation.491
. Mickwitz 2003a, 108–109, Hildén et al. 2002, 39–42.
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Fourthly, the flexibility of regulation has allowed the creation of a trend 
towards ever stricter standards.492 In other words, the standards were typically 
made stricter than before in each permit cycle. This may sound self-evident in 
modern society, but as air pollution control regulation will show, this has not 
always been the case, even fairly recently. From the perspective of a polluter, 
the trend towards ever stricter standards works as an incentive to anticipate 
coming stricter standards, because the polluter knows that some kind stricter 
standards will come in any case. The lack of a general binding standard agreed 
at national level has apparently promoted this development. However, a degree 
of stability was created in permitting practice. A so-called ‘general policy line’ 
(‘yleinen linja’), which was neither expressed in any document nor decided by 
any central body but to be founded on practice, guided the decision-making. 
The main policy guidance from above has been non legally binding water 
pollution programmes, which have not tied the hands of permit authorities, but 
indicated the direction of coming decisions.
Fifthly, the flexibility made the system open to regulatory capture.493 If the 
rules guiding decision-making are rather general and non-specific, it increases 
the discretionary powers of the permit authority and makes them more difficult 
to control. One could even talk about delegation of powers from the legislator 
to the permit authorities. There is no clear evidence as to what extent regulatory 
capture took place, although some indications can be found.494 On the other 
hand, some features of regulation worked as safeguards against at least the 
crudest versions of regulatory capture.495 If the supervisory authority was not 
satisfied with the decision of the permit authority (i.e. the Water Court), it 
had an opportunity to take the case to the Supreme Water Court, which had 
extensive powers to review the lower decision not only from a procedural 
but also from a substantial point of view. The Supreme Water Court was a 
specialised national body, and thus had both the expertise and opportunity 
to ensure the coherence of the decisions of lower bodies within the legal 
boundaries of judicial review. Furthermore, the national supervisory body496 
had an opportunity to ensure that local interests were not taken excessively into 
consideration. The permitting procedure was transparent towards the public, 
who did have fairly large participatory rights. The general policy line established 
through permitting practice was partly a product of control and partly a means 
. In the 1960s the permits were still granted for the time being and changing these kinds of 
permits is more difficult. In a decision of 1971 the Supreme Administrative Court (KHO 1971 A 
II 94) allowed the use of periodic permits. 
. Laffont and Tirole 1993.
. Hildén et al. 2002, 110.
. Hildén et al. 2002, 110–111.
. On the mechanisms of control exercised by supervisory and other public authorities, see 
Vihervuori 1981.
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of it. It increased predictability and predictability, in turn, facilitated the control 
in the sense that it enabled the identification of those decisions which differed 
from others.
4.2.1. Air pollution control
The approach adopted for air pollution under the Air Pollution Control Act was 
different from that of water pollution control. General standards had a greater 
role in decision-making than in water pollution control. The approach to air 
pollution was to based more extensively on uniform standards than that of 
water pollution, although the difference is not absolute but relative. It has always 
been possible to set differentiated standards under the air pollution regulation, 
though to a lesser degree than in water pollution.
Until the adoption of integrated pollution control, general standards 
were given either in the form of general regulations or general guidelines. 
A general regulation was legally binding and applicable directly without a 
transmitting administrative decision. In other words, the regulated industry 
had to comply with the general regulations immediately, otherwise there was a 
threat of facing administrative or criminal sanctions. General guidelines, on the 
other hand, did not have direct legal effects and aimed to guide the decision-
making of permit authorities. Hence, the permit authority had a greater degree 
of discretion to impose different installation specific standards than in the case 
of general regulations.497
The air pollution decrees were prepared in four committees.498 The 
Ministry of the Environment led the preparation and different stake-holders 
from industry and various parts of the government participated. During the 
preparation significant effort was invested in identifying different abatement 
technologies and differences of abatement costs between sectors. The aim was 
to promote the cost-effectiveness of the regulation by addressing investments 
to those sectors of industry where the costs are lowest. The emission limits 
stipulated in the general standards are based on the best available technology 
principle in the sense that the standards reflected the best technological options 
at the time of the formulation of decrees. 499
The total number of decrees adopted under the Air Pollution Control Act 
exceeds 30. The standards cover a variety of issues from emission standards for 
different sources to quality of fuels and air quality. However, it took rather many 
years from the adoption of the Act in 1982 before the full set of standards was 
. Kuusiniemi 1992, 370–429, 542–563. 
. Four different committees have prepared policy proposals related to air pollution: The Sulphur 
Committee I (1986), the Nitrogen Oxides Committee (1990), the Sulphur Committee II (1993), 
and the Acidification Committee (1998).
. Kuusiniemi 1992, 549–557.
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in use. The first standard adopted under the new regime concerned air quality 
in 1984500 and in 1987 the first emission standards relating, for example to SO2 
and particulates, were adopted. In addition three other decrees were adopted in 
the 1980s. From the effectiveness point of view equally or even more important 
is the rate of making the installation-specific decisions. The evidence available 
shows that this has been a rather slow process. With regard to pulp and paper 
mills only one regulatory decision was made before 1987, and five years later 
the number was still fairly low (18) and thereafter it has gradually increased 
so that by the end of September 2000, most installations (34 out of 43) had 
obtained at least one regulatory decision.501 The choice of making no fixed and 
strict time-table for implementation of the Act had its consequences; decision-
making processes often lasted several years, even a decade. The law made it 
possible to adopt general standards, which became directly legally binding, 
but because this opportunity was used only to a limited extent, it did not speed 
up the implementation process during the 1980s. Because the renewal of the 
decisions is also a slow process, many pulp and paper mills were still regulated 
at the beginning of 2000s by conditions set for the first time in the 1990s.502 The 
implementation of the Environmental Protection Act is gradually changing the 
situation.
Both quality standards and source standards have been used for guiding 
installation level decision-making, though in practice quality standards seem to 
have a minor role. Kuusiniemi notes that quality standards had not, at the time 
of writing, been directly used as a basis for individual standards. However, he 
points out that quality standards have still been as one factor among others in 
the final decision. According to this notion stricter emission standards should 
vary from one region to another depending on air quality of the region.503 In 
particular, one can assume that the role of quality standards was greater for 
those installations and pollutants not regulated by general standards.
The discretion of regulatory authority under the Air Pollution Control 
Act, as amended in 1995, was divided into two interlinked parts: consideration 
of whether the preconditions are met and the setting of installation-specific 
standards and other permit conditions. The permit conditions may have 
concerned emission limits, other air pollution prevention measures as well as 
monitoring and control. There were three preconditions which each activity had 
to meet before granting a permit: (1) the activity had to fulfil the requirements 
00. Decree (537/1984) on air quality was adopted in 1994, it was replaced by a new one in 1996 
(Decree 480/1996).
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0. Kuusiniemi 1993, 111–121.
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of or under the Act; (2) the activity might cause no risk or injury to health, or 
otherwise significant pollution of air; and (3) the reducing of emissions must 
correspond to the level of best available technology. The first point refers, in 
particular, to general standards. Furthermore, the following considerations 
(Section 7 para 2) were to be taken into account: (a) the characteristics of 
the impact area, (b) the effects on the environment, (c) the relevance of the 
measures to air pollution policy and (d) the technical and economic conditions 
for carrying out the measures.
Hence, the law left a degree of discretion to permit authorities to decide 
on permit conditions. As a point of departure the standards set in decrees were 
minimum requirements.504 However, there was only one reason to impose 
a different condition than that in the general regulations: the activity causes 
risk or injury to health, or causes otherwise significant pollution of the air. 
This option was a kind of safeguard clause aim to be implemented only in 
exceptional cases. Hence, the general regulations replaced the emission limits 
based on the BAT principle or other individual consideration apart from the 
safeguard clause.
With regard to the general guidelines the situation was different. Law 
did not prevent the imposition of stricter permit conditions than required 
in the general guidelines. However, there are indications that individual 
consideration has a more limited role in practice than the legal nature of the 
general guidelines implied. In the legal literature the impact of guidelines on the 
decisions has been considered significant.505 This was also acknowledged in the 
Governmental Bill proposing new integrated permitting: “(General—JS) limit 
values for air emissions in Finland have, as a point of departure, been considered 
simultaneously as minimum and maximum requirements.”506 A standard 
which simultaneously includes minimum and maximum requirements is a 
uniform standard: it is the same for all installations belonging to the category 
of installations regulated by the standard. This same observation has been con-
firmed in empirical research on one single sector, namely large combustion 
plants. In the study, it was shown that NOx and SO2 emission standards are 
almost always uniform based on the emission standards adopted in decrees.507 
This also indicates that air quality standards have rather a small role in decision-
making. There is no geographical variation of emission standards, though one 
could assume that air quality varies from one region to another.
0. According to the original formulation in the APCA, in force until 31 March 1996, the permit 
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However, the picture is not clear-cut. First, not all installations or all 
pollutants were covered by the general regulation or guidelines. Furthermore, 
not all decisions followed the guidelines, as becomes clear from the 
judgements of the Supreme Administrative Court. Kuusiniemi, in his analysis 
of discretionary rules,508 shows that already in 1993 a number of Supreme 
Administrative Court cases, which were based in different ways on individual 
discretion resulted in differentiated standards. For example in a case from 1988 
the Court considered acidification of soil and waters caused by sulphur dioxide 
as a significant harm to nature and imposed a stricter individual standard.509 
Thereafter, the Supreme Administrative Court has upheld this line. A case 
concerned the issue whether permit authorities were allowed to transform the 
non-binding general standard510 into a binding plant specific standard. The 
Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the permit authority was allowed to 
impose a binding permit condition.511
Despite this development uniform standards still have an important 
role in air pollution control. The importance of uniform standards comes 
from the fact that uniform standards cover the largest installations and major 
pollutants. For example with regard to sulphur and nitrogen emissions the 
general standards regulate the sources which emitted most of emissions.512 In 
other words, uniform standards seem to have a major role with respect to major 
air pollution problems measured by the amount of pollution. This is not to deny 
that standards have varied with regard to smaller sources, in particular in cases 
where there have not been general standards.
The impacts of regulation over time do not depend only on the first 
regulatory decision, but also on the possibility to renew a once set standard. The 
idea of modern pollution control also consists of a periodic review.513 However, 
the starting point of the original regulation was that standards once set will not 
be changed except in exceptional cases.514 This situation persisted until the 1995 
reform. Permits issued thereafter have had a mandatory provision for a periodic 
review. To ensure that those decisions already given would also be reviewed, it 
was enacted that all existing regulatory decisions were to be renewed according 
0. Kuusiniemi 1993, 106–121.
0. KHO 1988 A 84.
0. VOC regulation, 468/96.
. KHO 8 September 1997/2148.
. On the sources of sulphur and nitrogen emissions, see Wahlström, Hallanaro and Manninen 
1996, 135–145.
. The periodic review has also been considered problematic, because all installations where no 
change has occurred will be reviewed and reviewing requires resources which could be used 
in other way. In the USA, states have developed different responses to avoid regular 5-year 
periodic reviews as required by federal legislation. Davies 38–41. 
. On this issue, see Kuusiniemi 1992, 762–769.

to a timetable.515 Later, in the context of the next reform in 2000, the timetable 
was coordinated with a new one, which provides for the implementation of 
integrated permits.516 In practice this meant that the operators were obliged to 
institutionalise a new permit application by the first half of the 2000s. From this 
it follows that only after two decades of the implementation of the air pollution 
control regime was an effective mechanism ensuring a systematic review of 
standards adopted.
Though there was not a general system of periodic review, there were 
other channels, which may have resulted in a change of installation specific 
standards.517 Firstly, it was possible to impose a stricter general standard after the 
installation specific decision was made and if this was done in the form of general 
regulation it replaced the installation specific standard. Secondly, though there 
was no general periodic review a significant change in the regulated activity 
may have led to a need to apply for a new permit. Thirdly, it was possible, in 
principle, that in a case where the preconditions laid down in the Section 17 of 
the Act were met, the decision could be changed. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest that either of these channels had, in reality, often resulted in a change 
of installation-specific decisions. After all, the general regulation was seldom 
renewed, reasons for acquiring a new permit were seldom realized, and the 
option to change existing standards was seldom exercised.
The main implications of the approach adopted in air pollution regulation 
are as follows. Firstly, the evolution of air pollution regulation has been more 
closely related to legislative development than in the case of water pollution 
control. With regard to water pollution many important aspects of regulation, 
such as the emergence of the periodic review, the exact scope of activities 
under regulation as well as the types and strictness of standards used, were 
developed through permitting practice. In the case of air pollution control the 
development of similar features relied heavily on legislative changes. From this 
it follows that the role of actors, such as permit authorities, the judiciary, the 
ministries and supervisory bodies, differed in the case of air pollution from that 
of water pollution.
Secondly, the use of uniform standards with respect to major polluters and 
pollutants may have resulted in efficiency losses in comparison to situations 
where differences between installations would have been fully considered. The 
application of best available technology principle and efficiency considerations 
at the moment of formulation of decrees, instead of at the moment when the 
final regulatory decision was made, cannot totally reflect the real situation. 
Though asymmetry of information limited the application of the BAT principle 
. Decree 306/1996.
. Decree 169/2000, Sections 41–43. 
. For a legal analysis of how to modify a permit decision, see Hepola 2005, 417–586.
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and restricted efficiency considerations at the moment of the final decision, 
some of the differences between installations would have been recognized. 
The use of the BAT principle at the moment of formulation of decrees tends to 
freeze the level of environmental protection to the moment of formulation.
Thirdly, the incentive to make further improvements beyond the existing 
legal limits for environmental performance has been weak. There was no general 
mechanism encouraging the regulated industries to anticipate coming stricter 
requirements. This can be assumed to have reduced the efforts of the regulated 
industries at continuous improvements and efforts to develop technologies. One 
might, of course, claim that there is no need for incentives to make continuous 
improvements if there is no real opportunity for such improvements due to 
technological constraints. However, the experience from Swedish air pollution 
regulation, which has a dynamic element (NOx charge), indicates that such 
major polluters as large combustion plants can also continuously improve 
their environmental performance and have done so in Sweden, though not in 
Finland.518
As a last point, attention is drawn to features which have apparently 
reduced implementation problems. So-called general regulation had a direct 
legal effect, which meant that no mediating permit decisions were required. This 
may shorten the implementation time, but only so far as this type of regulation 
has been used. The adoption of this type of regulation has, however, been a 
slow process. Furthermore, it may be that the predictability of requirements 
has reduced conflicts between the industry and the authorities at the level of 
individual installations (no surprises, no conflicts).
The previous water and air pollution regimes have been incorporated 
into an integrated permitting mechanism from 2000 onwards, as noted earlier. 
Integrated permitting is based on other ideas than the sectoral pollution 
control mechanism and it would be reasonable to assume that the standards 
used to guide regulated entities under integrated pollution control regime 
would differ from those under the sectoral regime. Standards for integrated 
permitting will be discussed later, while integrated permitting is otherwise 
discussed. However, already at this point attention can be drawn to the fact that 
the different traditions in water and air pollution control have affected the way 
the integrated permitting mechanism is constructed. Hence, some features of 
old regimes have been transferred to the new one.
. Mickwitz et al. manuscript 2006b.
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4.3. Influences on technical development 
of water pollution regulation
4.3.1. Purpose of the analysis
Traditional regulation have been criticized for hampering innovations and 
their diffusion, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is often suggested that permitting 
does not motivate an operator to reduce pollution below the limit stipulated 
in a permit.519 This implies a lack of incentives to innovate. This is a critical 
argument against a policy instrument, because without further developments 
in technology it will be difficult to achieve a better level of environmental 
protection in the future. The problem will become more important in the 
future, because easy solutions have already been used and in many areas better 
environmental technology is either not known or too expensive to use.520
Traditional regulation is, after all, based on the use of coercive power. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that all impacts of traditional 
regulation could be directly associated with the use of coercive power. The 
regulated industry—not to mention other actors, such as suppliers to the 
regulated industry—may do something due to the regulation despite an absence 
of concrete legally binding obligation to do so. If a permit authority, despite the 
objection of an operator, sets an emission limit in a permit at a level which 
cannot be achieved by the technology in use or planned to be adopted, the 
operator would be forced to adopt a new technological solution. I call this kind 
of impact of a permit a coercive impact. If an operator adopts new technological 
solutions which it would not otherwise have been adopted in order to anticipate 
a coming decision, the regulation has had an indirect impact on technological 
development. The anticipation may occur before the application for a permit is 
submitted or during the negotiation process. This kind of impact can be called 
non-coercive. It could be argued that what I call a non-coercive impact is based 
on the potential use of coercive power. Be that as it may, it appears in the form 
of anticipation. To understand the effectiveness of regulation the distinction 
between coercive and non-coercive impact is relevant.
Regulation is far from being the only factor which has an effect on 
innovations and their diffusion. Other factors, such as opportunities for cost-
savings and the demands of customers, also affect the technological solutions 
developed and adopted by the profit-maximising mills. State intervention, 
like permitting, constitutes only one explanatory factor with respect to a 
certain phenomenon among many. The difficulties in ascertaining whether the 
. E.g. Steinzor 1998, 115. 
0. See Derzko 1998, 5.
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intervention has caused a certain impact are discussed as an impact problem.521 
Despite all difficulties related to the identification of the role of different factors 
affecting the same phenomenon, a change of the environmental performance of 
the regulated industry should not, without a proper analysis, be seen as a result 
of only one factor.
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of a regulatory 
instrument on innovations and their diffusion. The instrument concerned is 
wastewater permitting under the Water Act in Finland. The study is focused on 
the pulp and paper industry and the period studied is between 1970 and 2000. 
Thus, the study does not cover the impacts of integrated permitting, which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. The evaluation is made at two different 
levels. Firstly I consider the regulatory approach towards innovations and their 
diffusion. The main elements of water pollution regulation, including the role of 
general and individual standards as well as institutional structures, have already 
been presented and discussed above. It was then noted that the control is 
based on differentiated standards adopted under the wide discretionary powers 
of permit authorities. Now I will go one step further in the analysis of the 
regulatory approach by asking what the relevant elements of permit decisions 
are with regard to technological development. Thereafter these elements—as 
well the reasoning behind permit conditions—are analysed. Secondly, on the 
basis of the material gathered, I consider whether it is possible to distinguish any 
positive or negative impact of the permits on innovations and their diffusion. 
The focus is on the impacts of the permits on the regulated installations, not on 
indirect impacts on the whole technological network, including suppliers and 
other actors, to which they belong. Due to this restriction the overall picture 
will be incomplete, but it would be impossible to carry out a study without 
limitations in its scope.
The field of industry to be examined is the pulp and paper industry 
(hereinafter ‘the industry’), which has traditionally been one of the major 
polluters in Finland. The total number of paper and board mills was 37 and 
of pulp mills 19 in 1999, which was the last whole year, when sectoral water 
pollution control regulation was in use. The load of pollution from the industry 
has decreased significantly in recent decades despite a significant increase 
in production capacity. The biological oxygen demand was approximately 
445,000 t/a in 1972 and less than 19,000 t/a in 1999. The suspended solids load 
was approximately 221,000 t/a in 1973 and less than 20,000 t/a in 1999. The 
production capacity of paper and board mills in Finland has increased from 
approximately one million tons to almost 13 million tons per annum over the 
past 30 years. The production capacity of pulp mills has increased over the same 
. Vedung 1997, 93–99.

period of time from more than one million tons to more than 11 millions tons 
per year.522 It is worth noting that the figures would not be so positive if other 
parameters such as phosphorus and in particular nitrogen were used, though 
the total load of both phosphorus and nitrogen started to diminish in the 
1980s. However, the goals set for the industry generally in the National Water 
Protection Programme for 2005 were not achieved with regard to phosphorus 
and nitrogen. In addition, the industry is still a major source of biological 
oxygen demand and suspended solids among all industrial sources.523 However, 
the numbers show that a significant technological development has occurred.
4.3.2. Material and methods
The evaluation is mainly based on two sources of information: decision-making 
material (in the first instance and at appeal bodies) and thematic interviews. 
The document produced as an output of decision-making contains, in addition 
to the permit itself, a description of the administrative process as well as facts 
and opinions presented during the process. Due to the vast amount of lengthy 
documents, it was not possible to analyse the documents related to all mills. 
Thus, 6 mills 524 were selected and their permitting histories over 30 years were 
analysed. Different regions and different types of mills were included in the 
selection. Four of the mills produce pulp and paper products, one only board 
and one only pulp. The number of major decisions (including at least a new 
emission limit value) was 23.
The thematic interviews were undertaken during the spring of 2000. 
The total number of interviews was 21 (paper and pulp mills: 6, the industry 
at national level: 3, regional authorities: 6, the national authorities: 6). Three 
of interviewees were employees of the mills, whose permitting history was 
examined. All interviewees from regional administration were either employees 
of the supervisory authorities or the Water Courts issuing the permits examined. 
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and thereafter coded with N-Vivo 
software. The interviews were conducted by different members of the research 
group,525 though I alone am responsible for any deficiencies in this analysis.
The decisions, despite being very long, were often poorly grounded. 
Lengthy descriptions of the features of the activity and often complicated 
. Pollution load in the 1970s: the Finnish Environment Institute. Production capacity in the 
1970s: http://www.forestindustries.fi.
. Suomen ympäristökeskus 2006, 16–26, Wahlström et al. 1996, 214–215. 
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administrative procedure took up most of the space. Typically the courts 
have justified their decisions by merely quoting the essential sections of the 
Water Act with minor modifications. The courts have only seldom made clear 
which facts led them to justify the exact content of a permit. Thus, a significant 
number of different kinds of facts is presented in the documents, but still 
it remains somewhat unclear which of them the decision-making body has 
deemed relevant. During the last few years the courts have improved the quality 
of their decisions by presenting the underlying facts more clearly.
The reliability of different sources of information varies from one matter 
to another. Documents are more reliable than interviews e.g. with respect to 
the exact content of permits and the opinions expressed during the procedure. 
On the other hand, documents naturally do not contain reliable information 
on the coming impacts of the permit, though they may contain information 
on the impacts of previous permits. This deficiency can be overcome in certain 
cases by recourse to interview material. The documents do not reveal which 
other factors than the permitting have influenced the behaviour of an operator. 
In this respect, the interviews give a better basis for analysis. Because the two 
sources of information complement each other, both are used in this study.
4.3.3. Relevant elements of permits
Static standards, which remain the same over long period of time, do not 
foster in the long run technological development. Thus, from the technological 
development point of view the gradual tightening of standards is crucial. No 
provision requiring a review clause to be included in wastewater permits was 
inserted into the Water Act until 1987. In fact, the starting point of the original 
Water Act of 1961 was that a permit is granted for the time being. Despite the 
wording of the Act most wastewater permits included a review mechanism 
already in the early years of the implementation of the Act.526 There are, however, 
some exceptions. Due to the lack of a proper review clause in permits issued in 
the 1960s, two mills did not get proper emission limits before the mid 1990s.
The impacts of a permit on technological development depend on 
the standards used. In Chapter 2 many types of standards were identified, 
among them product, process and performance standards. One of the main 
justifications for emission limit values lies in their measurability. In the 1960s 
environmental standards were often so loosely determined that they were 
not enforceable in practice. Quantitative obligations were needed so that the 
operator knew exactly what the allowed level of pollution was. The use of 
conditions determining the type of technology was problematic because it 
. Hollo 1976, 383. In 1971 the Supreme Administrative Court (KHO 1971 A II 94) ruled that 
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constrained operators excessively. The introduction of emission limit values was 
an improvement in both dimensions: being able to define the environmental 
objective clearly helped enforcement and left the operators free to choose the 
means.
Process standards, known to be problematic in relation to technological 
development, were rather seldom used during the period studied between 
1970 and 2000. Among the 23 permits examined, the end-of-pipe technology 
to be used was specified in four permits. In all four cases it was the operator 
who proposed the type of technology in her application for a permit. In 
addition, there was a case in which the operator was determined to treat a 
special part of the wastewater chemically or in comparable way. In this case, 
too, the operator was, in principle, free to use any technique whatsoever. Thus, 
despite a few exceptions the operators have generally had the freedom to 
choose the purification technology. Typically the effluent treatment obligations 
have been given in very loose terms like an obligation to treat wastewater “in 
an appropriate way” or “by using modern technology”. Furthermore, other 
process standards were used which were obviously relevant for environmental 
impacts, though not apparently have any affect on the general development of 
technology. In this category of permit conditions mention can be made of those 
defining the location of a discharge tube. Product standards, though important 
for air pollution control, have not been used in the wastewater control of pulp 
and paper mills.
There were also permit conditions which did not fall into any of the 
categories mentioned. Most of these permit conditions were of minor 
importance in relation to the technological solutions adopted by the industry. 
They regulated matters other than technology or the dynamics of permit 
mechanism. However, one particular type of conditions, namely research and 
development obligations, explicitly aim to improve technology and, thus, this 
category must be considered as relevant to technological development.
None of the interviewees considered process standards to be relevant with 
respect to technological development more than on a minor scale. Furthermore, 
there is no other evidence available to suggest that process standards have had 
a significant impact either in a positive or negative sense on technological 
innovations or their diffusion. The impact of a permit, according to the 
interviewees, largely depends on the emission limit values defined therein. 
Some of the interviewees also acknowledged the relevance of risk analysis 
obligations. Such permit conditions have gradually become more common, 
although their exact impact to the practical solutions was not pointed out. In 
the rest of this analysis I will concentrate on emission limit values and research 
and development obligations.
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4.3.4. Emission limits
Types of emission limits in use. The degree of differentiation of standards 
extended to the strictness as well as the type of standards. Supervisory 
authorities systematically promoted certain emission limits on policy grounds. 
However, the decision-making body, the Water Court, was not bound to follow 
the proposal of a supervisory authority though, in practice, it often did so. 
Before 1970 there were hardly any numerically defined emission limits in the 
industrial sector studied. Thereafter, due to a change of policy resulting from 
the establishment of the National Board of Waters in 1970, emission limits 
using suspended solids and biological oxygen demand as parameters spread to 
permits. Due to problems of enforcement it took more than a decade before 
most of the pulp and paper mills were controlled by emission limits using these 
parameters. Later other parameters (e.g. phosphorus, AOX) have also been 
used in emission limits, and the spreading of these parameters into permits has 
also been slow, partly due to the length of the permit cycle and partly for other 
reasons.
Emission limits were either (1) mass-based emission limits, (2) rate-based 
emission limits, or (3) emission limits as target values (hereinafter target values). 
A mass-based emission limit refers to the absolute amount of pollution over a 
certain period of time, (e.g. 1 ton of suspended solids per day). Rate-based 
emission limit is typically defined per ton of paper or pulp produced (e.g. 1 kg 
suspended solids per ton of paper produced). A target value differs from other 
emission limits by its legal character: a target value is a goal to be achieved. If 
the target value (defined either as mass or rated-based standard) is exceeded, it 
not necessarily a violation of law, but requires the operator to take measures in 
order to achieve the target value again. Table 1 presents the types of emission 
limit values used in the 23 cases examined.
Table 1. Types of emission limit values.
1971–3 1976–8 1982–9 1991–7 1999
Case 1 M M + R M + R M
Case 2 M M M M
Case 3 M M M + T M + T
Case 4 R M M + R M + R
Case 5 M + R M + T M + T
Case 6 R M + R M M + T
M: mass-based emission limit; R: rate-based emission limit; T: target value
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Mass-based limit values were the main type of emission limits used in 
the period studied. The role of rate-based emission limits and target values was 
additional. For a short period of time in the beginning of the 1970s rate-based 
emission limits and mass-based limit values were seen as alternatives. Among 
the cases studied, the mass-based emission limits have become more stringent 
with each permit issued. The number of permits including an emission limit 
has increased so that nowadays each mill has such a permit.527
Among the cases examined rated-based target values have been imposed 
three times for the same parameters as mass-based emission limits. In two 
other cases target values were defined as mass-based standards for parameters 
other than mass-based emission limits. In these cases where the target-values 
were defined for the same parameters as mass-based standards, the aim was to 
foster the operator to go beyond the level of mass-based emission limits. An 
occasional exceeding of the target level was possible, though the operator was 
obliged to inform the authorities of this and to take steps to avoid exceeding it 
in the future. A parallel target value with consultation obligation is an attempt 
to avoid problems related to mass-based emission limits. While designing a 
mass-based emission limit, the authorities must take into account the variation 
of discharges. Thus, a mass-based emission limit based on ideal circumstances, 
would be violated in case of a malfunction. On the other hand, if all kinds of 
malfunctions were taken into account, a mass-based emission limit may be too 
loose. A target value may, instead, be set on the basis of ideal circumstances. 
Thus, a technological solution of the operator must be so designed as not to 
exceed the target value while the installation is working normally. In addition, 
the interviewees report that target values are used as a signal to the operator that 
an emission limit for a new parameter or more stringent emission limit values 
will be coming at the next permit cycle. Particularly with respect to a target value 
defined by using another parameter than that used for a mass-based emission 
limit, the indicative role has been essential. A rate-based emission limit has 
another kind of function than a target value: if production is temporarily 
reduced e.g. due to reduced demand for paper, a rate-based emission limit will 
ensure that the level of discharges will be reduced accordingly. Thus, the main 
function of a rated-based emission limit parallel to a mass-based emission limit 
value is to ensure appropriate management of the purification system, not to 
determine what kind of purification system must be adopted.
A standard which comes into force immediately after the adoption of it 
does not leave the operator any time to develop new technological solutions. He 
has only two options; he may either adopt a technological solution available at 
the time of the decision or reduce production. Thus, the emission limits of a new 
. Mickwitz 2003a. 
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permit do not give a stimulus for innovative measures assuming that the operator 
refuses to reduce the production. From the perspective of the development of 
technology, it is important that the authorities leave time for an operator to 
adjust. Out of the 23 examined cases there were 16 such cases where at least one 
of the emission limits came into force more than one year from the day when 
the final decision came into force (in the 70s: 6 out of 10, in the 80s 6 out of 6, in 
the 90s 4 out of 7). The longest period was almost 6 years and typically the time 
was between 2 and 3 years. A period of 2–3 years is a rather short period for any 
major innovation. In addition, although there have been some emission limits 
with an adjustment period of more than a year, most of them have come into 
force within a shorter period of time. This therefore indicates that the emission 
limit values have been used to foster the diffusion of technology rather than 
to give impetus for new innovations. However, the regulatory mechanism as a 
whole can give a stimulus for innovation if the trend of tightening of standards 
is predictable. In this case operators may anticipate the coming standards and 
develop technological responses to standards which do not so far officially exist.
Design of emission limits. There is a variety of factors affecting the design of 
emission limits. The overall regulatory approach was, as explained above, fairly 
flexible. For example, the absence of statutory standards is characteristic of 
Finnish water pollution control.528 The law did not specifically determine how 
the emission limits should be designed. Instead, the legal grounds for a permit 
decision defined in law were rather vague. The law, as it then stood, referred to 
absolute obstacles and the weighing of different public and private interests, to 
the assessment of environmental protection measures not exceeding reasonable 
cost and, later, to the BAT principle. These expressions do not provide detailed 
guidance for decision-making and leave wide discretionary power to the 
administration. Thus, it is worth asking how the administration saw the factors 
affecting the design of emission limits and analyse whether the rationale behind 
the factors has a positive or negative impact on the technological development.
In the interviews the representatives of the environmental administration 
mentioned five different general factors which affect the design of standards, 
in particular emission limits. None of them listed all five factors, although 
all individual factors were mentioned by several representatives of the 
administration. The factors are as follows:
. The same applies to some other countries, like the UK (Ball 1997, 107–109), though not to all 
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1. The historical data on the discharges of the mill concerned
2. The stage of the investment cycle of the mill
3. The general policy line
4. Technology available at reasonable cost
5. The state of the environment
Regarding technological development the historical data on discharges is 
irrelevant if it is used only to correct the level of emission limits to reflect the 
new actual level of discharges. In this case emission limits follow technological 
development, not the other way round. From the notion that standards designed 
purely on the basis of historical data as described above cannot alone give a real 
stimulus for innovation, it does not follow that historical data could not used 
at all in the standard-setting process. If historical data is used as one element 
if the process, it may increase predictability, which, in turn, is important for 
technological development. The use of historical data may also have negative 
effects, as was indicated in the interviews. Interviewees reported that those 
operators which had managed to reduce discharges exceptionally well in the 
past were “rewarded” by even stricter limits in the future. As was pointed out by 
representatives of the industry, this undermined the motivation of operators to go 
beyond the emission limits and may have a negative impact on the technological 
development. Thus, historical data alone is not sufficient for drafting emission 
limits to foster technological development. On the contrary, using historical data 
alone may even have a negative impact on innovations and their diffusion.
The relevance of the stage of the general investment cycle appears obvious. If 
a production line is completely modernized, there are better chances of adopting 
new technologies which significantly decrease discharges in comparison to 
mills which only consider the option of renewing end-of-pipe technologies. 
Thus, if permitting speeds up the general investment rate, its influence is more 
significant than it would otherwise be. However, on the basis of the interviews, 
speeding up the general investment rate was not even an intention of the permit 
authorities. The general investment cycle affects the stringency of emission 
limits, not the other way round. In other words, there were different standards 
for old and new installations, although this is not expressly stipulated in the 
law. This may have had both negative and positive impacts on technological 
development. The pressure on old mills to adopt new technologies is rather 
weak. With regard to new installations strict standards may, instead, foster 
diffusion of technologies. In addition, focusing on new installations is more 
cost-effective in comparison to a policy requiring all operators to achieve 
proportionately same amount of pollution reduction. However, the closure of 
old installations may in some cases be the most cost-effective solution, though 
this option is not usually even considered a realistic alternative.
The interviewees both from the environmental administration and the 
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industry referred to a so-called ‘general policy line’ as an important factor 
affecting the design of a permit. The basic idea of the general policy line is that 
any new standard should be at least as stringent as the standards previously 
specified in similar cases. This logic promotes continuous tightening of 
standards assuming that time after time standards are made stricter than ever 
before. Merely comparing standards already set in other permits does not result 
in long-term tightening, but only in similar kinds of standards. However, mere 
comparison already ensures that backward mills are pushed to follow the general 
development of technology. Thus, the mechanism has a positive—although 
limited—impact on the diffusion of technology. By and large comparison to 
other permits does not encourage radical innovations, because backward mills 
are required to do roughly the same as others are already doing. Incremental 
innovations may occur while the specific conditions of a particular mill are 
adjusted in order to achieve the level of the ‘general policy line’.
According to the interviews, assessment of availability of technology has 
always been an essential part of the design of permits. This is also clearly based 
on the provisions of the law. The Water Act, already in the 1960s, required that 
all protection measures not exceeding reasonable costs must be taken. The 
introduction of the best available technology principle in 1994 stressed the 
importance of technology assessment, but did not totally change the ultimate 
rationale on which the design of emission limits was based. The BAT principle 
is also relative to the costs of environmental measures.529 It can be assumed that 
the principle has pushed the environmental administration to undertake more 
in-depth assessment, although this hypothesis is hard to confirm on the basis 
of empirical data. Be that as it may, emission limits designed on the basis of 
technology assessment result, in theory, in diffusion of innovations. In fact, this 
is the very idea of the BAT principle. According to the principle, emission limits 
should be designed so that the industry is forced to adopt the best available 
technology.
The asymmetry of information limits particularly the theoretical impacts 
of technology-based standards. Before being able to design an emission limit the 
permit authority should have an understanding of the alternative technologies 
available at reasonable cost. However, often the industry knows this better and, 
thus, may affect the informative basis of setting a standard. The asymmetry of 
information on the technologies available between the administration and the 
industry was generally acknowledged by permit officials. As one interviewee 
put it: “As a whole the administration does not know the technological 
solutions as well as the industry, because who else could know how to manage 
the mill but the operator. The operator always has the best know-how.“ Another 
. Krämer 2000, 117.
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representative of the administration claimed that if an operator is unwilling 
to co-operate, it is not so easy to acquire sufficient information as a basis for 
decision-making. She also pointed out that the administration is dependent 
“to large extent on the know-how of the operators. “ However, yet another 
interviewee expressed an opinion that previously the permit authorities were 
better informed than the industry about the purification technologies.
Furthermore, the industry has much greater resources to invest in issues 
related to technologies than the administration. In addition, to make an assessment 
of the technological possibilities of a particular installation, general information 
on innovations is not sufficient. Information concerning the specific conditions 
of each installation is also needed. In this respect the administration will always 
be dependent on information provided by the operator (on the basis of a legal 
obligation or otherwise). The point of departure in technology assessment 
should moreover be the whole technological solution planned to be adopted. 
However, the interviews indicated that the permit authorities concentrated 
their limited resources on end-of-pipe technology. This may result in neglecting 
opportunities related to the development of process technologies and does not 
directly foster the development of process technologies. On the other hand, if 
the development of process technology is a more efficient solution as a whole, 
and the trend of coming standards is predictable, the industry may choose to 
develop it instead of adopting possibly inefficient end-of-pipe technologies.
One way referred to in the interviews to avoid the difficulties related to 
the asymmetry of information is to base the design on the comparison to the 
real discharges of other mills. This means that the environmental performance 
of other installations is used to exemplify what level of pollution reduction is 
achievable. This, as well as comparison to the standards of other mills, gives an 
incentive to the backward mills to follow the general technological development 
and is a mechanism to foster the diffusion of both end-of-pipe and process 
technology. Even more, it could result in a positive vicious circle: while designing 
emission limits, pioneers are used as examples for laggards, and thereafter some 
of the laggards raise their level of environmental performance in response to 
tightening standards to the extent that they become examples in relation to 
former pioneers. However, the dynamics of this development requires that 
there are pioneers willing to go beyond defined emission limits. The motivation 
to go beyond emission limits must lie elsewhere than in regulation itself. In this 
sense this dynamics fosters rather diffusion of technology than encourages new 
innovations.
Although the legal regime is fairly flexible, its reactive nature may restrict 
the setting of standards intended to foster technological development. An 
example may clarify this point. In a certain case an operator applied for a 
permit several years before the installation concerned was to be started up. 
However, the administration refused to issue a permit on the grounds that the 
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technology would likely improve before the start-up of the mill. However, the 
Supreme Administrative Court530 considered that this was not justifiable. The 
permit should have been issued on the basis of information available at the time 
of issue. In other words, the permit authority should only require the use of 
such technologies which have been demonstrated to function. As a solution to 
the problem that emission limits may be out-dated even before they come into 
force, the Court pointed out that the operator may be required to apply for a 
review of a permit in the future. The review of a permit, which takes place after 
the basic technological choices have been made, however, comes too late. If the 
up-dating of standards takes place after the major investments have been made, 
they will certainly not affect the structural elements of the technology.
In principle, an emission limit could be pro-active. The design of emission 
limits could be based on emerging technologies instead of technologies de-
monstrated to function. An approach which forces the industry to develop 
a technology is called a technology-forcing approach.531 With regard to the 
installations studied, this approach was never used. The emission limits have 
been based, as the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court referred to 
above suggests, on existing technological ideas which have been proved to 
function. The interviews also support this interpretation.
Depending on the state of the environment it may be possible to set stand-
ards stricter than the best available technology principle requires. Traditionally 
the state of the recipient water has been one factor to be taken into account in the 
design of standards. This has led, in principle, to a more marked differentiation 
of standards than it would otherwise be the case. Some of the interviewees 
reported that the most stringent emission limits have indeed been imposed in 
those permits which regulate sensitive or heavily polluted areas and then spread 
to other permits. The qualitative material used in this study does not allow the 
truth of this to be tested.532 In theory, this kind of design means a greater impact 
on the diffusion of innovations than the BAT-based approach, because then the 
operators would be required to adopt technologies more developed than the 
best available technology, i.e. emerging or even technologies not yet emerged. 
The interviews did not support the hypothesis that the poor state or sensitivity 
of the environment had been used as an argument to opt for a technology-
forcing approach.
Impacts of emission limits. The statistical information presented at the 
beginning of this chapter shows that there has been a significant reduction 
of absolute discharges despite a major increase in production during the last 
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decades. Most of representatives of the industry considered that the impact of 
permitting on this development has been considerable. This can be taken as an 
indication that there has been an impact on the technological solutions behind 
the discharges. However, the representatives of the industry also systematically 
pointed out that other factors have also exerted influence in the same direction. 
A fairly typical example of the views of the industry regarding which factors 
have influenced the amount of discharges is the following:
It is a rather complicated matter. It is clear that with respect to wastewater 
discharges the first remarkable factor affecting the quantity of them has 
been water legislation, the concrete administrative limits, which have 
affected e.g. the fact that biological purification plants are so widely 
in use. But then there is the other side affecting the development. The 
first big issue with respect to wastewater was the suspended solids … 
and it was also an economic issue. Raw material is so expensive that 
nobody can believe that such an amount of raw material could be lost… 
But after all, the major factor affecting the amount of discharges is the 
development of environmental legislation.“
In addition to this very general link between permits and technological 
development, it is possible to find examples of the diffusion of technology at a 
concrete level on the basis of both Court and interview material. Let us take an 
example. According to the decision-making material in the case of one sulphate 
mill there was a dispute between the supervisory authority and the operator 
concerning the type of purification plant. The authority required an emission 
limit based on an active sludge plant. The mill opposed this requirement. 
However, the final emission limit set in the permit granted was so strict that 
the active sludge plant had to be built. This observation was confirmed in an 
interview with a representative of the company concerned, as the following 
quotation from an interview shows:
The relevance of the concrete conditions of a permit has been dramatic. 
For example, it was a “must” to invest in an activated sludge plant in 
a pulp mill of our company, because the nutrient limit was so strict 
and remained strict after all phases of administrative procedure. A 
purification plant (aerial lagoon), which made it possible to achieve 
a sufficient level with respect to organic load, had already been 
constructed, but the phosphorus limit meant that the only possibility to 
solve the problem was to construct an active sludge plant instead of the 
aerial lagoon.
It would be easy to give other examples, too. However, casual examples showing 
the impact of a permit on the diffusion technology do not reveal how often 
this kind impact occurred and how strong it was. Estimating of the degree of 
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impact is difficult for a variety of reasons. However, it is possible, on the basis 
of the documents, to systematically evaluate the coercive impact of permits. 
The evaluation of coercive impact is based on the answers to the following 
questions: (1) Are the final emission limits and other permit conditions stricter 
than the operator originally proposed in the application or agreed during the 
administrative process; and (2) have the stricter conditions forced the operator 
to adopt a new technological solution?
The permitting history of 6 mills during the period between 1970 and 
2000 was studied in order to answer this question. During that period of time 
the total number of permits granted to the mills was 23, as mentioned above. Of 
these permits it was possible to make the two-step judgement with respect to 
20 permits. In three cases the information available was insufficient to make a 
judgement. All these three cases concerned one and the same installation. Hence, 
a permit-by-permit based judgement can be made with respect to five mills. Of 
these, a coercive impact was observed in 9 cases. Four times out of 9, when a 
coercive impact was observed, a major impact on end-of-pipe technology was 
identified. Three times a new purification plant was established and once the 
operator solved the problem by leading its wastewater to a municipal wastewater 
treatment plant. Each of the four cases concerned different installations. In 
addition, the fifth installation was once forced, according to one interviewee, to 
adopt a more advanced major end-of-pipe solution than the operator originally 
proposed. However, it is not possible to confirm this observation from the 
documents related to the issuing of the permit. The documents suggest that 
the operator accepted this solution (although not all other permit conditions) 
before the permit was officially issued. Strictly speaking, this means that this 
case does not meet the criterion of coercive impact, though one could, on the 
basis of the interview, still claim that the permitting forced the operator to adopt 
new technologies. On this basis it is possible to conclude that all five mills with 
respect to which it was possible to make a permit-by-permit judgement were 
once forced to adopt a new major end-of-pipe solution between 1970 and 2000. 
In addition there were five other cases of minor coercive impact, which did not 
result in identifiable major new investments. In one case the operator was able 
to fulfil the requirements by improving the management of the plant. Thus, no 
new investment was needed at all in this case. With respect to the other 4 cases of 
minor coercive impact, the information available did not allow identification of 
the concrete measures the operators took to fulfil the requirements of a permit.
The evaluation of non-coercive impact, i.e. the impact which appears 
in the form of anticipation, is more difficult. An operator which agrees on 
standards with the supervisory authorities before or during the permitting 
process, may do so for a variety of reasons. The documents available do not 
contain relevant information on the reasons why an operator has complied with 
the administration. The interviews are more reliable in this respect, though it is 
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not possible to cover all cases by interviews. In addition, an interviewee may 
behave strategically, i.e. may not pass on all information.
Despite these difficulties it can be noted that the anticipation of coming 
standards was acknowledged by many representatives of the industry. However, 
the representatives of the industry typically combined the anticipation of 
coming standards with other factors, such as improvements in resources 
efficiency and the demands of the customers. An example may clarify this 
point. One representative of the industry, who reported that the most important 
investment in environmental technology with regard to the mill concerned was 
an activated sludge plant in 1989, stated as follows:
Well, with respect to purification plants the pressure (to adopt new 
technology—JS) comes from outside. In fact, with respect to the 
wastewater purification plant a plan for the reduction of discharges was 
required in a permit in 1983, when we got a permit for a new paper mill. 
At the same time the customers became interested in discharges … and 
this resulted in a proposal for a new activated sludge plant in the next 
permit application. The timetable went so that after we had agreed with 
the authorities on the effectiveness of the plant, … in 1987 we started to 
plan the plant, and the construction was started a year later and the plant 
was taken into operation in 1989, but the permit … came into force in 
1992.
Generally speaking, representatives of the industry stressed the importance 
of negotiation with the administration. In addition, they pointed out that in 
the context of large investments, the industry takes as a point of departure 
the adoption of well-developed environmental technology. Typically this was 
grounded by an argument that investments must last tens of years, not by 
referring to the immediate demands of the administration. Some representatives 
of the administration agreed with this view. Furthermore, many representatives 
of the administration pointed out that in the past, say more than 10–15 years ago, 
the reluctance of the industry to take environmental issues into consideration, 
was much greater than nowadays. A representative of the industry described 
the same idea in other words. He stressed that permit conditions have had 
more concrete impact in the past and that nowadays other factors, such as the 
demands of customers, are more important. These observations indicate that 
nowadays there are fewer open conflicts between the administration and the 
industry than before. This has made the policy style even more co-operative.533 
Whether the administration now has a stronger or weaker position with respect 
to the industry is another question. One could argue that there is no longer 
. On policy styles, see e.g. Vogel 1986 and Lange 1999.
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such an acute need to use coercive power, because non-coercive means are 
effective enough. This does not necessarily mean that the regulatory process 
has a weaker influence on the industry than before. Be that as it may, it can 
be concluded that the existence of anticipation is confirmed in interviews and 
there are indications that the use of coercive power has diminished.
Most of the examples mentioned in the interviews where regulation has 
affected the adoption of new technologies concerned the diffusion of end-of-
pipe technology. Although the representatives of the industry gave examples 
of inventions of process technology, none of them reported that operators had 
adopted a process technology solution solely in order to fulfil the requirements 
of a permit. A decision to adopt a new process technological solution is typically 
motivated by several reasons. Instead, one representative of the industry argued 
that regulation is the main factor behind the fact that e.g. biological purification 
plants are widely in use. These observations suggest that the coercive impact 
has been stronger with respect to end-of-pipe technology than in process 
technology. However, this is a relative conclusion, because end-of-pipe 
technology and process technology are technically and economically linked to 
each other. For example, it was reported in the interviews that improvements 
in water circulation have made activated sludge plants cheaper to establish 
and this, naturally, has eased the adoption of the technology. Due to the link 
between process and end-of-pipe technologies, the impact of regulation on 
process technology may be real, though indirect. An operator may be motivated 
to improve process technology in order to avoid increased costs of end-of-pipe 
technology.
4.3.5. Research and development obligations
It is often argued that traditional regulation does not give a continuous 
incentive for regulated industries to improve environmental performance. One 
aspect of this criticism is that traditional regulation does not motivate regulated 
industries to put effort into creating new solutions for tomorrow. One might 
respond to this criticism by referring to continuously tightening emission 
limits. However, regulators may take a more straightforward approach to this 
issue and regulate the production of information with the aim of creating a 
sound basis for future decisions.
There are a variety of types of permit conditions regulating the production 
of information by operators. The most typical conditions relate to monitoring 
of emissions and assessing their environmental impacts. The improved 
information basis achieved through these obligations may help to identify 
environmental problems and, assuming that the results are public, increase the 
pressure to take adequate measures. Both the identification of environmental 
problems and increased pressure may improve the effectiveness of regulation. 
However, they have no direct link to the development of technology. Instead, 
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permit conditions requiring an operator to take research and development 
activities have such a direct link. The Water Act contained no explicit provision 
on research and development obligations, though a provision on monitoring 
was inserted into the Act in 1987 and amended in 1994. However, the option 
to impose such conditions stems from the general discretionary power of the 
permit authorities.
The most typical (and most lax) research and development obligation 
required the operator to prepare a plan for further reduction of discharges. An 
example from 1971 of this kind of permit conditions is as follows:
The operator must continue to take measures in order to treat the 
wastewater in an adequate way. To that purpose the operator must 
continue to make investigations and prepare a plan for the improvement 
of the wastewater treatment…
This obligation is imprecise, which apparently impairs its effectiveness. In 
addition, a permit condition on research and development may lack a reporting 
mechanism, which leaves open how the results of research and development 
activities will be verified and used. An imprecise permit condition without 
any reporting mechanism is not much more than a wish on the part of permit 
authority. However, gradually the quality of the obligations has improved. 
Obligations were linked to the permit cycle, the reporting mechanism was 
improved by an obligation to consult with the supervisory authority and 
the scope of investigations defined more exactly e.g. by referring to certain 
pollutants. The most developed type of research and development obligations 
defined the project to be carried out by a reference to the pollution level to be 
achieved. An example of this kind of obligation is the following from a permit 
granted 6 September 1999 for an industrial complex including a sulphate pulp 
mill, two paper and board mills and a chemical plant:
The operator must continue to investigate the means to reduce the 
amount and load of wastewater. In particular, the possibilities to reduce 
chlorine and nutrients must be investigated. With respect to the pulp 
mill the targets are the following:
 Q 20 m3/tp P 15 g/tp
 CORCr 15 kg/tp AOX 0,25 kg/tp.
   (Tp: produced ton of pulp)
Most of the 23 permits examined included some kind of an obligation requiring 
the operator to carry out research and development. However, there were 6 
permits which did not contain such an obligation. Three of them were issued 
in the 70s, two in the 80s and one in the 90s. There were more permits, which 
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included only imprecise and unspecified obligations concerning technology 
development projects than permits including precise and specific obligations. 
The number of permits with the most developed type of investigation obligation 
was only 5. The facts that in the 1970s no research and development obligation 
with clear environmental objective was given and in the 1990s such an obligation 
was included 50% of permits examined may be taken as an indication of the 
improved quality of permit conditions.
There is no doubt that forcing an unwilling operator to carry out a good 
quality research and development project is difficult. Taking this into account, 
it is not surprising that neither the representatives of the administration nor 
those of the industry stressed the importance of these obligations. However, 
some representatives of the administration reported that the investigations have 
resulted in positive outcomes. They have improved the information and created 
a sound basis for negotiations between the administration and the industry. In 
addition, representatives of the administration reported that the obligations are 
also signals to the industry to be prepared for the coming new parameter or new 
level of emission limit values. Thus, it is on this side of a permit that the future-
orientation is included. This point was also acknowledged by the industry.
Most of the clearly defined research and development obligations were so 
new that follow-up was not possible. However, the first research and develop-
ment obligation of good quality was stipulated in the mid 1980s and it can be 
studied as an example.534 The obligation given was as follows:
The operator must prepare a plan for the measure to improve wastewater 
treatment by 31 December 1987, if the operator intends to release 
discharges after the said date. The plan must include a proposal for the 
measures to reduce the phosphorus load below the level of 50 kg/d and 
an investigation on emission limit values on chlorine and lignin. Before 
the plan is presented to the Water Court, the Board of Waters must be 
consulted.
The obligation led to an administrative process with several steps. First the 
plan was presented in due time before the end of 1987. In the plan several past 
and future protection measures were reported. With respect to the phosphorus 
limit the conclusion was negative. According to the operator it was impossible 
to achieve level of 50 kg/d. The operator claimed that such an emission limit 
would have prevented the rational management of the mill. Despite this the 
Water Court after having consulted the National Boards of Waters, required 
another investigation obligation with only some minor modifications to 
the previous one. After a year the operator again reported that the level was 
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unrealistic and unreasonable taking into consideration the costs and harms. It 
evinced, among others, an argument that the technology was not well enough 
known and the outcome of the possible adoption of new technology might 
result in new kinds of environmental problems. This time, the Water Court, 
after consulting the National Board of Waters, imposed a requirement to 
make a pilot-level experiment. The objective of the investigation was defined 
basically at the same way as before. The operator carried out the experiment. 
When the operator applied for the next permit it proposed a phosphorus limit 
of 75 kg/d. However, the Water Court imposed a phosphorus limit of 50 kg/
d in 1994. Thus, after approximately 10 years of investigations and dispute the 
phosphorus limit was set at the level defined in the investigation required in 
1985. No information available indicates that the operator had difficulties in 
achieving the level stipulated in the permit. With regard to the effectiveness of 
this procedure one can note that the results of the investigations made on the 
basis of the research and development obligation were negative. The operator 
never came to the conclusion that the defined level was achievable. In this 
sense, the required research and development activities were not effective. In 
fact, on the basis of the study, it was not possible to show a single research and 
development obligation, which alone led to an innovation or to the diffusion of 
an innovation. Thus, there is no direct evidence to suggest that this method of 
regulating is effective.
Despite this it is still possible to argue, as did many representatives of the 
administration and some of the industry, that the authorities show the direction 
of the coming level of environmental protection by research and development 
obligations and in this way motivate an operator to improve its environmental 
performance before the next permit cycle. However, the credibility of an 
individual obligation depends on the coherency of the overall policy. It is not a 
single condition in a permit, but the policy as a whole, which forces an operator 
to take the indications of the coming level of environmental protection seriously. 
With respect to phosphorus there was an ongoing change of policy at the time 
of the dispute studied. Phosphorus limits have gradually become a common 
parameter in the permits from 1987 onwards.535 The individual research and 
development obligation discussed above was one element of this change and 
the indicated level of emission limit became reality, although not directly based 
on the reported results of the research and development efforts required by the 
permit authority.
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4.3.6. Concluding remarks on influences 
on technological change
Impacts on technological change are considered to be one of the main 
characteristics of regulatory instruments. This has been stressed particularly by 
economists,536 but its relevance has also been acknowledged by private actors537 
and public bodies.538 Under the Finnish water pollution control regime the 
strategy to influence technological change has been developed in permitting 
practice on an individual basis, not by general means such as general standards. 
The systematic inclusion of a review clause into permits, the choice of pollutants 
to be regulated, the adoption of emission limits as the main type of permit 
condition, the increasing stringency of environmental requirements as well as 
the adoption of research and development obligations have all been developed in 
permitting practice. The introduction of the best available technology principle 
into the law could be seen as an indication of a more active policy towards 
the diffusion of innovations by the legislator. However, the introduction was 
perhaps not so much an idea of the national legislator as an implementation 
measure of international law.539
The core of the regulatory approach has been gradually tightening emission 
limits. Once emission limits have been set up, industry is free to choose how to 
comply with the values. Emission limits do not give an incentive to innovate, 
but they allow it. In theory, emission limits could be used as a technology 
forcing instrument, but this has not happened in the field studied. However, 
performance standards, like emission limits, do not hamper technological 
development in the same way as process standards could do. These conclusions 
apply to the regulatory approach adopted towards the industry studied.
Technology based performance standards are an instrument to foster 
the diffusion of innovations. It has been shown in this study that regulation 
has had an observable impact on the diffusion of technology, particularly with 
respect to end-of-pipe technology. Partly the impact has been coercive; partly 
non-coercive (i.e. it appears in the form of anticipation). Whether even more 
effective and efficient instruments are available is another matter. In an ideal 
world it would be possible to imagine instruments which allocate the resources 
available for technological development in a better way. In the real world other 
instruments, such as taxes, have suffered from remarkable design problems and 
have not always had significant impacts, as discussed in Chapter 3. Despite the 
impact observed there are features of the regime studied which diminish the 
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theoretical impact. Not all the factors affecting the design of emission limits 
are relevant or may even have a negative impact from the point of view of the 
diffusion of inventions. Due to asymmetry of information and the reactive 
nature of permitting the regulatory instrument does not ensure that the most 
advanced technology is always adopted. However, in the long run backward 
installations have been forced to adopt technological solutions ensuring the 
same level of environmental performance which more progressive installations 
have already achieved. This impact could be assumed to be stronger in those 
countries, such as Finland, which have a transparent administrative process 
and well-developed access to emission information at the level of individual 
installation.
Permitting is a more effective instrument to foster the diffusion of end-of-
pipe technology than of process technology. It was possible to observe an impact 
on the diffusion of end-of-pipe technology, whereas an impact on the diffusion 
of process technology was more difficult to distinguish. This applies in particular 
to coercive impact, and does not rule out the possibility that anticipation may 
have a bigger role with regard to process technology. It is also rational that 
permits have stronger impacts on end-of-pipe technology than on process 
technology. Specific end-of-pipe technology can easily be classified as ‘best 
available technology’ and therefore demand a level of environmental protection 
equal to the performance of this technology. For example, because biological 
purification plants have been considered as the best available technology with 
respect to pulp and paper mills, this ensures that the invention (or its equally 
effective alternatives) will spread. Despite this, the rate of diffusion is not fast; 
usually it takes many years before a technology comes to be considered as the 
best available technology.
The classification of process technologies as BAT is, a priori, more de-
manding. However, it has been shown with regard to the Finnish pulp and paper 
industry that the technologies identified as best available technology in the 
BAT references documents have spread widely. The variation among emission 
limits is even smaller than that of actual emissions, which is because the design, 
operation and maintenance of the technologies, the specific local conditions 
and the product quality requirements affect the emission.540 Other factors 
than permitting, such as cost savings or customer demands, presumably affect 
process technology more markedly than end-of-pipe technology. Furthermore, 
end-of-pipe technology and process technology are technically linked to each 
other541 and the operators must take both sides into account when developing 
technologies and seeking efficient solutions. Hence, it would not be correct to say 
that emission limits affect only the development of end-of-pipe technologies.
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Though individual emission limits are not used as means to foster 
innovations, the dynamics of the permitting mechanism as a whole may have such 
an impact. The dynamics is a combination of different factors. First, operators 
always have an incentive for cost savings, also with respect to the environmentally 
relevant technologies542 Secondly, there is a general trend of tightening emission 
limits. This trend provides an implicit incentive to innovate solutions which 
fulfil the anticipated stricter emission limits in the cheapest possible way. This 
study was able to confirm that the industry does indeed anticipate. In fact, many 
representatives of the industry reported that emission limits were halved each 
time a permit is reviewed and is expected to tighten in the future as well. However, 
the dynamics is weakened by the reactive nature of permitting. Technology 
forcing seems to fit badly in the national regulatory style. Neither is there any 
reason to assume that the dynamics motivates significant investment in research 
and development in order to make a radical innovation,543 because following 
the general development is sufficient. Furthermore, no indication was found 
in this study that anticipation had led to innovations, although anticipation has 
been one of the reasons for diffusion of innovations. In another study on the 
Finnish pulp and paper industry,544 it is pointed out that though standards have 
been set on the basis of existing technologies, regulation has had impacts on 
innovations through anticipation. The conclusion is based on the investigation 
of the development of two specific technologies. Interestingly, the anticipation of 
future regulation proved to be wrong. The company developing the technology 
found, however, other markets for it.
Different methods for production the same product may have different 
environmental consequences. For example, the fact that most sulphite 
mills in Finland have been replaced by other mills, such as sulphate mills, 
has had a crucial role in the reduction of pollution, when measured e.g. by 
biological oxygen demand. No clear indication was found suggesting that 
this was a result of permits. On the contrary, general economic reasons for 
the change were evinced in the interviews and counter-arguments can be 
presented. It is doubtful that smooth measures could have a significant impact 
on technological changes of this scale. However, no permit has been disallowed 
on the basis of the production method. Neither has any permit condition 
intended to have such an effect been identified. The design of emission limits 
is based on an assessment of each type of technology on its own merits. The 
question for the administration is: if a mill chooses this or that production 
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method, what environmental measures should be considered reasonable? The 
basic technological choices of the industry have been taken for granted by 
the administration. This kind of flexibility towards technology is actually a 
typical feature of permitting. Other instruments, such as taxes or other kinds of 
economic instruments, are far more suitable to make one production method 
more attractive than another for the industry.
Under the Water Act a research and development obligation is an instru-
ment intended to foster the development of innovations. In theory one 
may argue according to the lines of Porter and Linde545 that research and 
development obligations signal potential technological improvements, focus 
on information gathering and create pressure to innovate, and in these ways 
contribute to technological development. In practice the theoretical impact of 
research and development obligations is diminished by the facts that they were 
not systematically used and the quality of most of such obligations was poor. The 
administration also had only weak means to control the amount of resources 
allocated to the projects by operators as well as the quality of the research and 
development projects. Thus, the success of a research and development obligation 
depends to a large extent on whether the operator also has other motives to put 
its best effort into the required kind of research and development activities.
4.4. Integrated pollution control
4.4.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the integration of environmental pollution 
control mechanisms in Finland from the effectiveness and efficiency point of view. 
The integration was carried out through a reform, which—with the Environmental 
Protection Act as the centre-piece of the reform—entered into force on 1 March 
2000. The main outlines of the reform as well as changes in the administrative 
structure have been explained above, at the beginning of Chapter 4.
A great variety of activities goes under the integrated pollution control and 
prevention regime covering all major point sources. The number of installations 
and activities under the regime is significant, taking the size of the country into 
account. It is estimated that 26,000 installations need to have an environmental 
permit.546 By the end of May 2005 the state authorities (regional permit centres 
and environmental permit authorities) had made more than 3,000 decisions on 
integrated environmental permits. The number of annual decisions has gradually 
increased and state authorities made 1,000 decisions in 2005. About 12% of 
the decisions made by the state authorities are covered by the IPPC Directive 
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(so-called ‘IPPC installations’). The number of decisions made by municipal 
environmental authorities is not known, but it is assumed to be even greater. 
The variation between municipal environmental authorities is great due to the 
different size of the municipalities. The environmental board in Helsinki grants 
some 20 permits annually,547 whereas some minor municipalities do not grant 
a single permit in a year. Not only permit authorities but also the courts made 
several decisions; an appeal is made regarding about 18% of all decisions.548
A legal reform has often not only one but several goals. In particular this 
applies to profound reforms of established institutions, like that of pollution 
control in 2000. The reform was apparently the largest ever reform of 
environmental law in Finland. New laws were introduced, and some earlier laws 
repealed, but even more were amended. Perhaps among all the recent reforms of 
environmental law only the reform of planning law, which came into force only 
two months earlier than this reform, comes even close to the magnitude of this 
reform measured in the number of sections amended and introduced. Within 
such a large reform there are several smaller arrangements which may serve the 
overall goals of the reform but which also have their own goals. The creation 
of municipal environmental protection regulation (Section 19 of EPA) is an 
example of such a smaller reform. It clearly aims to improve the effectiveness of 
pollution control as does the reform in general, but in a different way than the 
main control mechanism, namely permitting. In addition, the reason behind 
it is not the same as those behind the integration of permit mechanisms. Next, 
the main goals of the integration of permit mechanisms are identified, though 
concentrating on the core ideas means that some aspects of the reform will be 
neglected. The main goals have served as a driving force for the development of 
integrated permitting at international as well as national level.
The Finnish reform in 2000 was the implementation measure for the 
IPPC Directive. From the European perspective, the national legislation 
implementing the European legislation has a dual nature: It aims to transpose 
the European legal requirements into a national legal system, but it may also 
have goals of its own. Sometimes national goals may be united with European 
goals so that it becomes difficult or even impossible to separate them. At least 
it is clear that measured in the number of activities covered by regulation, the 
pollution control reform of 2000 mainly concerned other installations than 
those covered by the IPPC Directive, as the figures presented above show. In 
this sense the national policy ambition has been broader than the European 
one. The idea of integration has been discussed in Finland for a long time 
without any formal or even substantive link to European law,549 and one may 
. Kolju and Autio 2005, 13. 
. Similä et al. 2006, 13–19. 
. Kuusiniemi 1995b, 8–11.
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wonder whether the integration of permits would have occurred without an 
international legal obligation to do so. Be this as it may, national legislation 
does not make a difference with regard to the principles and rules applied to 
IPPC installations and other installations, though there is a special arrangement 
which aims to ensure that all IPPC installations are regulated by integrated 
permit in due time. However, the reform also brought in changes, which did not 
have any connection to European law. Again it can be referred to the municipal 
environmental protection regulation now as an example of an aspect of reform 
which is of purely national origin. Such aspects of the reform, although they 
would merit a study of their own, are not later given any special attention.
4.4.2. IPPC policy
The idea of gathering environmental decision-making processes on environ-
mental pollution together has long prevailed among politicians and environ-
mental experts.550 However, it was not until the OECD’s catalytic work that 
the idea became a political reality in many countries. The recommendation of 
the OECD Council on integrated pollution prevention and control551 can be 
considered as the break-through of the idea at the international level. Before 
the recommendation the idea was developed in working groups, particularly in 
the chemical group between 1985 and 1987 of the OECD for several years.552 The 
OECD Council took a very broad starting point for integration, as can be seen 
in the following: 
Integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) is a method to take 
into account all environmental media simultaneously when attempting 
to reduce natural resources and energy use, exposure to hazardous 
substances and releases of pollutants by economic activities. Therefore 
IPPC promotes the concept of economic progress with reduced resource 
consumption and pollution.553
In the OECD recommendations three different foci for integration were 
distinguished: integration by substance, integration by source and integration 
by geographic area or ecological problem.
The broad definition of integrated pollution prevention and control policy 
developed within the OECD is not restricted to any single type of instrument.554 
The approach adopted in the OECD covers all environmental problems related 
0. Doppelhammer 2000, 200 and references therein.
. OECD 1990, OECD 1991.
. Emmott 1999, 26.
. OECD 1996, 6.
. On the relationship integration of pollution permits and IPPC policy, see Emmot and Haigh 
1996.
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to pollution and use of natural resources and all appropriate means of public 
policy to prevent or reduce these problems. Integrated pollution permit is 
apparently one of the most prominent tools of IPPC policy and sometimes 
the whole idea of integration of environmental decision-making is associated 
with this policy instrument. This is understandable, taking into account that 
the piece of European law, which integrates pollution permits, has included the 
concept of integrated pollution prevention and control directive in its name.
The core idea of IPPC policy is to abandon policy approaches which 
tackle different environmental problems as separate phenomena. Methods 
of control vary from one focus to another. Integrated permitting may be a 
useful method for the integration of decision-making concerning point 
sources. Other methods are required for integration strategies focusing on 
other sources, substances or geographical areas.555 A significant number of 
recent innovations of environmental policy can be associated with IPPC policy. 
In addition to the integration of pollution permits’ life-cycle assessment, 
product policy, eco-labelling, extended producer’s responsibility and river 
basin management are examples of IPPC policy measures. Furthermore, one 
could claim that the attempts to make large codifications of environmental 
law, which are based on common principles and legal concepts, and which 
govern numerous environmental decision-making procedures, are a part of 
overall environmental integration aiming to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of environmental policy. Many of the instruments listed above can 
be located under internal integration, where clearly environmental protection 
related control mechanisms are developed. The other aspect of integration, 
namely the integration of environmental decision-making into other policies, 
has recently received increasing attention in political discussion,556 though 
the methods are still developing. From IPPC policy both sides are equally 
important, though making a strict borderline between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
integration may, after all, be difficult. It is challenging to identify the point at 
which environmental policy ends and other policies starts.
As can be seen in the foregoing, there is no single coherent system of 
instruments for integrated pollution prevention and control, but different 
approaches and methods to promote IPPC policy. Different approaches are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Integrated permitting and the river basin 
approach of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60) can both be seen 
. The river basin management regulated by the Water Framework Directive is a good example 
of integration based on geographical areas. See Adler (1999) for USA experience of integrated 
approaches to water pollution.
. The so-called Cardiff process at EU level resulted in a number of resolutions and 
recommendations in different Councils of Ministries, though the actual integration of 
environmental protection into other policies has been considered to be rather weak, see 
Dhondt 2003, 477–485.
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as examples of IPPC policy methods, though they may overlap to certain 
extent. Theoretically, it could even be possible to distinguish a further level of 
integration, namely meta-integration of different integration approaches.
4.4.3. The goals of integrated pollution control
The goals of a regulatory reform are not necessarily same as the goals of the 
reformed regulation. A reform may aim at modifying the existing regulation in 
some particular way, though it does not necessarily aim to alter its fundamental 
goals. In the case of integrated pollution prevention and control the aim was 
not to bring about a change in the general goal of pollution control, i.e. the 
prevention and reduction of pollution. Instead, the purpose is to change the 
principles and methods by which this goal is to be achieved. Because these 
changes are, in fact, reactions to flaws of sectoral pollutions control, the goals 
of the reform are best understood in relative terms. Integrated pollution 
prevention and control aims to overcome some deficiencies of the previous 
control mechanisms identified.
During the preparation of IPPC policy the goals—or benefits—of it were 
discussed in many policy papers as well as in the literature. Essentially IPPC policy 
suggests that fragmented structures of on pollution control based on sectoral 
approaches should be replaced by new ones. The main reason for reorganising 
institutional and legal structures is—according to the OECD—efficiency flaws 
inherently present in sectoral approaches. In other words, institutional and legal 
structures of integrated pollution prevention and control may, in comparison 
to sectoral permits, enable society to achieve a given environmental outcome 
at lower costs or, alternatively, achieve a superior environmental outcome at the 
same cost. Thus, one main argument favouring IPPC policy relates to efficiency, 
as is the case with regard to economic instruments, though the underlying 
assumptions as to how increased efficiency is achieved differ.557
Efficiency has many dimensions. Frances Irwin has identified seven different 
reasons for integration, all of which can be considered as one dimension of 
efficiency: (1) fragmentation encourages the use of control methods that transfer 
pollutants to other parts of the environment; (2) existing pollution problems 
are often not accurately identified and therefore cannot be effectively managed; 
(3) fragmentation does not encourage the prevention of pollution (selection of 
raw material, design of products, the choice of processes); (4) fragmentation 
decreases the likelihood that new and more complex problems will be identified 
and prevented or controlled; (5) fragmentation makes it difficult to set priorities 
among problems; (5) the current approaches hinder more effective integration 
. Taken literally a definition of economic instruments by Hahn (an economic instrument = an 
instrument that is expected to increase economic efficiency relative to the status quo) integrated 
pollution prevention could be seen as such an instrument. Hahn 2000, 376. 
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of environmental policy into other policies; (7) fragmentation results in an 
excessively complex and inconsistent administrative structure.558
The main policy document in which the goals of the European IPPC 
Directive can be found is the explanatory memorandum of the Directive.559 
The explanatory memorandum was prepared before the Commission made its 
proposal for the IPPC Directive, and during the negotiation the Council made 
certain modifications to the Proposal. However, none of these amendments 
aimed to change the overall goals. The goals of the IPPC Directive, as identified 
in the explanatory memorandum are as follows: (1) to prevent or solve pollution 
problems rather  than  transferring  them to other parts of  the environment, 
(2)  to make pollution controls more efficient  for  industry and effective  for 
the environment, (3) to increase ability to set priorities, and (4) to encourage 
consistency in environmental law.560 The language used in the preamble of the 
IPPC Directive is not explicitly the same, but the goals are similar. The need for 
a move towards a more sustainable balance between human activity and socio-
economic development, on the one hand, and the resources and regenerative 
capacity of nature, on the other, is acknowledged. Furthermore, it is noted that 
different approaches to control emissions into air, water and soil separately 
may encourage the shifting of pollution between various environmental media 
rather than protecting the environment as a whole. In addition to the benefits 
of the integration of the existing permitting mechanisms, the introduction of 
the IPPC Directive was motivated by a need to extend the scope of permitting. 
The inadequacy of the Community legislation with regard to prevention and 
minimizing emissions into soil was presented as an additional argument in 
favour of the Directive.561
The goals identified in the Finnish legislative material produced during 
the preparation of the reform are similar to the European goals. However, they 
can be considered independent in the sense that the problems were seen to be 
present in the Finnish system. Hence, it was not only a formal transposition of 
European law, but a reform where national needs and European requirements 
were combined. In the legislative material it was acknowledged that the 
inconsistency of environmental law is problematic for the environment, the 
authorities and the operators. It was noted that the competence on permit 
authorities and enforcement measures differs in different sectoral laws and that 
the need for a permit is defined differently in different laws. The administrative 
. Irwin 1991, 12–18. These or similar arguments are often repeated in the literature, before Irwin 
(Guruswamy 1990) and after Irwin (Davies 2001, 70-). The discussion continues in the USA, 
where no integration has taken place.
. IPPC Explanatory memorandum. 
0. IPPC Explanatory memorandum, 2. 
. Preamble, para 2, 6 and 7.
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costs of both public authorities562 and operators were assumed to decrease 
because the integration of permit mechanism would decrease the number 
of decisions. In addition, the risk of unpredictable delay was assumed to 
become smaller in an integrated system. This would also reduce the costs of 
operators. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that the conditions imposed in 
different permits may be controversial and costly. Lack of coordination may 
result in a situation where environmental problems are transferred from one 
environmental medium to another and make it more difficult to take into 
account the results of environmental impact assessment. In addition, it was 
assumed that integration of the permits would make it possible to shorten 
the period required for the procedure, enable comprehensive environmental 
protection and the use of cost-effective measures.563
There are two arguments not found in the European legislative material 
which were used in favour of the reform in national legislative documents. 
The first concerns the improved protection of rights and interests of stake-
holders. This follows partly from a simpler, clearer and more transparent 
decision-making structure, which is a result of the integration of permits. On 
the other hand the participatory rights of those affected were also improved in 
the reform by strengthening the position of non-governmental organisations. 
This improvement is not related to the IPPC Directive.564 According to the 
other argument additional to the European goals, different goals and scopes 
of application of sectoral laws detrimentally limit the possibilities to impose 
appropriate permit conditions. In other words, a need to extend the control 
over gaps between different permitting mechanisms was identified.565
In sum, the main goal of integrated pollution prevention and control is 
to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of pollution control in comparison 
to sectoral approaches. This argument—with rather similar reasoning—has 
been used at all levels of government and also in the literature promoting IPPC 
policy. Although the use of this argument in Finland is no surprise, taking into 
account the long discussion on IPPC policy, it is important to acknowledge that 
efficiency and effectiveness, are indeed, key concepts for the evaluation of the 
success of the reform.
One might think that the primary goal of IPPC policy is solely to increase 
. Hildén, Ollikka and Sahivirta have evaluated the impacts of the reform on the costs of the 
state permit authorities during the first two years of the implementation of the Environmental 
Protection Act. They concluded that the reform resulted in an unexpected increase of the 
resources used, which is exactly the contrary to the goal. The increase of administrative costs 
may be temporary and hence the original goal of decreasing them may, in theory, be achieved 
later. Hildén, Ollika and Sahivirta 2003. 
. Governmental Bill (HE 84/1999) chapters “2.5. Assessment of the Present State” and “3.1 Goals 
and the means for their achievement”.
. Governmental Bill (HE 84/1999) Chapter 3.1 ”Goals and the means for their achievement”.
. Governmental Bill (HE 84/1999) Chapter 2.5 ”Assessment of the Present State”. 
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efficiency, i.e. to use available resources in a better way. There is some truth in 
this. However, it is clear that IPPC policy—or at least the reform carried out 
in Finland in 2000—does not only aim to achieve the same substantial policy 
goals with lesser costs, but also to raise the level of environmental protection. In 
this sense it can claimed that the integration of pollution control mechanisms 
also aims to increase the effectiveness of regulation. However, integration of 
pollution control mechanism does not aim in a straightforward way at setting 
stricter environmental standards. In any permit mechanisms whatsoever, where 
permits are regularly reviewed, it is possible to make environmental standards 
stricter cycle after cycle. In fact, the previous control mechanisms, in particular 
that of water pollution control, has also used this technique, as noted above. 
Thus the underlying reasoning behind the reform is that the integration of 
permits makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of permitting even more 
than the trend inherent in a system of sectoral permits. Due to the fact that 
there are no quantitative goals for IPPC policy in general or for the Finnish 
Environmental Protection Act in particular, measuring effectiveness is not 
a simple task. However, it is possible to identify certain mechanisms of the 
reform aimed to improve effectiveness. These mechanisms are at least partly 
specific to the Finnish context. Generally speaking, there are many options to 
integrate pollution permits and though the European law set certain limits for 
national discretion, it still leaves many options open.
It needs to be stressed that not all the goals of the Finnish reform can be 
put under the concept of effectiveness and efficiency. The goal to improve the 
protection of rights and interest of stake-holders, i.e. better opportunities for 
public participation, is not directly and totally linked to the issues of effectiveness 
and efficiency. The assumed increased consistency of environmental law can be 
seen as an intermediate goal, which helps to achieve final goals like increased 
effectiveness and efficiency.
4.4.4. Legal framework for integrated permitting
Integrated decision-making aims for an optimal solution, which takes into 
account the environment as a whole and is the most efficient of all possible 
alternatives. One could argue that a really optimal solution requires that there are 
no restrictions limiting the number of possible solutions available. Restrictions 
may prevent the adoption of the best possible solution. In practice, the process 
where standards and other permit conditions are set is strictly regulated and 
permit authorities are obliged to take into account tens of different kinds of 
statutes and other material. Hence, seeking an optimal solution is one guiding 
principle in decision-making, but it is far from being the only one.
Ideally, well designed regulatory machinery supports the finding of an 
optimal solution. However, rigidities may also hamper the achievement of an 
ideal decision. Next I will outline the basic elements of decision-making as 

defined in law. Thereafter the issue of possible rigidities will be discussed.
The rules governing discretion regarding integrated permits566 can be 
grouped on different grounds. Firstly preconditions can be distinguished from 
rules governing the design of permit conditions. All preconditions must be met 
before a permit can be granted. The requirement that carrying out the activity 
must not result in harm to health is an example of these preconditions.567 If the 
preconditions are met, then the rules governing the design of permit guide the 
decision-making. Generally speaking, the best available technology principle568 
is apparently the most important principle for the design of the permit 
conditions. In addition, there are a number of context-related factors, like 
the nature of the activity, the properties of the impact area, the impacts of the 
activity as a whole, the significance of measures intended to prevent pollution 
of the environment as a whole as well as technical and financial feasibility, 
which should be taken into account. The distinction between preconditions 
and rules governing the design is not sharp. An activity which in the first place 
would have not have met the preconditions, may meet them after it has been 
modified through permit conditions.569
Another grouping can be made between general and sector specific 
regulation. Sector-specific regulation, as its name suggests, applies only to 
certain types of impacts. The preconditions and rules governing the design 
of permit conditions are general ones though it would be possible to trace the 
origin of different preconditions to the previous sectoral legislation. Instead, 
certain sections of EPA570 and most of the sub-legislation (decrees) are sector-
specific, for example emission limits are defined according to the media 
concerned.
The reasoning on how standards and other permit conditions are to be set 
according to the law, can be outlined through a model (below). This structure 
must be understood as an heuristic model showing the steps of reasoning of a 
permit authority when considering what kind of permit conditions it should 
. The basic rules are to be found in Chapter 7 of the Environmental Protection Act. The key 
sections are 42 and 43.
. The preconditions imposed in Section 42 are as follows: Granting a permit requires that the 
activity, severally or together with other activities, does not result in (1) harm to health; (2) 
other significant pollution or risk thereof; (3) a consequence prohibited in Sections 7–9 of the 
Act; (4) deterioration of special natural conditions or risk to water supply or other potential use 
important to the public interest in the activity’s area of impacts; or (5) an unreasonable burden 
referred to in Section 17, paragraph 1, of the Adjoining Properties Act. In addition, causing 
certain environmental effects is prohibited. The prohibitions are as follows: soil pollution 
prohibition (7 §), groundwater pollution prohibition (8 §) and prohibition to pollute sea (9 §).
. The scope of the principles is limited: it applies only to the design of emissions limits and other 
conditions related to emissions. 
. The linkages between these two kinds of rules have often been pointed out in the literature (e.g. 
Kumpula 2001, 1234).
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impose. The model identifies 6 steps of the reasoning. The heuristic model 
does not necessary totally reflect the decision-making process in practice, but 
it identifies key elements of it and shows the relationship between different 
elements.
Heuristic model for the setting of standards
Step 1.  Are the preconditions met?
Step 2.  Are the requirements of general source standards (e.g. emission limits set in 
decrees) met?
Step 3.  Are context related factors taken into account (nature of the activity, properties 
of the impact area)?
Step 4.  Are the requirements of the BAT/BAP571 principle met?
Step 5.  Are the general quality standards met?
Step 6. What is the most efficient combination of permit conditions meeting all 
requirements identified previously?
Steps can be understood as cumulative in the sense that the five first steps may 
occasion further requirements in comparison to the previous steps. However, 
the logic of reasoning of the last step differs from the previous ones: at this 
stage the aim is not to identify new environmental requirements but to find 
an optimal solution. At this stage the main principle governing the decision-
making is efficiency; in other words, the aim is to find a combination of permit 
conditions which meets the previously identified requirements, but still comes 
as close as possible to the solution where marginal benefits are equal with 
marginal costs. In this sense the integration of permit mechanisms aims to 
increase the efficiency of regulation in comparison to the sectoral permitting 
mechanisms, though the efficiency considerations may, in practice, still be 
biased for a variety of reasons, such as asymmetry of information. Even if the 
permit authorities had perfect information on environmental impacts, it is 
rather unlikely that they would know exactly the technological alternatives and 
the costs of these alternatives for an operator. This is a structural problem of 
traditional regulation which is difficult to totally overcome, although measures 
to reduce its impact can be taken.
Another source of biased decision-making is the rigidities of the regulation. 
Rigidity in regulation may hamper the achievement of an optimal solution, 
even though all legal requirements are fulfilled. The main source of rigidity 
with respect to the optimal solution seems to be sector-based requirements, in 
particular generally applicable source standards. The standards may be so strictly 
defined that they eliminate options, which could be better from the efficiency 
point of view taking into account the environment as a whole. Preconditions, 
. BAP = best available practice.
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context-related factors, requirements of the quality of the environment and 
the BAT principle do not pose major problems with regard to optimality. 
Preconditions categorically prohibit the causing of unacceptable impacts, like 
harm to health, and no efficiency consideration may change this. Optimality, by 
its very nature, is a context-related matter and quality standards define the goals, 
which should be achieved through efficient means. The BAT principle is likewise 
not incompatible with the search for an optimal solution. The principle guides 
decision-makers to assess technological possibilities on the basis of efficiency 
and use this information in the design of the emission limits. Though the BAT 
principle, in its normative capacity, requires efficiency considerations to be taken 
into account, a formal mechanical use of BREF documents and other similar 
sources of information may make it difficult to see all available options and so 
hamper the achievement of optimal solution. This, however, is not a problem 
of law, but of practice and this analysis is restricted to rigidities arising from the 
law itself. Hence, next the relationship between general and individual standards 
of sector-based legislation is discussed. Though applying sector basic source 
standards is only one step of decision-making, it is worth remembering that a 
significant part of decrees under the Act can be located in this category.
The standard-setting of the previous water pollution control regime and 
of the previous air pollution control regime were different. The water pollution 
control tradition left the permit authorities a great degree of discretion to 
decide what kind of standards are needed, whereas the general standards of 
air pollution regulation laid down in decrees have had a much greater role, in 
particular with regard to major polluters and pollutants. Integration of air and 
water pollution regulation has introduced a common procedure for standard-
setting, though the structural difference has remained.
Section 51 of the Environmental Protection Act is the key element making 
the difference between air and water pollution control standards. It defines 
the situations in which it is possible to impose stricter requirements in a 
permit than the minimum requirements laid down in decrees. The section 
distinguishes between air and water pollution. With regard to water pollution, 
there is actually nothing to prevent the adoption of stricter water pollution 
standards in permits than those enacted in decrees. It is always possible for 
purposes of the protection of waters. To this can be added that there are still no 
general standards of water pollution other than those required by EU law and 
the level of these standards is not high in comparison to the national permit 
practice. Hence, the water pollution standards stipulated in the decrees serve as 
minimum standards without significant practical relevance. It seems clear that 
the legislator intended to maintain the traditional approach to water pollution 
control regulation, which is based on differentiated standards. This is also 
pointed out in the motivation for the section in the Government Bill (84/1999 
vp) introducing integrated pollution control.

With regard to air pollution, the regulation have recently been amended. 
Originally in 2000, the law made it possible to impose stricter standards in 
two different situations: either for the purpose of meeting the preconditions 
for granting permits or to ensure that quality standards were met. With regard 
to air pollution control the clause on preconditions refers, in essence, to harm 
to health or otherwise significant pollution. This means that the best available 
technology principle as such was not originally a reason to impose stricter 
requirements in permits than required by decrees. Thus in 2000, the starting 
point of the Act was still that though there might be better technologies avail-
able to reduce air pollution than those fulfilling the requirements of the decrees, 
these technologies should not be required unless the quality standards were 
violated. However, apart from exceptional cases, such as particle content in 
air in major cities, quality standards mainly are rarely violated in Finland. 
Harm to health or otherwise significant pollution is an important safety clause, 
but only seldom applied. Hence, the legislator has aimed to maintain the 
previous approach to air pollution control, also after the adoption of integrated 
mechanism. The decrees stipulated the minimum requirement and the law, in 
general, prohibits exceeding them. The emission standards stipulated in decrees 
are therefore fairly uniform in practice.
Due to intervention by the European Commission,572 the law was 
amended in 2005.573 The amendment aims to correct the transposition of the 
BAT principle of the IPPC Directive. The law, as it stands now, allows the use 
of the BAT principle as a justification for stricter installation specific standards 
in comparison to the general ones. However, the basic logic of the national 
regulatory mechanism has been kept as before, and the exemption from it 
required by European law is limited to a minimum. A minimal approach was 
used to cope with alien elements of European water pollution regulation in 
the mid 1990s, when Finland joined to the European Union. Then, however, 
the purpose was different, i.e. to maintain as far as possible the wide degree of 
discretion of permit authorities, which has been part of water pollution control 
tradition in Finland. The technique to restrict the European influence is as 
follows: The BAT principle can be used as a justification for stricter requirements 
only if so determined in a relevant decree. Hence, in the absence of an explicit 
reference to the BAT principle in the decree, the situation will remain the same 
as before. No change to the decrees has been made at the time of writing this 
study. The Bill introducing the new law indicated that the decrees implementing 
. In this context it may be interesting to draw attention to the historical development of the IPPC 
Directive. The Directive is seen as a compromise between northern and southern European 
countries. The northern European countries promoted strict predetermined (=unified) 
standards for new installations, whereas the southern European countries opted for a more 
flexible approach (=differentiated). Davies 2001, 73. 
. Law 21.4.2005/252.
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the LCP and the VOC Directives574 will be changed in the future but there is no 
need to make other changes.575 It is also stressed in the Bill that the change of law 
is not intended to make standards stricter. Hence, the change is considered as a 
mater of formality only, which should not affect permitting practice. However, 
it is doubtful if the national legislation actually fulfils the requirements set in 
Article 3 of the IPPC Directive. In this Article the point of departure is that the 
principle applies to all IPPC installations, not only to those cases regulated by 
LCP and VOC Directives. How the regulation will actually be developed and 
what will be the consequences of these changes remains to be seen, though 
one can note that the national government seems to aim at minimal changes. 
However, due to the fact that the national government is not allowed to influence 
regulatory decisions concerning individual installations, it is uncertain whether 
and to what extent the new position of the BAT principle, after all, will affect the 
permitting practice. From a legal point of view it seems clear that the statements 
in a Governmental Bill cannot change the wording of the law.
Uniform standards bring in an alien element into integrated permitting 
seeking for an optimal, most efficient solution. If all emission standards were 
uniform, there would be no room at all for optimality considerations. In this 
extreme situation the permit authority would not have to do anything but transfer 
the general standards to the individual permits without any consideration 
whether the set of standards imposed in a permit were efficient or whether it 
would result in the best solution for the environment as a whole. Although this 
extreme is not reality in Finland, it shows that the rigidity coming from uniform 
standards may, indeed, hamper the seeking of the optimal solution.
4.4.5. Mechanisms for increased effectiveness and efficiency
The benefits associated with integrated pollution control in comparison to the 
sectoral control mechanism are not realized automatically. They require that the 
intervention theory of the control mechanism (i.e. the causal chain of influence 
by which policy produced outcomes)576 be changed and this change yields new 
outcomes. There are in principle two different ways in which the adoption of 
integrated permitting modifies intervention theories. The reformed regulation 
may enable the regulation of new environmental problems or old problems are 
regulated in a different way. The first type of change can be called an extension 
of controlled matters, whereas the latter is typically labelled cross-media effects. 
A change related to cross-media effects may either be initiated from the top or 
from the bottom. The change is initiated from the top when permit authorities 
on their own initiative impose new kinds of standards and other permit 
. Decrees 1017/2002 and 435/2001.
. Governmental Bill (HE 227/2004) motivation for Section 51.
. The concept of intervention theory was presented in Chapter 1.
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conditions which substantially differ from those stipulated in sectoral permits. 
The change is initiated from the bottom when the regulated companies initiate 
the change. It is possible that the integration of control mechanisms makes it 
possible for the regulated industry to find new opportunities not previously 
possible for a more efficient solution regardless of the intention of the permit 
authority. Next the underlying logic of both mechanisms, namely extension 
of controlled mechanisms and cross-media effects, will be discussed, first on a 
general level, and then evaluated on the basis of the empirical material.
Extension of controlled matters. The logic of the integration of pollution 
control mechanisms may result in the extension of the range of matters 
controlled, though the total number of regulated activities and installations 
may not increase. In other words, the same installations are regulated more 
extensively. This kind of change increases the effectiveness of regulation because 
new environmental problems become regulated. However, the regulation of 
new environmental problems may increase compliance costs in comparison to 
the previous situation. In the sectoral system each instrument has its own area 
of application and they overlap with each other only to a certain extent. While 
control mechanisms are integrated, activities which were previously regulated 
by only a single sectoral instrument come to be controlled by an integrated 
mechanism which regulates a broader range of matters. Hence, the gaps 
between sectoral instruments disappear and matters previously in the shadows 
of different instruments become objectives of the control. From this it follows 
that the integration of the permit mechanism makes it possible to regulate new 
kinds of environmental problems.
The Finnish reform of 2000 followed the logic described above. The 
combined scope of activities in previous sectoral permits of the national law 
does not significantly differ from the scope of activities of the Environmental 
Protection Act. However, previously only few activities or installations were 
regulated by all sectoral laws and typically activities were covered by only 
two or three previous control mechanisms,577 all of which were designed to 
tackle certain environmental issues. It follows from this that the control of the 
activities was limited to those activities which at some historical point in time 
were considered relevant for the purpose of each control mechanism. The logic 
of integration resulted in a situation where all releases of all regulated activities 
can be regulated without limitation stemming from the nature of regulatory 
instrument concerned. Hence, after the reform it becomes possible that an 
activity which was previously regulated only by water pollution standards, 
is nowadays regulated by air pollution and/or waste management standards 
. Annex 1 in the explanatory memorandum of the Environmental Protection Decree includes a 
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as well. An example of this development is municipal waste water treatment 
plants. Previously these plants were controlled under the Water Act and only 
releases into water were regulated. Nowadays the treatment of sludge and 
waste is also regulated in order to minimize the odour and other detrimental 
environmental effects. 
The likelihood that the integrated control under the Environmental 
Protection Act extends the types of standards and other permit conditions 
in comparison to previous mechanisms in real terms varies from an activity 
to another. An integrated permit decision concerning activities which were 
previously regulated by all sectoral laws namely the Public Health Act, the Air 
Pollution Control Act, the Water Act, the Waste Act, the Noise Abatement Act 
and the Neighbourhood Relations Act, are less likely to include new kinds of 
provisions due to the integration of permits. These activities and installations 
are typically fairly large.578 Instead, integrated permits concerning small, non-
industrial activities are more likely to include new kinds of standards, because 
they were rather seldom regulated by all previous mechanisms.
The needs to regulate new environmental problems were not visibly 
invoked as an argument in the legislative material for the reform. The material 
lacks examples of environmental problems in need of new regulation and there 
is no indication that the regulation of new environmental problems was an 
essential matter in the preparation of the reform. As one legal draftsman of 
the Bill wrote “The goal of the reform was not primarily to create totally new 
permit conditions unknown to previous practice”.579 Despite this it is worth 
noting that there are some references to the extension of controlled matters 
in the legislative text. It was pointed out in the Bill that the different goals and 
the scopes of application of the sectoral laws result in limitations to set permit 
conditions.580 Despite this, it seems that the extension of controlled matters is 
more a result of the logic of the reform than an expressly stated goal of it. With 
regard to the IPPC Directive, the situation is different in the sense that the IPPC 
Directive aimed specifically to improve the regulation of soil contamination.581 
In the national context soil contamination had already been regulated.
Cross-media effects. Cross-media effects are at the heart of integrated 
pollution control. Comprehensive decision-making makes it possible to 
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compare the environmental impacts of different options and choose a set of 
environmental standards, which ensures the achievement of an optimal outcome 
for the environment as a whole at a given level of resources used. There may 
be different options available, which require a choice to be made between the 
amounts of releases of pollutants in the same environmental media or of the 
same pollutant to different environmental media. For example, the availability 
of different air pollution control technologies may require a choice to be made 
whether air pollution should be reduced by increasing water/soil pollution.582 In 
addition to emissions, the impacts on the use of resources such as energy, water 
and raw material, should be taken into account, even if they have no immediate 
environmental effects in the site concerned. It is assumed that a holistic approach 
will bring about efficiency gains and efficiency gains make it possible to raise 
environmental standards more than would be possible in a sectoral system.
As mentioned above, both permit authorities and the regulated industry 
may induce changes related to cross-media effects. The environmental permit 
authorities may impose new standards and other permit conditions and the 
regulated industry may exploit the new opportunities provided by the structural 
change of regulation. In both cases it is assumed that integrated technologies 
are more efficient than sectoral ones. Although this assumption is common, 
the assumptions behind their intervention theories otherwise differ. The 
former requires that the permit authority have the necessary information on 
technological alternatives and costs associated with these alternatives so that 
it could impose other standards than in the sectoral system not exceeding 
reasonable costs. This does not necessarily mean totally new information. The 
permit authorities may have been aware of technological alternatives even 
before the integration of control mechanisms, but the rigidities of the sectoral 
system have prevented them from making full use of this information.
A change induced by regulated industry may take place, even if permit 
authorities do not have information on (new) technological alternatives and the 
costs associated with them. The regulated industry may adopt new technologies 
regardless of the sectoral basis of standards or the authorities may acquire the 
information in interaction with the applicant (though it is also possible that 
companies behave strategically and control information flow). A change induced 
from the bottom can occur only so far as the regulated industry has motivation 
for a change and the change can be associated with the regulatory shift only if the 
motivation relates to the integration of permits. With this regard one can note that 
an operator has an economic incentive under any pollution control mechanism 
whatsoever to find the most efficient technologies to meet the environmental 
requirements they are obliged to fulfil.583 Integrated environmental technologies 
. European Commission, BREF on economics and cross-media effects 2006, 7.
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are assumed to be cheaper and possibly cost-saving serve as an incentive to adopt 
such technologies which rigidities of sectoral regulation would have prevented. 
Partly the difference between integrated and sectoral control mechanisms comes 
from timing: when all standards and other permit conditions are set at the same 
time, the operator should not expect any additional requirements from another 
decision-making process before the next permitting cycle. This makes it easier 
for an operator to look for an efficient solution from her own perspective, which 
best fulfils all requirements. Because defining the best available technology used 
is prohibited in law,584 the operator typically has a large degree of discretion 
regarding what kind of technologies she uses.
Furthermore, the regulated industry as well as suppliers of technologies 
may also have a motivation to develop and the regulated industries to adopt new 
integrated technologies, which it assumes will become best available technology 
in the future. The regulatory change from sectoral to integrated system 
means that rigidities of sectoral regulation do not prevent the development 
of integrated technologies. In this respect the predictability of regulation is 
high and predictability is considered a key feature of regulation with regard to 
innovations.585
If these assumptions hold, one could conclude that the stimulus caused 
by regulation is not dependent on the information available prior to the 
commencement of the permit procedure. This, however, requires that there is 
flexibility in decision-making and the exact formulation of standards is decided 
in the negotiation process preceding the permit decision. If standards are fixed 
in advance, the integration of permits loses some of its weight, because then the 
difference between integrated and sectoral permits partly disappears.
The obligation of permit authorities to seek an optimal solution is expressly 
based on both European and national law. The purpose of the IPPC Directive is 
to achieve integrated prevention and control of pollution in order to achieve a 
high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole (Article 1). In the 
Environmental Protection Act (Section 43.3) the list of factors to be taken into 
account in the design of permit conditions, includes “the impact of the activity 
on the environment as a whole” and “the significance of measures intended to 
prevent pollution of the environment as a whole”.586 In addition, the new setting 
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of decision-making has implications for how the law should be interpreted 
regardless of changes in its wording. In particular, the role of the BAT principle 
is changed, because what is the best for one sector is not necessarily the 
best for the environment as a whole. Furthermore, the interpretation of the 
proportionality principle, which links environmental benefits and the use of 
private resources, may also change after the integration of control mechanisms. 
An investment which would have been disproportionate in the context of 
sectoral pollution control may become proportionate if benefits to other media 
are also taken into account. In sum, integration of control mechanism has 
fundamentally changed the discretionary powers of permit authorities.587
Seeking an optimal solution where all cross-media effects are considered, 
means that the structure and the strictness of standards are not designed in 
isolation from other standards. In an optimal solution priority should be given 
to the set of standards and permit conditions which reduced the overall pollution 
most compared to alternative sets. So far as a modification of a single standard or 
other permit conditions can increase the overall benefits, it should be modified. 
The design of different standards together requires that the links between them 
are identified. The links may be technical or economic in nature. The cross-media 
effects referred to above concerning the relationship between air and water/
soil protection can be considered technical, because the environmental effects 
depend on alternative technologies and one of them must be chosen. Links are 
economic when the use of (private) resources, not the technological options 
available, is the crucial factor affecting the design. Restrictions in economic 
resources may exclude the possibility that all needed environmental investments 
are made at the same time, and hence a choice must be made on the order they 
will be done. In other words, prioritising means by definition that at least one 
permit condition is less strict than it could be, would there not be technical 
or economic constraints. If each environmental issue is treated in isolation, it 
makes the decision-maker vulnerable to a so-called “kitchen sink” approach, 
which means that the likely consequences of each environmental problem 
for humankind are seen as very significant and deserving almost any level of 
resource input.588 Naturally, an optimal solution does not necessarily require 
that any single standard of integrated control should be looser in comparison 
to sectoral control mechanisms. If integrated pollution control techniques are 
really more efficient, as assumed, this may open up a win-win situation where 
both the environment as well as the regulated industries benefit.
The argument that integrated environmental technologies are more 
efficient was used expressly in the preparatory work of the IPPC Directive. In 
the explanatory memorandum is written that integrated approach “is likely 
. Kumpula 2001, 1235. 
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to be less costly to an industrialist than requiring him to add on technologies 
or measures to deal with releases to each environmental medium separately 
as a new law or programme is implemented protecting each separate part of 
the environment”.589 Furthermore it is claimed that “the control of releases 
to all media from an installation is often, according to OECD, significantly 
less expensive than the introduction of separate technologies for sequential 
releases to each medium. Such control also increases efficiency in the use of 
materials, water and energy.” 590 This efficiency argument is used more visibly 
in the preparatory works of IPPC Directive than those of the Environmental 
Protection Act and the economic reasoning is generally more clearly present 
in the explanatory memorandum than the corresponding national document, 
namely the Bill. However, in the preparatory work of the Act, the goal of seeking 
more cost-effective measures is also established, although it is not clearly stated 
whether this goal is to be achieved through the improved possibilities of the 
permit authorities to design permit conditions or due to some other reason.
4.4.6. Evaluation
Material and methods. The mechanisms which may increase the effectiveness 
of integrated pollution control in comparison to sectoral ones, were identified 
above. Next, I will turn to the evaluation of these mechanisms. Hence, the aim 
is to identify, whether there is any evidence proving that the assumed benefits of 
the mechanisms have been realized, or, on the contrary, have not. Furthermore, 
to balance the overall picture, the rigidities of regulation discussed above, will 
also be tackled.
The evaluation is based on the material gathered for an evaluation project 
on the implementation of the Environmental Protection Act during its first 2 
years (March 2000—March 2002) and results based on this evaluation project.591 
In addition new material was gathered during the summer of 2004 in order to 
expand the time frame of the evaluation. The empirical material gathered for 
the evaluation consists of interviews, permit-analysis and a questionnaire. 
Representatives of the operators (7), organisations (4) and the administration 
(14, of whom 8 were from the local administration) were interviewed. In 
summer 2004, a survey was sent to all 16 regional permit authorities; 8 of 
them responded. The survey aimed to ascertain the opinions of the permit 
authorities, not of individuals. Furthermore, permit analysis related to the 
extension of control matters were carried out in 2004.
The evaluation of the impacts of regulation is demanding for several 
. IPPC Explanatory memorandum, 3.
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reasons. Environmental problems are often complex with long time frames, 
concern geographically remote areas, and consequences and causes are 
unequally distributed.592 Another key problem is related to the so-called 
impact problem. Sverdrup has pointed out that when the long-term effects 
of laws and regulations are studied the impact problem, which arises from 
the fact that observed outcomes may be caused by simultaneous events other 
than the laws and regulation evaluated, become serious.593 With regard to a 
recently introduced policy instrument, the problem, in addition, is availability 
of information.594 Evaluation methodology may alleviate the problems related 
to information availability, though it cannot totally solve the problem. A key 
concept in this regard is intervention theories, i.e. the ways how regulation is 
assumed to produce outcomes. The intervention theories for the integrated 
pollution regulation were constructed above. The verification of intervention 
theories can be done partly by examining permit decisions. This applies both 
to the extension of controlled matters and cross-media effects induced by 
permit authorities. With regard to change induced by the regulated industry, 
the making of empirical observations is more demanding, because permit 
decisions are an insufficient source of information. However, interviews make 
it possible to draw some conclusions on this.
Evaluation of the extension of matters controlled. The change in the 
law of 2000 has made it possible to regulate such environmental issues which 
could not previously be regulated. As noted above, the extension of matters 
controlled is to a large extent a consequence of the logic of the reform rather 
than a purpose of it. However, although with regard to some issues like energy 
efficiency, the reform intended to expand the range of controlled matters. Next 
I explore if the integration of permits has brought in new kinds of standards 
and other permit conditions.
To make an extensive evaluation of the development of permit conditions 
would require that all permits be scrutinized. This is not possible due to the 
huge number of permits granted. Neither is it possible to limit the evaluation to 
the permits under legal review because reviewed permits are not representative 
with regard to the general development of permit practice. However, it can be 
assumed that the designers of the permits, i.e. environmental officers recording 
permit decisions, would know best to what extent the permits granted after the 
reform differs from the previous permits.
As a result of the interviews it was concluded that the extension of 
matters controlled during the first 2 years of the implementation of the new 
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regime, has in particular concerned non-industrial activities. Examples of 
such activities mentioned included the following: livestock shelters, fur farms, 
crushing plants, outdoor shooting ranges, peat production and fish farms, 
and examples of new kinds of permit conditions mentioned included the 
following: disposal of manure waste from livestock shelters; the disposal of 
fish cleaning waste from fish farms; dust and noise from peat production; and 
regulations for contamination on shooting ranges. The findings above show 
that the reform has qualitatively changed pollution control practice. However, 
to put these observations into context, it must be stressed that a major part of 
the interviewees pointed out that to a large extent standards and other permit 
conditions were as before. With the exception of horizontal changes covering 
a number of activities, namely the increase conditions on noise and odour, 
the interviewees considered that the reform had affected the development of 
permit conditions only to a minor extent.595
On the basis of a survey carried out in summer 2004, it is possible to 
identify further matters controlled due to the legislative development in the 
200¨s. The questionnaire was directed solely to the regional permit authorities. 
The permit authorities were able to identify several, mainly horizontal 
conditions covering different sectors which they considered new in comparison 
to the sectoral systems existing prior to the reform. The examples of the new 
kind of permit conditions given in the responses concerned the following 
issues: energy efficiency, environmental risks, noise, odour, waste management; 
monitoring and exceptional situations.596
One respondent made a reference to a specific activity (waste water pu-
rification) which had been regulated more comprehensively. The respondent 
pointed out that odour emissions from the plants, waste management in the 
plants and treatment of waste water coming into the municipal sewers are 
regulated in the integrated permits, unlike in previous permits. Unlike in the 
interviews in 2002, the extension of matters controlled was acknowledged in 
most of the responses (5/8) to the survey. However, three respondents did not 
consider that the reform had resulted in an extension of matters controlled. In 
addition, one respondent pointed out the difficulty to distinguish the impacts 
of the integration of permits from other changes in regulation.
In addition to the survey which gives general though rough information, 
all the permit decisions of one sector, namely municipal water purification 
plants in 2003, were explored. From the analysis of permit decisions it is possible 
to draw conclusions similar to those of the survey. All permits included new 
kinds of permit conditions not related to waste water treatment regulated in 
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previous permits under the Water Act. In all but one case there were at least two 
new kinds of permit conditions. Most of permits included permit conditions 
on sludge/odour, waste management and noise. Thus, the change of permitting 
practice is clear with regard to this sector.
The findings reported above on the basis of interviews, survey and permit 
analysis show that the reform has led to the qualitative development of permit 
conditions. The change concerning minor, non-industrial activities has been 
more significant than that of major activities. This can be easily been explained 
by the fact that larger activities have previously been regulated by many or 
all sectoral laws, whereas smaller ones by only few of these. Despite this, the 
change has, according to the interviews, been somewhat incremental, meaning 
that most of the standards used before and after the reform have been of a 
similar kind. This does not rule out the possibility of an ever-increasing number 
of incremental changes proving significant in the long run. However, it is still 
too early to draw such a conclusion.
Standards related to cross-media effects. A major argument for the 
integration of pollution control mechanisms has been that it makes it possible 
to take into account the links between different environmental effects. A permit 
authority may formulate different kinds of standards or make a standard either 
stricter or looser to ensure that overall optimality is achieved. Next I explore 
whether permit authorities have imposed standards which aims to regulate old 
problems in a new way and which can be associated with the integration of 
permits.
Permits of IPPC installations in the pulp, paper, metal and chemical 
industries granted during the first two years of the implementation of the 
Environmental Protection Act were studied to identify cross-media effects.597 
The total number of permits granted during this period for these sectors was 
19. However, only four permits included quantitative emission standards both 
for air and water. This indicates that the installations emit pollutants on a 
significant scale only in one environmental medium. During the evaluation the 
researchers did not find references to cross-effects media or other comprehensive 
considerations related to water/air linkages or any other linkages between 
different media on the grounds of the permits. Because inter-linkages between 
environmental problems are an important matter in principle, one could assume 
that a reference to inter-linkages would be included in the statement of reasons 
in a permit decision so far as they affect the design of permit conditions. The 
Administrative Procedure Act, Section 24 (598/1982) and the Environmental 
Protection Decree, Section 19.2 (169/2000) provide for the obligation of permit 
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authorities to state their reasons for the decision. With regard to the permit 
conditions on waste the results were basically the same. No indications of cross-
media effects or other comprehensive considerations related to waste regulation 
were found. Regulation concerned how the waste should be used, treated, 
stored, transported, and accounted for after being produced. No regulation 
on the amount of waste was found. Furthermore, it was found that permits 
contributed only little to energy efficiency issues. Though energy efficiency 
measures were carried in half of IPPC installations studied, this was mainly 
based on energy efficiency agreements with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
not on requirements defined in permits.
These observations were confirmed by another analysis within the 
same research project.598 In this analysis, too, it was found that in the permits 
concerning large installations, no references to the cross-media effects were 
made in the statement of reasons in the permit decisions, although the studied 
permits regulated emissions to different environmental media. The interviews 
carried during the evaluation project essentially confirmed the results of permit 
analysis. The basic message coming from the interviews was that standards and 
other permit conditions included in the integrated permits do not significantly 
differ in substantial terms from those included in the sectoral permits. 
Consequently, interviewees were able to give only few concrete examples in 
which the integration of permits had turned out to be a relevant factor in 
the design of standards. However, in the interviews cross-media effects were 
acknowledged as an important matter on a general level. Some permit officials 
also expressed the opinion that regulating all environmental impacts at the same 
time helps to find a better solution for the environment as a whole in comparison 
to sectoral decision-making.
The examples of cross-media effects evinced by permit officials concerned 
various matters. The first example related to the timetable for environmental 
investments. Two permit officials considered that the integration of permits had 
improved the capacity of the permit authorities to determine which investment 
should have a priority over others. Another informant stressed that the main 
point in integration is just the possibility to give priority to the most needed 
investments. On the other hand, he stated that he had not been involved in 
any case where the transfer of an environmental problem from one medium 
to another had been under consideration. In fact, no indication that giving 
priority to the most important investments had an effect on the final level of 
environmental requirements was found. The problem was when environmental 
measures should be taken, not what kind they should be. Another example 
concerned a balance between different kinds of environmental impacts. 
. Similä 2003, 126–130.
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A representative of an environmental permit authority pointed out that the 
intensity of the use of electricity for waste water treatment has affected to the 
strictness of emission limits on waste water. Emission limits have been made 
looser than it would technically and economically be possible, because stricter 
emission limits would have led to other undesirable environmental effects. He 
also stated that this is the only example he knows. A third example concerned 
sludge originating from waste water treatment. One interviewee reported that in 
the sectoral system the role of the various authorities with respect to the sludge 
was not clear. In the integrated system there is only one authority involved, 
which makes the responsibility clear and helps to avoid constraints arising from 
unclear responsibilities.599
The interviews of the representatives of the regulated industries did not 
change the picture obtained from the environmental officials. Neither did they 
see a great difference between standards before and after the integration of 
permits. A representative of the industry reported that recently an innovation 
which made it possible to reduce both water and air emissions was adopted in a 
plant of the feed industry partly to fulfil the coming waste water requirements, 
but partly also to anticipate air emissions requirements (during this permit cycle 
no air pollution standards were imposed). The representative of the industry 
considered that the solution had saved costs. This example, however, only shows 
that integrated technologies are more efficient than sectoral technologies, but it 
does not show that sectoral regulation prevented the adoption of an efficient 
integrated technologies.600
In the survey addressed to permit officials carried out in summer 2004 the 
cross-media effects were also scrutinized. The officials were asked whether in the 
formulation of environmental standards the linkages between environmental 
media were taken into account so that the standards were different than 
they would otherwise have been. Only two out of eight officials, responded 
positively to this question. However, they did not give any relevant concrete 
example how of the linkages had affected the design of the permits. Three other 
respondents pointed out that integrated permitting had made it possible to set 
time priorities for different environmental measures (investments), although 
they did not indicate that the final environmental requirements differed in 
comparison to sectoral permits. In addition, one respondent stressed the 
importance of coordination: in the reformed system it is clear which authority 
has the responsibility. Hence, the indications that the holistic decision-making 
setting facilitates priority setting gained some support.
The issue whether rigidities originating from the sectoral aspects of 
regulation have limited the seeking of an optimal solution was addressed in 
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the interviews. Generally speaking, the interviewees did not directly claim that 
the regulation had restricted the possibilities for finding optimal solutions. On 
the contrary, they claimed that the sectoral aspects are well justified. In fact, 
some interviewees had not even found cross-media effects at all. Consequently, 
sectoral regulation has not—according to them—hampered the finding of 
optimal solution and environmental problems can be addressed separately. On 
the other hand, some interviewees claimed that regulation had become very 
detailed and this is to a large extent due to European regulation. They claimed 
that the number of detailed legal requirements which must be met regardless 
of their relevance for the solving of environmental problems has increased. 
Furthermore, one interviewee asserted that requirements related to European 
waste regulation had prevented the wise use of waste. Hence, there are some 
indications suggesting that the space of freedom to choose the optimal solution 
has narrowed due to sector specific regulation.
In sum, it can be noted that despite both public authorities and the 
regulated industry generally acknowledged the importance of cross-media 
effects, only few examples of concrete benefits were evinced. Positive attitudes 
towards the integration were expressed, although the option of taking cross-
media effects into account has in practice been realized only rather seldom. In 
particular, the material at hand suggests that the benefit of avoiding a transfer 
of an environmental problem from one medium to another is apparently more 
theoretical than practical. Only one such an example showing that a permit 
condition was made looser than would be technically and economically possible 
in order to avoid other detrimental environmental effects was given (energy 
efficiency and waste water treatment). No other examples were described 
showing that technical inter-linkages between environmental problems had 
affected the formulation of permit conditions.
There were, however, some indications that the new holistic approach has 
enabled new priorities to be set with regard to the temporal order of environ-
mental measures. Some environmental problems were considered more urgent 
than others, and because economic constraints did not allow them all to be 
carried out immediately, some of them were given priority. This would not 
have been possible under the sectoral system, and hence it has improved the 
efficiency of regulation. However, there is no reason to overstress its relevance, 
because, after all, only a minority of the designers of permits acknowledged this 
effect. Another acknowledged benefit is that the coordination for the setting 
of different standards has improved. Better coordination for setting standards 
makes decision-making more transparent, helps to avoid unnecessary rigidities 
and increases the possibilities of the operator to respond to regulation. However, 
the number of environmental officials who mentioned better coordination as a 
benefit, was even smaller than the number of those who referred to the setting 
of time priority for environmental measures.
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Change from below. In the foregoing I outlined an intervention theory of how 
the integration of regulation may induce cross-media effects which are not due to 
intentional policy of permit authorities. This may appear in two different forms. 
Either the regulated industry provides the information required for the setting of 
new standards for the permit authorities, or then the absence of rigidities inherent 
in the sectoral permits enables the industry to adopt new technologies. The issue 
of whether new kinds of standards have been adopted was already discussed.
The change in the behaviour of the regulated industry, which is a result 
of the general structural change of regulation, is difficult to observe. The 
permit decisions as such—contrary to the other cases discussed above—are 
not an adequate source of information, because the initiative comes from the 
regulated industry, not from the permit authorities. Neither can the interviews 
of environmental officials provide a good information basis, because they do 
not necessarily know how those regulated see the changed situation. Hence the 
interviews with the representatives of the industry are the most relevant source 
of information for this analytical task.
In the interviews with the representatives of the industry some, albeit 
rather few, indications of the change were found which were not associated 
with the individual standards set in permit decisions. The change as a whole 
was considered something positive even though only rather few changes in 
actual standards were identified. Some interviewees pointed out that integrated 
permitting has facilitated the preparation of the permit applications and left 
a greater latitude for operators to choose the set of environmental measures 
they consider best compared to the sectoral system. The increased degree of 
freedom apparently makes it possible for the regulated industry to find low-cost 
solutions. This is exactly in line with the intervention theory, but it should not 
be stressed too much because the interviewees were not able to give concrete 
examples of how this opportunity has been used.
It is hard to draw definite conclusions on whether the integration of 
permits resulted in such changes which could not be associated with individual 
standards. Only few traces of this kind of change were found. The interviewees 
did not claim that the integration of permit mechanisms opened up radically 
new opportunities to manage environmental problems or adopt new 
technologies compared to the previous regulatory setting. It can be assumed that 
if the efficiency gains had been significant, the representatives of the industries 
would have noticed them more clearly than they did. Though this means that 
no convincing support for significant change was found, it is important to 
stress that not all impacts of integrated permitting can be attributed directly 
to individual standards. Even the structural change of permitting may, in 
combination with other factors influencing the behaviour of the operators, cause 
positive impacts in terms of efficiency regardless of what kind of information 
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on technological alternatives and costs associated with these the permit officials 
have. The time-scale of such impacts can be assumed to be long.
4.4.7. Concluding remarks on integrated permitting
The integration of pollution permits has been the most important single 
reform of pollution control regulation in Finland in recent decades. There are 
indications that the legislative reform has also changed the ways regulation 
works in practice. According to the survey carried out in 2004, 6 out of 8 permit 
authorities who responded to survey reported changes which they attributed 
to the reform. With regard to permit conditions, either extension of control 
matters or considerations of cross-media effects were reported to have occurred. 
One respondent had not observed any changes and another pointed out that 
although changes had taken place after 2000 it was difficult to attribute them 
solely and directly to the integration of pollution control. The main conclusion 
on the change is that the effectiveness of regulation has increased albeit not in 
radical way. The empirical evidence showing that efficiency of regulation has 
also improved is weaker, though some support was also found for this.
The integration of pollution control has changed the permit conditions 
used to regulate polluting activities. As a result of the integration many non-
industrial facilities, like livestock shelters, fur farms, crushing plants, outdoor 
shooting ranges, peat production plants and fish farms, have become regulated 
by a more comprehensive set of standards and other permit conditions than 
before the reform. It was interesting to find that also permits concerning such 
installations as waste water purification plants, which have been a key object 
of regulation for decades, have changed. In addition, new permit conditions 
with respect to energy efficiency, environmental risks, noise, odour, waste 
management, monitoring and exceptional situations have spread to new 
permits. In other words, environmentally relevant issues previously unregulated 
are now under control. Some of these changes can be explained by individual 
provisions of law,601 though most changes can be attributed to the general 
change. The changes observed are important, even if the change has not been 
radical. The majority of the standards included in permit decisions are still 
much the same. The extension of controlled matters has, after all, brought in a 
minor change taking all activities into account.
Cross-media considerations, which are often considered a key element of 
integrated permits, had a smaller role in the decision-making than expected. 
No references to the cross-media considerations to show that they affected 
the design of permit conditions were found in the statement of reasons in 
permit decisions. In the interviews, too, only few examples of cross-media 
0. This applies, in particular, to energy efficiency and accidents (other than normal situations) due 
to Section 43.3 of EPA. 
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were mentioned. This applies in particular to the technical linkages between 
environmental problems. Most of the examples mentioned concerned priority 
setting, i.e. the temporal order of environmental investments, not the balancing 
of different environmental effects of a polluting activity in the long run. The 
increased flexibility of regulation has therefore mainly been used to overcome 
economic constraints. To the extent this has happened, it has increased the 
efficiency of regulation.
There are many factors explaining incremental change. First, there may 
be fewer cross-media effects in reality than suggested in the legislative material. 
The fact that only few permits of IPPC installations included quantitative 
emission standards for more than one environmental medium can be seen 
as an indication of this. Although the permit authorities would not see the 
technical linkages between impacts on different media, one can assume that 
they at least regulate all significant releases on a sectoral basis. If there is no 
releases on several media, there can not be cross-media effects.
Another factor is that the evolutionary process towards integrated pollution 
control started years before the reform now studied took place. Administrative 
practices have developed towards integrated pollution control even prior to 
2000, which could partly explain why the change after the adoption of integrated 
permitting was not so radical. As early as in 1976 the Supreme Administrative 
Court602 laid down the principle that emissions to air, if they were be carried 
into waters, shall be taken into account in the formulation of water pollution 
standards. The benefits of integrated pollution control were actively discussed 
long before the reform took place and serious policy efforts to establish such 
a mechanism have been made at least since the 1980s. Hence both the permit 
authorities and the operators may have partly adjusted their attitudes to the ideas 
of integrated pollution control earlier to the extent that it was possible under 
previous regimes. In addition, the legislative development also started earlier. 
All but water pollution permits were procedurally incorporated in 1992. This 
reform was incomplete because only the procedure was unified, but substantially 
it meant a compilation of permits. Due to its specific nature the Environmental 
Permit Procedure Act did not open up opportunities to fully bridge gaps 
between permit mechanisms. It nevertheless facilitated the coordination of 
different activities and in this way fostered an integrated approach to pollution 
control. Furthermore, environmental management systems, though they have 
spread only to a minority of companies as discussed in Chapter 3, are based on 
the idea of integrated management and they may also have contributed to the 
development. Operators use environmental management systems as a basis for 
the preparing permit applications, and thus the ideas of integrated management 
0. KHO 1976 A II 91.
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have so been incorporated into the permitting process. In sum, though 1 March 
2000, the date when EPA entered into force, was an important day, it is—after 
all—a part of a process, which started long ago and is still on-going.
Different factors many impede the realization of the optimality inherent in 
integrated pollution control.603 One group of factors is the sectoral elements of 
environmental regulation, which are still strong, perhaps even dominant for the 
setting of standards. In an ideal world the standard-setting of integrated pollution 
prevention aims at an optimal solution, where each permit condition should be 
modified unless the modification cannot increase the overall effectiveness and 
efficiency of the final decision. If some permit conditions are fixed in advance 
so that they must be the same regardless the specific conditions of the case 
concerned, this may, in principle, bring down the overall optimality of a permit 
decision. The formulation of sector-specific uniform technology standards is 
based on sectoral technologies, and does not take into account the full spectrum 
of possibilities. Thus, the rigidity involved in uniform standards hampers 
the achievement of potential efficiency gains related to integrated pollution 
prevention policy by eliminating the flexibility of decision-making. Although 
permit authorities may have greater discretion with regard to one environmental 
medium, partial flexibility may result only in sub-optimal solutions.
Not only the idea of integration, but also the full realization of the 
best available technology principle may suffer from rigidities in regulation. 
Standards, like emission limit values, based on the principle cannot remain the 
same for a long period of time to be effective. This, however, is likely to be the 
case if they are given in the form of a decree. Thus, both the integration principle 
and the best available technology principle require flexibility downwards and 
upwards; to make one permit condition stricter may require letting another 
one be looser. After saying this, it needs to be stressed that the idea of totally 
abandoning sector specific general standards is unrealistic. The mere fact that 
general standards are anchored in European law and many changes would 
require action at European level makes a radical shift difficult. Furthermore, 
there are also some justifications for sectoral uniform standards. They can 
increase the predictability of decision-making, reduce the information costs of 
administration, and reduce the potentiality for regulatory capture as discussed 
in Chapter 2. However, a major part of these advantages would also be achieved, 
if general standards had the character of a minimum requirement.
What are the impacts of integrated pollution control for technological 
development? It must first be noted that integrated permitting—like sectoral 
water pollution regulation discussed above—is a reactive instrument in the 
sense that permit authorities have limited means to force technological change. 
0. See also Mickwitz et al. manuscript 2006c.
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Within the framework of integrated permits, permit conditions must be based 
on technologies which have been demonstrated to function, not better emerging 
technologies.604 Furthermore, a permit authority may not—on the basis of the 
BAT principle—impose a permit condition requiring the operator to make 
changes in the process technology.605 An operator is free to choose whatever 
process technology it deems fit and a permit authority can only regulate the 
environmental impacts of the chosen process technology taking into account 
that the requirements it sets are technologically and economically feasible. 
In addition, although the IPPC Directive and the Environmental Protection 
Act prohibit the use of permit conditions defining the technology to be used, 
this only applies to permit conditions based on the BAT principle. A permit 
authority may, on other legal grounds, impose such a permit condition.606
Despite traditional permit mechanisms are reactive in nature, it does 
not mean that they have no positive impacts on innovation. On the contrary, 
regulation may create opportunities for different market actors (regulated 
industry as well as suppliers) and these opportunities can spur technological 
development. However, there are other regulatory instruments, which can 
affect technological change more directly.607 Furthermore, the legal restrictions 
referred to above in the setting of standards may, after all, be well-grounded 
in the long-run from the technological development point of view. Very 
straightforward technology forcing policy based on specific technologies may 
reduce the rate of technological change, because it is based on the assumption 
that permit authorities have the necessary information to make the right choice. 
Technology forcing policy may, if wrongly designed, prevent the emergence of 
alternative technologies.
The main advantage of the regulatory change from sectoral permits to an 
integrated permit is linked to the elimination of the rigidities of sectoral permit 
mechanisms. However, practically no evidence to show that the structural 
change of regulation spurred new technological solutions was found in the 
empirical evaluation. Taking into account the short time period between the 
reform and the evaluation, this is perhaps not surprising. However, lack of 
evidence of significant positive impacts does not prove that the opposite is 
true. The theoretical argument in favour of positive impacts on technological 
development is still strong.
0. KHO 2 October 1996/3085, explained previously. 
0. KHO 8 November 2005/2867. The case concerns a cold store which uses ammonia. The Supreme 
Administrative Court considered that the BAT principle does not justify an permit condition 
requiring the use of a substitute for ammonia.
0. KHO 8 April 2005/762, KHO 2005:23.
0. A major example of tradable permits. The EU –wide tradable permit for CO2 can make coal 
and oil based energy production technologies so expensive as to result in rapid change to other 
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
An integrated approach means that more technological variables and 
combinations of them are incorporated into the negotiation process in which 
the permit is formulated. This strengthens the position of operators—and 
in particular so-called Big Players608—due to increasing asymmetry of 
information between an operator and the authorities. It is the operator who 
knows specifically how the process technology could be developed so that the 
overall burden of pollution would be decreased. It can be assumed that an able 
operator will use this opportunity to decrease compliance costs by adopting 
efficient innovations. Seen from this perspective the permit authorities should 
let the development take place rather than force it to emerge. This notion, 
however, should be put in the right normative context. Previously, when the 
heuristic model of decision-making consisting of six steps was presented, it 
was noted that at the final step the efficiency considerations had a major role. 
It is at this stage that authorities should ensure that possible rigidities of other 
considerations (steps 1–5) do not prevent efficient solution. Other steps should, 
instead, aim to guarantee the adequate ambition level of the decisions.
It is possible that although all benefits of integrated permitting are not 
visible now, they will emerge later. In particular, this applies to technological 
development as just noted. However, also with regard to the formulation of 
standards, the learning process required for full realization of new opportunities 
may be long and require one extra permit cycle. The slow renewal of permit 
decisions slows down the rate of change. The experience from earlier reforms 
of pollution control suggests that it takes a decade before a new regulatory 
technique is expanded to cover most of the regulated installations. By now all 
large installations (including IPPC installations and installations under air 
pollution reform in 1995) have instituted new permit applications as scheduled 
by the reform, though the granting of permits is still on-going. This wave of 
new permits may bring new changes, in particular through the mechanism of 
extension of matters controlled. With regard to efficiency, the most interesting 
installations are those which are experiencing a technological change due to 
other than environmental reasons, because then the operators have a special 
interest in seeking new, efficient solutions. With regard to the installations 
where no technological changes are on-going the chances of aiming at efficient 
solutions may be more limited.
Integrated pollution control increased the flexibility of decision-making 
and the degree of discretion of permit authorities. This could, in principle, also 
have negative impacts in terms of effectiveness. In Germany, one argument 
against integrated permitting has been the threat that it will lead to a situation 
where the costs of environmental protection have to be taken into consideration 
0. Mehta and Hawkins stress the importance of the size and wealth of an operator with respect to 
its response to regulation, Mehta and Hawkins 1998.
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on a much wider scale than formerly.609 This, it is feared, may reduce the 
effectiveness of environmental regulation, because it could result in looser 
environmental standards in comparison to sectoral regulation. On the basis of 
the Finnish experience, this does not seem to be the case.
In addition to the legal constraints, lack of good practical methods to 
valuate different options complicates the search for an optimal solution. To 
achieve an optimal solution requires that the different options available are 
identified and their consequences estimated and compared. At the moment 
there is no practical method widely in use, although methodologies have been 
explored and efforts to develop them have been made.610 Some scholars have 
even considered the comparison of different environmental effects so demanding 
that doubts have been cast on the very idea of integrated permitting.611 No doubt 
the comparison is difficult, because the causal relationships of environmental 
problems are complicated and valuation of the detrimental environmental 
effects demanding. However, the development of methods to identify and assess 
cross-media effects as well as technologies to deal with these effects will remain 
a key issue in the future. The methodology developed in the BREF document 
on economics and cross-media effects may be useful for the assessment of 
technological alternatives, but it was not planned for the identification of 
technologies. Thus, that methodology may help in the assessment which of the 
options available is BAT, but it does not tell which options should be compared.
Despite the critical thoughts presented above it is important to realize that 
public authorities as well as stake-holders like industry and non-government 
organisations are by and large satisfied with the reform. This becomes clear 
through the interviews. There is no principal criticism against the integration 
of control mechanism or even the way it is done in Finland. This does not mean 
that pollution control is not criticized at all, but that the message of the critics 
does not concern integration, but other aspects of pollution control common 
in all kinds of permits (such as too slow and too bureaucratic processes). This 
contradicts some views presented in other countries, notably in Germany.612
Having said this, one can wonder how is it possible that the results of 
integration in terms of effectiveness are rather small but the consensus on the 
overall usefulness of the reform is so strong. Partly this may be due to the belief 
that the benefits of integrated permitting will be realized in the future. Another 
reason may be that integrated permitting has already brought other benefits, 
which are not directly linked to effectiveness of regulation measured in terms of 
0. Koch and Jankowski 1998, 61. See also the definition of BAT in Article 2 of the IPPC-directive.
0. Vasara et al. 2002. European Commission, BREF on economics and cross-media effects, 2006.
. Zöttl 2000, 284–285. On German problems related to the relationship between integration and 
water law, see Berendes 2002.
. Zöttl 2000.
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the amount of reduction of pollution. Clearly, other benefits can be found. The 
representatives of the industry, each of them being responsible for environmental 
management in the company concerned, were in favour of the reform because:
integrated permitting reduces bureaucratic work in the companies
integrated permitting makes it easier to motivate environmental measures 
within the company
integrated, but installation specific permits, make it easier to re-organize 
the companies (including selling and buying parts of companies)
integrated permitting is easier to relate to the general environmental ma-
nagement system.
The representatives of the administration used similar arguments in 
favour of the reform. They stressed the administrative clarity of the integrated 
system, the abolition of the ambiguities of regulation and the manageability of 
permitting process. These achievements can be seen as positive outcomes in 
their own right. Furthermore, it is possible that increased manageability will 
also increase effectiveness, although it would be difficult to observe. Improving 
the links between the permitting and the environmental management systems 
of the companies can increase the quality of information flows. Improved 
management of the process will make it easier for the permit authorities and the 
operators to identify environmental problems and solutions for them, as well as 
generally enable them to concentrate on the essential issues of environmental 
policy instead of using their time in scrambling through administrative 
peculiarities and obstructions. In short, it is easy to see positive links between 
increased manageability and increased effectiveness. However, there is no such 
relationship between these two phenomena so that increased manageability 
would of necessity improve effectiveness. Another kind of development is 
also possible. Furthermore, the positive outcomes achieved so far may not last 
for ever, though the idea of integrated permits remained the core of pollution 
control. In particular, if the regulatory machinery as a whole becomes more 
and more complicated, as many interviewees envisaged due to the continuing 
regulatory activism of the European Union, this development may consume the 
benefits of integrated permits.
•
•
•
•
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Chapter 5
Past and future
5.1. Path-dependent and incremental development
In recent decades two important ideological turns relevant for environmental 
policy have taken place, the first already several decades ago in the late 1960s. In 
the late 1980s the discussion on sustainable development started, and changed 
many perceptions related to environmental problems, their causes and solutions. 
A major milestone in this development was the publication of the report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. The era starting 
from this ideological turn has been called ecological modernisation. Ecological 
modernisation refers to extensive and profound changes of societal institutions 
and has numerous dimensions. Although legal regulation is only one institution 
among many, it is hard to see that such a profound change of society could occur 
without significant implications for legal regulation. It is not surprising to note 
that ideological turning points have not immediately resulted in the adoption 
of totally new legal regulation. Nevertheless it is possible that the turns have 
changed the direction of the development.
The need for modernisation arises from the deficiencies of traditional 
regulation. Partly deficiencies have been associated with the formulation of 
traditional regulation and partly with implementation problems. Traditional 
regulation is claimed to be inefficient and unable to induce technological 
change. Although it is considered effective in the sense that the defined goals 
are often achieved, this is not always true, because of delays and implementation 
problems. Despite a long tradition of criticism of traditional regulation, a closer 
look at the literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, shows that it is hard to draw 
generally applicable conclusions. Context-related factors, such as the nature of 
the environmental problem in question, exact formulation of an instrument, 
technological options, socio-economic constraints and the legal-administrative 
environment are equally important. Even efficiency criticism, although correct 
in general terms, does not apply to all situations. Traditional regulation also has 
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its own benefits related to effectiveness and public participation. Furthermore, 
though regulation promotes the efficient allocation of resources in relation to 
given goal, it does not necessarily foster technological change at the same time. 
In the long run the ability of regulation to induce technological change can be 
considered even more important than effectiveness, because the immediate 
goals of today can only be estimates of existing options and technological 
change can open up new opportunities.
Recent decades have witnessed rapid legislative change. Tens of environ-
mentally relevant legal acts are adopted annually and the rate of change is 
rather increasing than decreasing. Most of the laws in force prior to 1990 have 
been reformed and only few pieces of environmental law in force are more than 
15 years old. Not all legislative changes are on a major scale, but the number of 
manifestly irrelevant changes should not be over-stressed. European influence 
has been strong in the legislative development since 1993, when Finland started 
to harmonize its laws with the EU laws. About 30% of all environmental laws 
adopted between 1993 and 2003 transpose EU laws. The most Europeanised 
sector of environmental regulation is waste, chemicals and pollution control. 
Although most of national laws do not have a formal link to EU laws, a major 
part of the essential legal structures as well the substantial requirements are 
influenced by EU law.
Regulation has, indeed, been modernized. New instruments have emerged 
to regulate environmental issues in general and pollution control in particular. 
Almost one third of the new legislation concerning pollution (including mobile 
sources) since 1988 was related to economic instruments. Only in the field of 
natural resources was the use of economic instruments relatively speaking at 
the same level. Pollution control legislation related to procedural instruments, 
like environmental management systems and eco-labels, was also adopted. 
Still the change has been gradual and path-dependent. Most legislation 
concerning economic instruments relates to issues such as fuels, electricity, 
agriculture and forestry, which have been regulated by economic instruments 
for a long time. Traditionally these instruments have mainly promoted other 
public goals (revenue raising, sufficient level of agricultural income) than those 
of environmental policy, though the environmental dimension has recently 
strengthened. Hence, legislative change to large extent relates to traditional 
regulation.
The overall effectiveness of the actual alternatives to traditional regulation 
has been limited. Environmental management systems, in particular that based 
on EMAS regulation, have spread only to few large companies. The evidence 
of the effectiveness of liability regimes is weak. Only two sorts environmental 
agreements (one concerning energy efficiency and another purification of 
contaminated land) are systematically used. It is likely that energy taxation has 
reduced the emissions of traditional pollutants (e.g. SO2 and NOx), not only 
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that of CO2 emissions. Nevertheless the design of energy taxation has reduced 
its effectiveness and empirical research has not be able to attribute significant 
impacts to it.
The conclusion of the weak effectiveness of alternatives to traditional 
regulation, can only be drawn with some reservations. Firstly, the notion 
does not necessarily apply to other fields of environmental regulation, such as 
pollution control from mobile sources. Secondly, the need to reduce greenhouse 
gases is changing this picture. Traditional permitting is generally considered an 
inefficient instrument to regulate greenhouse gases and there are no reasons 
to challenge this view. The tradable permit scheme, instead, is not only more 
efficient, but can also be a more effective instrument to achieve the goals of 
climate change policy. Thirdly, traditional pollution control regulation has a 
limited role with respect to energy related issues generally, like the choice of 
fuel for energy production and energy efficiency. The amount of pollution 
from energy production installations depends largely on the type of fuel used 
for energy production and traditional pollution control regulation has little 
impact on this issue, though it regulates the quality of some fuels (sulphur 
content). Instead, energy taxation has affected the choice of fuels and has in this 
way also affected emissions caused by energy production. The main means to 
influence energy efficiency are economic and voluntary. Traditional regulation 
has contributed to this issue to a lesser extent.
Traditional regulation, in particular the permit mechanisms, has 
remained a major instrument for the pollution control of point sources. It 
has been a major tool in combating a number of environmental problems, 
like eutrophication, acid rain, toxic substances, persistent organic pollutants, 
heavy metals, volatile organic compounds and waste. Traditional regulation 
has not been replaced, instead it has been modernized in order to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency. Several significant and numerous small amend-
ments of the legislation have been carried out. The rate of reform has been 
fairly high, in particular during the last two decades. The standards and other 
permit conditions have gradually developed partly through legislative means 
and partly through administrative and legal practice. The role of the Courts 
has been stronger with respect to water pollution than air pollution due to 
the different legal structures. The permit mechanism has been made more 
dynamic by making the altering of standards easier and developing the periodic 
review mechanism. The best available technology principle and other principles 
guiding decision-making have been adopted. Improvements such as joint 
implementation and coordination with other activities have contributed to the 
effectiveness of regulation. The process has been made more transparent and 
the public has better options than before to participate at different stages of the 
decision-making procedure.
The change has been continuous, but incremental and path-dependent. 
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This applies even to the most profound change, namely the introduction of 
integrated permitting in 2000. The adoption of an integrated permit system was 
based on the previous development in terms of administrative as well as legal 
structures. The path-dependence is particularly obvious for the development 
of administrative structures. In terms of personnel the greatest-ever reform 
of environmental regulation was accomplished with minor changes. The new 
administrative structures were built on the previous ones so far as possible and 
the staff of the permit authorities remained to a large extent the same as before 
the reform. As a result, there are two regional permit authorities and these do 
not have any other explanation than history. However, path-dependence is also 
strong with regard to standard-setting. The specific traditions of water and air 
pollution control were aimed to be saved, though it would be contradictory 
to the very ideas of the integration of pollution control and the best available 
technology principle. However, the integration of permits has paved the way for 
new reforms. Recently a step towards more widespread application of the best 
available technology principle in air pollution control was taken, likewise the 
introduction of the process of combining regional permit authorities.
Despite the gradual nature of the development, regulation has caused 
changes. This study shows that former sectoral water pollution control did 
promote technological development. It was shown that the regulation has had 
an observable impact on the diffusion of technology. Partly the impact has been 
coercive; partly non-coercive (i.e. it appears in the form of anticipation). It 
was found that permitting tends to be a more effective instrument to foster the 
diffusion of end-of-pipe technology than of process technology. An impact on 
the diffusion of end-of-pipe technology was discernible, whereas an impact on 
the diffusion of process technology was more difficult to discern. This applies in 
particular to coercive impact. However, through anticipation of standards the 
water pollution regulation affects the development of process technology. The 
approach adopted in administrative and legal practice was reactive in the sense 
that no technology forcing occurred and the permit mechanism did not aim to 
influence basic technological choices.
Two main mechanisms by which integrated permitting may increase the 
effectiveness of environmental permitting were identified. The first mechanism 
takes place through regulation of new environmental problems (extension of 
controlled matters) and the second through the regulation of old problems in a 
new way (cross-media effects). A change related to cross-media effects may be 
induced either from the top or from the bottom. The change is induced from 
the top when permit authorities on their own initiative impose new kinds of 
standards and other permit conditions which differ substantially from those set 
in sectoral permits. The change is induced from the bottom when the regulated 
companies initiate change which rigidities of sectoral permits have previously 
prevented. The motivation of the regulated industries to induce a change 
00
comes from new opportunities to adopt more efficient solutions. Due to the 
asymmetry of information, the change from the top has its limits.
During the study it was possible to show that the integration of permits 
has, indeed, resulted in the regulation of such environmental issues, which 
could not be regulated under the actual sectoral system in use prior to the 
reform. In particular, small-scale facilities like livestock shelters, fur farms, 
crushing plants, outdoor shooting ranges, peat production plants and fish 
farms have become regulated by new kinds of standards. Some indications of 
cross-media considerations were found, although they had a smaller role in 
the decision-making than expected. Most of the examples found concerned 
prioritisation, i.e. the temporal order of environmental investments, not the 
balancing of different environmental effects of a polluting activity in long 
run. It was not possible to find sound evidence that the regulated industry has 
induced any change through the adoption of new, more efficient integrated 
technologies. This may be because such impacts of regulatory change require a 
long time-frame.
Despite these critical notions related to cross-media effects, it is important 
to stress that the permit authorities, the regulated industries and non-
governmental organisations were satisfied with the reform. This was attributed 
to the other resultant benefits of the reform. The process has become more 
manageable both for those regulated and the regulators. In addition, those 
regulated made references to savings in administrative costs.
Incremental and path-dependent change is not necessarily bad. Building 
on traditions helps to avoid unnecessary risks that a new regulation will not 
work, institutional memory lost and long-term capacity weakened. Uncertainty 
related to major changes may create strong resistance and cause ineffectiveness. 
Despite this, gradual development may have impeded the full realization of 
the benefits of the integration of environmental permits. In particular the role 
of the sectoral elements of pollution control regulation should be noted. In an 
ideal world the standard-setting of integrated pollution prevention aims at an 
optimal solution, where each permit condition should be modified unless the 
modification cannot increase the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the final 
decision. If sectoral permit conditions are fixed in advance so that they must be 
the same regardless of the specific conditions of the case concerned, this may 
undermine the overall optimality of a permit decision.
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5.2. Prospects for future regulation
Next some key issues for the future development of environmental pollution 
control regulation will be outlined. The focus lies on the instruments of 
regulation as opposed to its environmental goals, with special reference to the 
integrated permit mechanism. Instead of trying to predict how regulation will 
develop, I aim to outline drivers for change, present possible solutions and 
identify challenges related to these solutions.
In the European context, a key concept for recent discussion on the future 
direction of regulation generally—not only that of environmental regulation—
is ‘better regulation’. It should be recalled that better regulation policy has 
originally aimed not only to promote efficiency (in the sense of allocative 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness) but also effectiveness, transparency and 
public participation. However, it is undeniable that the concept is contested 
and it is not yet clear what will emerge from political struggles related to better 
regulation policy. Still, it is likely that the coming reforms of environmental 
regulation will not aim solely to foster one goal like effectiveness or efficiency, 
but a combination of different goals. The real challenge is to find the right 
combination between these goals.
The discussion on the lightening of regulation can be seen as a part of 
better regulation policy. What does lightening mean for the development of 
environmental permits? Making more efficient use of public resources does 
not, in principle, require a change of legal regulation. The structures of permit 
authorities and administrative practices can be made more efficient even 
though the legal environment of those regulated remains untouched. While the 
merging of the two regional permit authorities (regional environment centre 
and environmental permit authority) looks promising in terms of efficiency, 
the previous budgetary constraints of authorities have already forced them to 
increase the efficiency of administrative practices. Hence, reforms which are 
based merely on more efficient use of personnel have their limits. Reforms of 
legal structures are needed to make the change significant. Such a reform tends 
to concentrate on numerous small and medium sized activities instead of large 
ones. The very idea of lightening is to remove resources from activities causing 
minor environmental harm to activities causing serious harm and hence to 
direct the resources in the right place. From this it follows that lightening 
could increase the overall effectiveness of regulation, though it would not do 
so with regard to specific activities. Small but numerous activities are relatively 
speaking likely to require/consume more resources than a few large ones. 
Hence the potentiality for the reduction of administrative cost is greater. Next 
some examples of how regulation could be made lighter will be discussed.
The repeal of obsolete, both substantial and procedural, legislative 
requirements may make regulation lighter. A reference to obsolete regulation 
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has also been made in the context of EU better regulation policy. Taken literally, 
the notion that lightening of regulation aims not to reduce effectiveness then 
repealing obsolete regulation should not be equated with deregulation. The 
problem is, however, that finding obsolete legislative requirements is not 
necessarily easy. In Chapter 3 it was noted that the rate of legislative change 
has been high. There are only a few pieces of legislation in force which were 
adopted prior to 1990 and the continuous process of change has apparently 
reduced the amount of obsolete legislation. The basic tension with regard to this 
form of lightening is, naturally, the very definition of obsolete regulation, which 
may be contested. What is considered obsolete is a matter of social definition, 
which varies over time. However, asking why regulation may become obsolete 
might pave the way for rational discussion. There are a number of possible 
reasons. The first one relates to changes in the technological and economic 
environment of the regulated activities. The techno-economic environment 
may change so that the activity no longer causes the same environmental 
harm as before. Depending on the nature of the change, even the repeal of 
regulation may be an adequate response to such changes. Another reason for 
obsolescence would be that a requirement has turned out to be ineffective or 
disproportionately expensive in relation to what is achieved. For example, if 
labour intensive production of information does not increase the effectiveness 
of a decision, then there may be no need for it. In this case a new understanding 
of effectiveness and efficiency may serve as a reason to reconsider the need 
for or form of regulation. The most contested reason for the repeal of obsolete 
legislation relates to changing perceptions. The need for regulation may come 
under discussion even if no changes in the material world and knowledge have 
occurred. Repealing obsolete legislation on the basis of changing perceptions 
comes conceptually close to deregulation understood as a reduction of the 
ambition level of environmental protection. However, to what extent this really 
is so is a matter of analysis of the particular case. In the future key tasks related 
to obsolete provisions of legal regulation are the identification of relevant 
changes in the techno-economic environment and the assessment of benefits of 
different requirements.
Another type of lightening would be a change from permits to a lighter 
form of control. Direct regulation, which has legal effects on those regulated 
without a transmitting administrative decision or regulation, which involves 
only registration without any detailed examination from the authorities’ side, 
could produce some efficiency gains. Information gathering, negotiations 
and designing the permit decision take the majority of the time of permit 
authorities and applicants. These activities can be well grounded, if each activity 
is individual in nature. However, this is not necessarily true in all cases and 
changes in the material world may change the situation. The most serious 
problem with regard to this form of lightening arises from public participation. 
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Public participation has been considered one of the main benefits of traditional 
regulation and constitutional law requires that the public authorities endeavour 
to guarantee everyone the opportunity to influence the decisions that concern 
their own living environment. However, it could be possible also to incorporate 
a public participation mechanism into direct regulation. If, for example, direct 
regulation were done by the municipalities, as is already possible, it could be 
possible, either by law or otherwise, to establish an extensive public participation 
mechanism in each municipality. Direct regulation could also be imposed 
temporarily, which would mean that a new public participation procedure 
would open up later. A control mechanism based on registration, instead, could 
include a retrospective participation mechanism. Although finding a good 
solution to meet both efficiency demands and public participation requirements 
is not an easy task, the development of new methods for public participation 
will be a crucial issue for coming reforms.
A third form of lightening is, surprisingly, an increase of regulation 
without other amendments to the existing regulation. Though this may sound 
like a contradiction in terms, complementary regulation in forms of soft law can 
produce some benefits. The information gathering takes time and money for a 
variety of reasons. The regulatory know-how of the new people involved is not 
necessarily perfect, flexible legislation may be open to various interpretations 
or there may be discrepancies and uncertainties in regulation. A new soft law 
instrument, like a BAT document or a guideline, could help to cut these costs. 
This method of lightening has the advantage that it is not politically contested 
in the same way as other methods. However, it entails another problem. At the 
moment it is still a matter of belief whether increased use of soft law would make 
regulation more efficient or not. Environmental management systems have not 
previously spread widely and model decisions are used already now. The benefits 
of both models and guidelines can be limited if the reality is more complex than 
the situation outlined in guidelines and models. Hence, the challenge with regard 
to this method of lightening lies on the technical side: how to produce a soft law 
instrument which really reduces the resources used for information gathering.
A fourth method of lightening relates to a new balance of responsibilities 
between public authorities and private actors. In addition to the decision proper 
as to what standards should be used, there are other regulatory functions, like 
monitoring and enforcement of decisions. Although they all are important 
phases of a regulatory process, one may well ask whether they could be 
privatized.613 This may sound rather radical, but in fact it has in a sense and to 
. In the literature, even private standard-setting is discussed. Driesen 2003, 139–161. Driesen’s idea 
of private standard-setting includes rather traditional information strategies (based on an idea 
that better public information about pollution levels results in increasing level of environmental 
protection), and more a radical idea about an environmental competition statute.
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some extent already occurred. Monitoring is to a rather large extent in the hands 
of the operators in Finland. Privatization of enforcement means, in essence, 
that private actors can take legal action against a polluter when environmental 
standards are violated. Non-governmental organisations have a right to initiate 
legal action against polluters in cases where they consider that law has been 
violated, though this option is not often used so far. Privatization of regulatory 
functions, however, suffers from serious problems. As a matter of principle it is 
not clear to what extent a transfer of regulatory functions should be considered 
acceptable. There is a risk that the privatization of regulatory functions may 
lead to both effectiveness and accountability problems. Hence, it may result 
in deregulation and the uncontrolled use of public power. In a country where 
the public expects the state to take care of these functions, the risk may be 
even greater. Furthermore, it is not clear whether privatization would decrease 
the overall costs, when the use of both the public and private resources is 
considered. On these grounds, this direction does not seem attractive.
Lightening is an important theme for future regulation, but still only 
one among others. Next I draw attention to some other ways to improve the 
integrated pollution control mechanism. First policy mixes are discussed. In 
Chapter 3 it was noted that voluntary approaches have not been very effective 
means of achieving environmental goals. The experience of using environmental 
management systems as a complementary regulatory instrument to traditional 
regulation is not encouraging. Hence, I pay attention to the relationship between 
economic instruments and traditional regulation.
The relationship between tradable permit schemes and traditional permits 
is counter-productive in the sense that they should not be used to regulate 
the same pollutant from the same source, as noted in Chapter 2. However, 
the use of both instruments to regulate different pollutants is not counter-
productive so far as the releases are not technically linked. At the moment 
some EU member states have adopted a scheme for trading traditional air 
pollutants and the possibility of using this kind of trading instrument has 
been discussed at the European level. The discussion relates to the pollutants 
regulated under the National Emission Ceilings Directive (2001/81, NEC) and 
covers major traditional pollutants contributing to environmental problems 
like acidification and eutrophication. Although the relevance of acidification as 
an environmental problem is decreasing, eutrophication continues to be one of 
the key problems for future environmental policies. If all NEC substances were 
included under such a scheme it would rather radically change the relevancy 
of traditional permitting with regard to air pollution. An alternative would 
be to use a tax instrument as a part of the policy mix. In political terms, the 
attractiveness of tax instruments is known to be rather low in the European 
context and hence development depends on national initiatives. In contrast to 
the case of tradable permit schemes, the relationship between taxes/charges and 
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permitting is generally complementary. Hence, there would emerge no need to 
narrow the scope of application of the permit mechanism if charges/taxes are 
rightly appropriately designed.
The integrated pollution control of point sources has advantages which 
are likely to persist. Possible changes related to lightening and/or development 
of policy mix, will not change this. Integrated permitting is a unique instrument 
in the sense that it makes possible the balancing of measures between a number 
of environmental issues. This has positive impacts in terms of administrative 
costs, though what is more important is its implications for compliance costs 
and technological development. The use of integrated pollution control induces 
technological development towards integrated technologies and this should 
increase the efficiency of pollution control in the long run.
For integrated pollution control, a key question is what standards should 
be used. A major principle for standard-setting is and will remain for years 
to come the BAT principle. The principle which forms the basis of individual 
permit conditions promotes technological development, in particular the 
diffusion of innovations. The basic idea is that the standards are set on the 
basis of the performance of forerunners and that this will force the laggards to 
follow. Then, when technologies continue to develop, new laggards would again 
be forced to adopt the technologies of new forerunners. This model does not 
explicitly aim to guide the operators to develop such technologies, which would 
be superior to the (advanced) existing ones. Still the continuous tightening of 
standards can spur innovations, although focusing policy measures this alone 
would not be correct. A permanent problem related to a BAT based approach is 
asymmetry of information. As a response to this problem reference documents 
on best available techniques are produced, but it is unlikely they will provide an 
adequate and up-dated information basis for all situations. There is no simple 
solution to the information problem. At the moment, the problem is not that of 
legal rules, but of practice.
Should preference have been given to uniform or differentiated performance 
standards? This issue is a delicate one, and requires a balance policy. Reflection 
on this matter can be started with the notion that the size of markets matters. 
European-wide markets are more attractive than the market of a small country 
for those who develop technologies. Hence, European-wide standards, all other 
things being equal, tend to induce more innovations than national ones.
However, it is not only the size of market but also the ambition level of 
standards which matters. The ambition level is relevant for effectiveness, but 
also for innovations. There are two reasons why a system of European-wide 
uniform standards tends to result in a lower ambition level of standards in 
comparison to differentiated standards. First, the rate of change would slow 
down. It is unlikely that the European legislator would be able to frequently 
update numerous uniform standards for several pollutants and numerous 
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branches of industry as technology developed. The slow progress in the 
making of BAT reference documents is not encouraging. In addition, it would 
be unrealistic to suppose that the European legislator would be able choose 
only uniform standards with great potential to spur innovations and leave 
others differentiated. Secondly, uniform standards which do not take into 
account individual differences between polluters would promote average, not 
innovative, solutions. A uniform standard for the whole of Europe would 
always be a compromise with numerous interests and it should work in many 
different situations. Thus, decision-makers tend to be even more cautious and 
leave even larger economic safety margins when designing standards for the 
whole of Europe in comparison to standards directed at individual installations. 
Differentiated standards enable public authorities to put more focused pressure 
on the regulated industries.
Furthermore, differentiated standards promote efficiency of pollution 
control. The exact set of standards should not be the same for all installations 
according to the very ideas of integration of pollution control. The technologies 
used in different installations vary and so should the regulatory response. 
Hence, uniform standards fit badly with the idea of efficient pollution control, 
in particular with regard to large scale activities.
Having said this, some balancing remarks require attention. Remarkable 
differences of standards would, indeed, be problematic for innovations. They 
could split the markets into small segments, which might not be attractive 
for those developing technologies. In addition, research has shown that the 
predictability of future standards increases the innovation effect of regulation. In 
order to achieve a sufficient degree of similarity and predictability, coordination 
of the content and tightening rate of standards is required. This could be 
achieved through an exchange of information on permitting practices.
With regard to the form of standards, there is a general consensus that 
emission control should, as far as possible, be based on performance standards 
instead of process standards. Performance standards are better for efficiency 
as well as for innovations. This notion is already incorporated into the IPPC 
Directive and into the Environmental Protection Act, though only with regard 
to standards based on the BAT principle. Process standards based on other 
legal grounds may still be imposed. Although it is not possible to claim that the 
use of process standards is always bad, they should be avoided if possible. A 
preference of for mass-based standards in comparison to rate-based standards 
could have positive impacts in terms of innovations. Mass-based standards 
would induce the regulated industries to innovate when they expand their 
production. Rate-based standards, in turn, allow the expansion of production 
using the same level of environmental performance.
The regulated unit of the integrated permit is an installation. This concept 
is crucial, because (partially) the efficiency criticism against permit mechanisms 
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stems from the size of the regulated unit. An installation is a rather small 
unit and the economic trend of splitting companies into pieces is making the 
units even smaller. Hence, the question is whether the regulated unit could be 
expanded to cover several entities currently treated as separate installations. 
Some mechanisms going in this direction are already included in the existing 
regulation, though they are only intended for use in exceptional cases. The first 
possibility concerns joint implementation. This instrument was designed for 
the purpose of climate change policy. However, the mechanisms could also be 
used for the control of traditional pollutants from two or more national sources. 
In its present form the instrument has not be used widely and the means to 
make it more attractive deserve to be investigated. The second possibility relates 
to simultaneous processing of separate activities. Now as a precondition for 
this it is required that the joint impact of separated activities is significant in 
terms of permit considerations and that they are pending simultaneously with 
the same permit authority. This limits its possible use. Different applications 
are only sporadically pending at the same time. However, in the long run a 
purpose-orientated permit authority could, through coordination of the expiry 
dates, create better opportunities for the use of this instrument. In addition, if 
the operators are willing to co-operate, there would be no obstacle to instituting 
the applications in a coordinated manner. Although these existing possibilities 
deserve to be explored, it needs to be pointed out that in terms of efficiency 
both instruments are of limited relevance. After all, standards are defined 
separately for each installation. Common emission standards would have a 
greater impact.
There are at least two additional, albeit unused, ways to enlarge the 
regulated unit. Instead of granting a permit for an individual installation it could 
be granted for an industrial estate or for a company. In principle, regulating an 
industrial estate and a whole company would make it possible for a larger unit 
to allocate resources to the cheapest source of pollution. However, there are a 
number of problems related, for instance, to information and the determination 
of responsibilities to be solved before these instruments can be taken into use.
Expansion and differentiation have featured in the recent development of 
regulation. In the future, the scope of regulated activities through traditional 
permits may not be enlarged. However, it does not follow from this that the rate 
of change will slow down. Pressures to develop regulation come from different 
quarters. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, making it 
more conducive to innovations and ensuring adequate public participation 
will all require changes. The future regulation may be even more specifically 
directed at certain sectors and issues than the present one. The continuous need 
for the modernization of regulation may mean that the rate of change will even 
accelerate and the differentiation process continue.
0
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